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ABSTRACT
In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), vehicles communicate with other
vehicles or fixed infrastructure, called road-side units (RSUs). One of the
main goals for VANETs is to improve vehicle safety. Work has begun on
defining and implementing VANET safety applications. VANET security
services will be standardized in IEEE 1609.2. Safety application message
broadcasts will include reports of vehicles’ positions, velocities, and accelera-
tions. Vehicles will use these messages as the basis for presenting warnings to
drivers. An insecure, distributed, wireless, easily accessible vehicular safety
system could easily be taken advantage of and actually result in poorer vehic-
ular safety. VANET safety messages need to be secured to mitigate falsified
reports from malicious actors and to detect erroneous reports generated by
malfunctioning vehicles. Concretely, safety messages must be authenticated
to a vehicle, and a malicious or malfunctioning vehicle (i.e., one that creates
falsified or erroneous messages) should have its credentials (i.e., its certificate
or certificates) revoked. In the eyes of government agencies and of automobile
manufacturers, a deployable VANET must not only be built on secure safety
applications but must also protect a user’s privacy. Specifically, consumers
may be averse to the privacy implications of using a vehicle that broadcasts
highly accurate reports of its location.
This work addresses VANET security and privacy in the following ways.
It investigates how specific authentication mechanisms affect network per-
formance. Next, it provides a scheme for the swift access to time-sensitive
security information. This work evaluates what user privacy is obtainable
based on sharing authentication keys. Further, this work evaluates VANET
network-layer and application-layer performance in the broader context of
safety application communication requirements. Additionally, it studies pro-
viding enhanced privacy to VANET users through identity obfuscating radios.
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But remember the LORD your God, for it is he who gives you the
ability to produce wealth, and so confirms his covenant, which he
swore to your forefathers, as it is today. (Deuteronomy 8:18)
To my Lord.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), vehicles communicate with other
vehicles or fixed infrastructure, called road-side units (RSUs). In the United
States, the FCC has assigned the 5.9 GHz band for use in dedicated short
range communications (DSRC) for intelligent transportation systems
(ITS) [1]. IEEE 802.11p will standardize the physical and medium access
control layers for VANETs. Higher layer behavior is also yet being stan-
dardized, but draft standards have been released in the IEEE 1609 set of
standards.
One of the main goals for VANETs is to improve vehicle safety. Vehicle
related crashes in 2006 caused on average more than 116 deaths and 7050
injuries daily in the United States [2] and 117 deaths and 3500 injuries daily
in the European Union [3]. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation estimated that vehicle crashes result in a total economic cost of
$230 billion annually [4]. Consequently, government transportation agencies
are interested in VANET safety applications from a public policy standpoint.
Both government transportation agencies and automobile manufacturers are
interested in VANET safety applications in order to improve vehicle safety.
Work has begun on defining and implementing VANET safety applica-
tions [5]. Initial work has also begun on designing security into VANET
systems. Security services will be standardized in IEEE 1609.2 [6]. Specifi-
cally, safety message broadcasts (or beacons) will be authenticated and tied
to identities or pseudonyms via certificates. Safety messages (sometimes
called safety beacons) will be broadcast periodically and will contain accu-
rate measurements of vehicles’ positions, velocities, and accelerations. An
insecure, distributed, wireless, easily accessible vehicular safety system could
easily be taken advantage of and result in poorer vehicular safety. In order
for a VANET safety system to be deployed by the involved government agen-
cies and automobile manufacturers, such a system must be secured so that it
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does not adversely affect the public and so that poor performance does not
reflect negatively on manufacturers. Vehicles that have been determined to
be malicious or that have malfunctioning equipment need to be identified and
removed to prevent damage to the VANET and to support VANET safety
goals. Additionally, consumers may be averse to the privacy implications of
using a vehicle that broadcasts highly accurate reports of its location.
In my work, I have investigated various authentication mechanisms by
simulating the effect using these mechanisms has on network performance.
Specifically, I have investigated the impact using different authentication
mechanisms has on the latency of safety messages. The results of my evalu-
ation and the methodology I used have been published [7], and I will present
them in Chapter 2.
Authenticating messages allows a vehicle to decide if the messages it re-
ceives are generated by authorized sources. However, this process is not suf-
ficient for deciding if those messages — and therefore, the message sources —
are trustworthy. A public key infrastructure (PKI) is required to attest to the
validity and trustworthiness of signing keys used in authentication. I have
developed mechanisms that provide swift access to time-sensitive security
information in the form of certificate revocation lists (CRLs), the design and
evaluation of which are published [8, 9]. In Chapter 3, I will present the eval-
uation and mechanisms for efficiently organizing and distributing revocation
information in VANETs.
Because vehicles will broadcast very accurate measurements of their loca-
tions, velocities, and accelerations frequently and because these broadcasts
will be cryptographically bound to an identity or pseudonym, both end-users
and vehicle manufacturers are concerned about the potential loss of personal
privacy resulting from VANET use. There is a fundamental trade-off be-
tween privacy and security in VANETs because information must be bound
to identities (authentication) but long-term identities should not be able to be
gathered by any entity. In response to this trade-off, I have mathematically
analyzed the security and privacy implications of different key assignment
methods for VANETs [10], which I will present in Chapter 4.
I continued this work in the direction of evaluating VANET network-layer
and application-layer performance in the broader context of safety appli-
cation communication requirements. I will detail my development of an
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evaluation framework for VANET safety applications and the results of my
evaluation in Chapter 5. I have also published this work [11].
Additionally, I investigated techniques for mitigating the use of RF finger-
printing as a mechanism for privacy compromise, providing enhanced privacy
to VANET users through identity obfuscating radios. Specifically, in response
to Brik et al. [12] indicating that the carrier frequency was the most useful
mode of identifying a wireless transmitter in their work, I proposed mecha-
nisms for shifting a wireless transmitter’s carrier frequency identity. In Chap-
ter 6, I will present the theory motivating my mechanism and my simulation
analysis of my mechanism’s effectiveness in a deployed VANET environment.
Investigating the impact various mechanisms have on communication per-
formance, like my work with authentication mechanisms in Chapter 2, is
important for choosing the mechanisms that will result in better VANET
performance. However, simply being able to conclude that one mechanism
is better than another is insufficient assurance that a deployed VANET will
result in the intended goals being achieved. Some work has been done on
determining the communication requirements of VANET safety applications.
However, these works have been done on a relatively small scale and have
not used real data from vehicle collisions, the prevention of which is one
of the main safety goals for VANETs. My large-scale simulations of acci-
dents based on actual vehicle collisions address both of these deficiencies
in previous work. Providing a concrete way to determine whether using a
mechanism will result in acceptable VANET safety application performance
will allow VANET designers to choose parameters for the mechanism. For
example, silent periods and mix-zones, ways for providing application-layer
anonymity, will be guided by such research.
While much work on such application-layer privacy mechanisms has been
done, mechanisms for providing physical-layer privacy have been largely un-
touched. Consequently, I propose low-cost ways for hiding a radio’s wireless
fingerprint. Physical-layer privacy should be provided in parallel with pri-
vacy at higher layers through using coordinated identity shifts. Any layer
that does not provide privacy to a user is a potential target for a privacy
compromising attacker. To partially evaluate my proposal, I analyze the ef-
fectiveness of carrier frequency switching on an attacker’s ability to identify
vehicles based on carrier frequency.
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CHAPTER 2
SIMULATION OF VANET
AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS IN
REAL-WORLD SCENARIOS
Safety messages (i.e., heartbeats or beacons) are a form of vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communication that contain vehicle state information such as position,
velocity, acceleration, and brake status. These messages can be used to
warn drivers of vehicles that may have otherwise been unseen without these
warnings. The hope is that these warnings will improve automotive safety,
reduce the loss of life in vehicle-related crashes, and save large amounts of
money from reduced healthcare costs.
Previous work has focused on simulating VANET environments using traf-
fic theory or traffic generation tools based on traffic theory. These simula-
tions have been used to analyze network behavior and are based on pa-
rameters such as node degree, vehicle speed, and vehicle density (e.g., ve-
hicles/lane/km) [13]. In this chapter, I present simulations based on real
vehicle movements [14].
In order to simulate the real vehicle movements I obtained, I built a custom
DSRC simulator. To verify results obtained from this simulator, I cross-
validated results from my simulator with results from NS-2 using NS-2’s
DSRC extensions [15].
Additionally, I analyze the end-to-end performance of broadcast safety
messages. I simulated the network performance of safety messages using
ECDSA signatures, as specified in the draft IEEE 1609.2 standard [6]. I also
simulated safety message performance while using TESLA-based authenti-
cation [16]. Finally, I simulated the use of different processors for verifying
signatures, showing the latency of messages for various hardware. Investi-
gating channel congestion caused by safety messages is important because
the results show how much of the channel is required for safety messages,
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being the most important source of packets in VANETs, and how much of
the channel remains for other ad hoc services.1
2.1 Related Work
Yin et al. [18] review DSRC and safety applications in VANET. The authors
briefly review the PHY layer of the DSRC environment, present applications
for safety broadcasts, and argue that safety messages are the priority mes-
sages for VANETs since the primary goal of deploying VANETs is to save
lives. The authors also provide results from a detailed PHY-level network
simulation of safety broadcast messages using the Qualnet network simulator,
showing the message reception percentage for varying frequencies of safety
message broadcasts and the latency associated with those frequencies. The
simulations were based on traffic traces generated by CORSIM on a map of
city streets and used 100 vehicles in an area of 6,600 x 4,200 meters. The au-
thors used a transmission power of 17 dBm, which resulted in a transmission
range of approximately 300 meters.
Robinson et al. [5] present a framework for using and generating safety
broadcast messages. The authors design an architecture for on-board units
(OBUs) and implement their architecture in two vehicles. They also give var-
ious uses for safety broadcast messages, such as traffic signal violations warn-
ings, curve speed warnings, emergency braking warnings, pre-crash warnings,
and lane change warnings. The frequencies required for these applications
range from 1 to 50 Hz. The transmission distance required for these appli-
cations ranges from 50 to 300 meters.
Hu and Laberteaux [16] consider various design issues for safety messages.
The authors compare ECDSA-based authentication to broadcast authenti-
cation using TESLA. The authors provide a brief review of TESLA. They
argue that a VANET could reduce network congestion by using TESLA be-
cause of TESLA’s reduced packet size and reduce the computational overhead
of signature verification since TESLA uses cryptographic hash functions to
generate signatures.
1Knowing these results will let designers specify the channel switching duty cycle for
IEEE 1609.4 [17].
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Studer et al. [19] proposed using a modified version of TESLA called
TESLA++ with ECDSA signatures, together called VAST. This hybrid use
of signatures provides resilience to DoS attacks on both memory and pro-
cessor usage, and provides non-repudiation. Using either TESLA or ECDSA
alone does not provide all of these properties. The authors simulated TESLA,
ECDSA, and VAST authentication using NS2 on a 1 km long highway, vary-
ing the number of vehicles within radio range between 1 and 75 vehicles,
using a radio range of 300 m. Their simulation of TESLA and VAST sends
the two required pieces of information (heartbeat and key for TESLA, and
MAC and heartbeat with key for VAST) in a single packet, attaching the key
for TESLA or the message and key for VAST to the next packet which con-
tains the safety message for TESLA or the MAC for VAST, thus reducing the
number of packets sent and correspondingly network congestion. Thus, there
is only a single packet sent for each safety message. The authors’ simulations
use a traffic density of approximately 15.6 vehicles/km/lane in a highway
environment, which is of much lower density than the real recordings I will
use and discuss below.
2.2 Cross-Validation
2.2.1 Motivation
The NGSIM project [14], supported by the United States Federal High-
way Administration, has recorded vehicle movements on various roadways
in the United States. These roadways include I-80 in Emeryville, Califor-
nia, Lankershim Boulevard and US-101 in Universal City, California, and
Peachtree Street in Atlanta, Georgia. Lankershim and Peachtree are major
arterial roads, and I-80 and US-101 are major multi-lane highways. These
data sets record the movements of thousands of vehicles. For my comparisons
below, I chose the I-80 and Lankershim traces, since I-80 held the densest
(most congested) traffic and Lankershim was an arterial roadway, not a major
highway. I chose to use the Lankershim data over the Peachtree data because
the Peachtree data was released after I had already completed a significant
number of simulations using the Lankershim data. NGSIM obtained vehicle
movements from transcribing video of the simulation area at a rate of 10
6
frames per second, i.e., vehicle positions are updated every 0.1 seconds. For
each roadway, two or three traces were recorded, each being approximately
15 minutes long.
The I-80 data was gathered over a section of the interstate that is mostly
straight and includes an on-ramp. There are three sets of data available
from NGSIM for I-80: 4:00-4:15 pm, 5:00-5:15 pm, and 5:15-5:30 pm. These
times are during rush hour. I chose to perform my cross validation using the
4:00-4:15 pm (I-80 4:00 pm) data.
Traces obtained from the NGSIM project contain up to 2,169 vehicles and
last for approximately 15 minutes of simulated time. The I-80 and US-101
traces, as obtained from the project, consisted of only a single direction of
traffic. Simulating these traces directly would not have given realistic worst-
case results. Thus, I geometrically reflected the traffic and shifted it such that
the reflected traffic moves in the opposite direction and is in the place the
traffic from the opposite direction would be. This resulted in a doubling of
the number of simulated vehicles (up to 4,338). I will describe the real vehicle
movement traces I used in other simulations in greater detail in Section 2.4.1
below.
Advantages Over NS-2
I built extensions to NS-2 to simulate safety messages and estimated that
the real-world duration of simulating traces of this size would be at least
100 days given current computer hardware. Thus, I built a custom packet-
based, event-driven simulator, which can simulate this amount of traffic data
approximately 600 times faster, that is, in a matter of a few hours. My
simulator is custom built for VANET simulations and thus is a specialized
tool. Being a specialized tool, my simulator does not include all of the other
overhead of the supporting code for other applications. For example, the
NS-2 VANET extensions [15] contain a more complete version of the 802.11p
MAC, while my simulator currently supports only broadcast. Additionally, I
have profiled the simulator code to optimize it for speed. Specifically, I have
noted that the in-order handling of simulation events is a major consumer of
CPU time. As a result, I chose to use a heap scheduler rather than a linked
list for the global event queue and have attempted to reduce the number of
events generated.
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2.2.2 Validation Methodology
In order to enable me to use my custom simulator to study large-scale
VANETs, I validated results from my simulator with those obtained from
NS-2 [15]. In each simulator, I built extensions for broadcasting safety mes-
sages from each vehicle every 0.1 seconds. These safety messages were signed
using ECDSA signatures, as specified by the IEEE 1609.2 draft standard.
I used the deterministic two-ray ground channel fading model for all com-
parisons in this section. All safety messages were 142 bytes long, including
MAC and PHY layer headers.
For my cross comparisons, I used the first 50 vehicles that enter the I-80
4:00 pm simulation area as my test data set. I compared the number of
packets for each vehicle-destination-pair between NS-2 and my simulator. A
vehicle-destination-pair consists of two different vehicles in the simulation,
e.g., the i-th vehicle and the j-th vehicle to enter the simulation area. I
consider each direction of message transmission separately, that is, messages
broadcast from the i-th vehicle and received by the j-th vehicle, and messages
broadcast from the j-th vehicle and received by the i-th vehicle are considered
separately.
I chose to cross-compare successful application layer packets because I will
use a measure of these packets in one of my performance analyses for my
simulations presented below. Since one of my goals is to determine how a
VANET might perform in a real deployment scenario, the number of success-
ful application layer safety messages is what will determine the utility of the
VANET in vehicle safety applications.
I performed 10 simulations of the same test data set (the first 50 vehicles to
enter the I-80 4:00 pm data set) both in NS-2 and in our simulator. For each
vehicle-direction-pair, I computed the average number of messages received
at the application layer. I also computed the 95% confidence intervals for
each vehicle-direction pair average over those 10 simulations.
2.2.3 Validation Results
A subset of 10 vehicles of the resulting comparison is shown in Figure 2.1. I
omit the full 50-vehicle comparison because the resulting plot is unreadable in
this format. The distribution of vehicle-destination-pairs is bimodal because
8
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Figure 2.1: A 10-vehicle subset of my cross-comparison validation results.
the traffic during this time-period is formed into two groups. Each group
enters the simulation area at opposite ends of the roadway, one from the top
the other from the bottom. The section of I-80 that is recorded in this data set
is approximately 503 meters long. Thus two vehicles entering the simulation
area from opposite ends of the roadway will have a much lower chance of
successfully receiving a packet than vehicles entering the roadway from the
same end of the roadway. The pairs that enter at the same end lie in the
higher success mode, and the pairs that enter at opposite ends lie in the lower
success mode. The pairs that have no successful receptions are same-vehicle
pairs; that is, vehicles never receive packets from themselves since they are
transmitting when they would need to be receiving from themselves.
This graph shows that almost every vehicle-direction-pair is within error
bars across simulators. Thus, any simulation that would be performed using
NS-2 can be performed on my simulator with the same confidence in the
results.
I also computed the mean of the absolute value of the percent difference
and mean percent difference in packets successfully received at the applica-
tion layer across simulators for all vehicle-direction pairs. The result of this
calculation was a 3.53% mean absolute percent difference and -1.52% mean
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percent difference between simulators. The latter number indicates that re-
sults from my simulator show 1.52% more packets being received at the
application layer on average. Thus, even if the statistical similarity demon-
strated by the error bars is questioned, my results should on average only
need to be adjusted by subtracting 1.52% from my application layer success
rate.
2.3 Safety Message Performance Analysis
In this section, I investigate the performance trade-offs between using ECDSA
signatures as proposed in the IEEE 1609.2 draft standard [6] and using
TESLA signatures, as proposed by Hu and Laberteaux [16]. I perform an
analysis comparing ECDSA and TESLA authentication to determine which
scheme results in less network congestion, investigate application layer recep-
tion rate, and compare the computational overhead of verifying signatures.
IEEE 1609.2 [6] specifies using ECDSA signatures over cryptographic hashes
using either SHA-224 or SHA-256. The curves used for ECDSA are specified
as either nistp224 or nistp256, which result in signatures 56 or 64 bytes long,
respectively (two numbers are required to make a signature). In my simu-
lations, I chose to use nistp224 and SHA-224, resulting in the fastest and
smallest signatures.
TESLA [20] uses time as the mechanism for creating asymmetric knowl-
edge, relying on predictable releases of keys for security. Since accurate
timing is required by TESLA, vehicles using TESLA signatures will require
a clock source for synchronizing their local clocks. This clock source is con-
veniently already available in the GPS hardware that vehicles will make use
of for determining their positions. TESLA signatures are message authenti-
cation codes, which are generated using cryptographic hash functions (e.g.,
SHA-1). Using hash functions to generate signatures results in orders of
magnitude shorter verification times as compared with using ECDSA to gen-
erate signatures. Additionally, using hash functions for signatures instead of
ECDSA signatures significantly reduces the packet overhead due to signature
size. For the TESLA simulations, I used 10-byte long signature fields and
HMAC-SHA-1 for generating signatures [16]. Further details of TESLA can
be found in earlier work [16, 20].
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2.4 Authentication Mechanism Simulation
Methodology
In addition to ECDSA-based authentication, as specified in the IEEE 1609.2
draft standard, I implemented TESLA-based authentication in my simulator.
When a TESLA key was used to create a signature, the key was either
released in a separate packet after the safety message broadcast or attached to
the following broadcast. This latter behavior was implemented to reduce the
network load induced by separate key packets, and I will refer to this behavior
as “TESLA attached” below. Including all header overhead (e.g., PHY-layer
and MAC-layer headers), safety messages with TESLA authenticators were
82 bytes long and with the attached keys scheme were 92 bytes long. Key
packets, when keys were not attached to position packets, were 43 bytes long.
Each vehicle broadcasts its safety message every 0.1 seconds.
Attaching keys to safety message broadcasts reduces the load on the net-
work by reducing the number of packets broadcast. However, delaying keys
until the following safety message packet results in increased latency for ver-
ification because vehicles cannot verify a signature until they receive the key
in the following safety message broadcast from the sending vehicle, which is
sent approximately 0.1 seconds later. I did not simulate certificates being dis-
tributed because certificate distribution is a separate issue. Because TESLA
uses a hash chain to generate its keys, I allowed vehicles to use any following
key to verify authenticators; thus a packet’s signature can be verified not only
by the intended next key but also by keys released later. Allowing vehicles
to use these latter keys results in many more additional verifications being
possible, as my simulations will show below.
2.4.1 Real Vehicle Movements
I chose to use the I-80 5:00pm and Lankershim 8:45am data sets for my
comparisons of security protocols. Here I describe the real vehicle traces I
used in greater detail.
The I-80 data was gathered from a section of that interstate that is ap-
proximately 503 meters long. This section of roadway contains 6–7 lanes of
traffic and an on-ramp. Of the three data sets for I-80, I chose the 5:00pm
data set because it contains the most dense traffic, having 1,836 vehicles. As
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described above, this data was from a single direction of traffic only, and I
reflected and offset the traffic, adding this to the original traffic to produce
traffic that mimicked bidirectional traffic on a highway. The result was a
trace consisting of 3,672 vehicles. Not all of these vehicles are in the simu-
lation area concurrently. The simulation time is approximately 15 minutes.
The average density of this trace is 52.1 vehicles/km/lane. The average speed
of vehicles in this recording is 20.3 km/h. The left-most lanes in each direc-
tion are high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, and the traffic therein moves
considerably faster than traffic in the other lanes.
The Lankershim Boulevard data sets were gathered from a section of the
road that was approximately 488 meters long. There are 3-4 lanes in each
direction in this area. The recorded area contains 4 intersections controlled
by traffic signals. Traffic was recorded for both directions along Lankershim
and also for a small section of the cross traffic at the intersections. I chose
to simulate the 8:45 am traffic on this roadway, because it is the denser
of the two Lankershim traces. This trace contains 1,231 vehicles. Again,
not all of these vehicles are in the simulation area concurrently. This trace
lasts approximately 15 minutes of simulated time. The average density of
this trace is 28.7 vehicles/km/lane, and the average speed of vehicles is 18.1
km/h.
2.4.2 Network Reception
Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) show the fraction of packets received from the net-
work layer versus distance for the I-80 and Lankershim data sets, respectively.
The highway simulations, I-80, result in significantly worse performance due
to the higher density of traffic.
Figure 2.2 shows that using TESLA always results in a lower fraction
of network-layer receptions for any distance as compared to using ECDSA.
TESLA performs worse than ECDSA because the overhead of sending two
packets for the non-attached keys simulations increases congestion. For
TESLA with keys attached to the following broadcast (“TESLA attached”),
the fraction of packets received from the network layer is higher because
of the smaller packet size as compared to ECDSA due to signatures being
smaller and because there is no separate packet released for keys as with the
12
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Figure 2.2: Network layer reception performance of ECDSA-based and
TESLA-based authentication.
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“TESLA” series. In conclusion, TESLA does not result in reduced channel
congestion compared to ECDSA, unless keys are attached to their following
broadcast packets.
2.4.3 MAC Layer Delay
Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) show the CCDF of the MAC layer delay for our
I-80 and Lankershim simulations, respectively. Thus, the graph shows the
fraction of packets (y-axis) that have a given latency or longer (x-axis).
These plots show TESLA with separate key release packets resulting in
noticeably worse performance in terms of MAC layer delay. In the I-80
simulations, using TESLA with separate key release packets results in 1%
of packets being delayed at the MAC layer longer than 16.9 ms, whereas
1% of packets in ECDSA are delayed longer than 5.2 ms. TESLA with
attached keys has lower latency than ECDSA because of the smaller packet
size. These graphs and the network reception graphs in Figure 2.2 indicate
that additional traffic, e.g., traffic besides heartbeats, will have a significant
detrimental effect on the performance of safety applications. Additionally,
1609.4 channel switching [17] will also only increase congestion.
2.4.4 Verification Latency
Since vehicles in our simulations need to verify the signatures of a large
number of packets, the computational overhead of the signing algorithm used
might be non-trivial. From a different point of view, I wanted to investigate
the hardware required by vehicles so that they can validate packet signatures
in a timely manner. Additionally, I needed to consider that TESLA requires
two packets to be correctly received for a single safety message to be correctly
verified: the safety message itself and a key.
In order to investigate the computational power required by vehicles to
perform validations while keeping up with packet receptions, I simulated
verifying both ECDSA and TESLA signatures on various desktop computer
processors. To empirically measure the time taken to sign and verify safety
message broadcasts, I wrote a program to calculate signatures over random
data that was the size of safety messages. For ECDSA signatures, I used the
14
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Figure 2.3: MAC layer delay.
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224-bit curve provided in the OpenSSL library. 2 For TESLA signatures, I
used the HMAC and SHA-1 functions also provided in the OpenSSL library.
For each trial, the program verified 1,000 signatures, which were generated
over random data the length of a safety message. On each machine I tested,
I ran 100 trials, and I calculated the average and 95% confidence intervals for
the data. I ran these tests on Pentium MMX 200 MHz, Pentium 3 1 GHz,
Pentium D 2.8 GHz, and Core 2 2.4 GHz desktop machines.
Figures 2.4(a) and 2.4(b) show the time required to perform signing and
verification operations using ECDSA and TESLA signatures, respectively.
(The error bars, which represent the 95% confidence intervals, are too small
to be noticeable.) Figure 2.4(a) shows time in milliseconds, and Figure 2.4(b)
shows time in microseconds. These figures show that verifying an ECDSA
signature takes approximately 2-3 orders of magnitude more time than veri-
fying a TESLA signature, independent of the hardware used.
I simulated vehicles with the processing power of both a Core 2 2.4 GHz
processor and a Pentium 3, 1 GHz processor. The Core 2 processor represents
a state-of-the-art processor, and the Pentium 3 represents more accurately
the state-of-the-art automotive embedded processor. I allowed vehicles to
queue packets for verification purposes but limited the total packet delay to
1.0 second. If the delay was longer than this time, I considered the packet
to have been dropped because of a lack of freshness, as many other position
broadcasts will have been made by the transmitting node during that time.
Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) show the cumulative distribution of total packet
verification latency. For a given number on the x-axis (time), the number
on the y-axis is the number of packets received with verification latency less
than or equal to the number on the x-axis divided by the number of position
packets that could have been received at the network layer. The total packet
latency is measured from the the time of reception at the PHY layer to
the time when signature verification completes and is shown sampled every
5 milliseconds. Measuring this delay allows us to fairly compare ECDSA and
TESLA authentication mechanisms because the TESLA delay due to waiting
for keys in later safety messages is included, and the ECDSA verification
delay due to limited processing power is included.
2See http://www.openssl.org.
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Figure 2.5(a) shows that approximately 15% of all receivable safety mes-
sages are verified within 0.1 seconds when using a Core 2 processor for verify-
ing ECDSA signatures. When using a Pentium 3 processor, fewer than 0.01%
of safety messages using ECDSA signatures can be verified in 0.1 seconds or
less. Thus, if ECDSA signatures are to be used for authenticating VANET
position broadcasts, VANET computational hardware will need to be more
powerful than a Pentium 3, 1 GHz processor. Vehicles using TESLA with
attached keys receive approximately 10% of their packets at the application
layer with a latency of 0.1 seconds or less and 39% with a latency of 0.11
seconds or less, independent of which processor is used for verification. Con-
sidering the performance difference between ECDSA and TESLA, as shown
in Figure 2.2, and the latency difference, as shown in Figure 2.5(a), using
TESLA and ECDSA results in a similar percentage of packets with latency
0.1 seconds or less, if ECDSA uses state-of-the-art hardware and TESLA
sends signing keys separate from safety messages. Using TESLA with at-
tached keys results in significantly more packets being verified within about
0.1 seconds compared to using ECDSA.
Figure 2.5(b) shows again that using hardware with computational power
equivalent to a Pentium 3, 1 GHz, while using ECDSA as the authentication
mechanism for safety messages results in extremely high latency and a large
amount of packet drops due to limited computational power. However, due
to fewer vehicles being in the simulation area, as is the case for the Lanker-
shim data used in Figure 2.5(b), using Core 2 2.4 GHz equivalent hardware
incurs almost no latency from the time it takes to verify position broadcast
signatures.
The verification latency data from using TESLA with attached keys shows
a large jump at 0.1 seconds. This jump corresponds to the key in the next
broadcast. Around the jumps there are slight rises in the number of packets
with latency around those areas. This behavior is due to MAC-layer back-off.
The additional jumps correspond to the keys released for following packets.
In further investigation, I found that the fraction of packets received and
able to be verified is slightly higher for ECDSA at longer distances (beyond
about 230 meters in the I-80 simulations) due to ECDSA signatures not
requiring a second packet containing a key. The performance at longer dis-
tances is particularly interesting because receiving packets at longer distances
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is required for detecting head-on collisions a sufficient amount of time before
the collision would occur.
2.4.5 Rate-Based Congestion Control
My simulations of congested roadways above suggest that network congestion
control will be an important issue. Two likely mechanisms for implementing
congestion control are power control (adjusting vehicles’ transmission pow-
ers) and rate control (adjusting the rate at which vehicles transmit safety
beacons). Reducing the rate at which safety beacons are sent has the advan-
tage over reducing the power vehicles use to transmit in that the range at
which transmissions can be received is not reduced. However, reducing the
rate at which safety beacons are sent increases the amount of time before
receiving fresh information from surrounding vehicles. More stale informa-
tion about surrounding or approaching vehicles may lead to higher latency
in predicting collisions and/or warning drivers about hazardous situations.
To investigate the effects of rate control on VANET performance, I sim-
ulated vehicles transmitting at four different rates: 10, 5, 2, and 1 Hz. In
earlier sections, vehicles transmitted only using 10 Hz. Because TESLA with
attached keys performed best in the above sections, I simulated rate-based
congestion control using this authentication mechanism. Figure 2.6 shows
the network layer performance plotted as the fraction of packets received
versus distance and the total number of packets received versus distance for
the different transmission rates I used.
Figure 2.6(a) shows that reducing the rate at which vehicles transmit safety
beacons substantially increases the fraction of packets that are received, espe-
cially at distances larger than 50 meters. This increase in performance seems
to suggest that the rate of vehicles’ safety beacon transmissions should be
less than 10 Hz. However, Figure 2.6(b) shows that for distances less than
approximately 175 meters, using a transmission rate of 10 Hz results in more
packets being received in total compared to the other transmission rates I
simulated. Additionally, at distances less than 100 meters, the data shows
that the number of receptions using 10 Hz was substantially higher than the
other transmission rates.
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Figure 2.6: Network layer performance for various network load or safety
beacon transmission rates using TESLA with attached key releases.
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It is likely that receiving packets from vehicles in a surrounding neigh-
borhood will be more important than receiving packets from more distant
vehicles. Consider, for example, a safety application that warns a driver
when there is a vehicle in his blind spot and the driver is about to make a
lane-change maneuver. This safety application will need information from
vehicles that are extremely close to the vehicle about to change lanes and
with a low latency in order to predict a potential collision. Furthermore,
if necessary, drivers could steer away from potential hazards that are more
distant.
2.4.6 Certificate Distribution
In the previous sections of this chapter, I simulated the network performance
of various authentication mechanisms without considering or using any cer-
tificate distribution. To measure the effects of distributing certificates, I
simulated vehicles broadcasting their certificates once per second, where ve-
hicles attach their certificates to their safety messages. Figures 2.7–2.9 show
the fraction of packets received at the network layer, MAC layer delay at the
transmitter, and verification delay at the receiver, respectively. In each of
these figures, I denote simulations where I did not simulate certificate distri-
bution as “No certs,” and omit such a label where I did simulate certificate
distribution.
Because TESLA with separate key releases performed so poorly, as I
showed above, I omitted this version of TESLA from my simulations in this
section. Adding certificates to transmissions further congests the network for
any of the authentication mechanisms I simulated. However, TESLA certifi-
cates are larger than ECDSA certificates because TESLA certificates must
contain the anchor information for the TESLA key chain. Thus, the perfor-
mance for TESLA may be more affected by simulating certificate distribution
than ECDSA may.
Figure 2.7 shows the fraction of network layer receptions versus distance.
As expected, ECDSA is not as affected by certificate distribution compared
to TESLA. However, TESLA still results in more packet receptions than
ECDSA at any distance.
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Figure 2.7: Network layer performance with and without simulating certifi-
cate distribution.
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Figure 2.8 shows the MAC layer delay at the transmitter. Again, TESLA’s
performance degrades more than that of ECDSA, but still results in better
performance than ECDSA.
Figure 2.9 shows the fraction of packets received at the application layer
versus verification latency. For the Lankershim trace, using ECDSA with a
Core 2 processor resulted in fewer packets being received at the application
layer, which was due to fewer receptions at the network layer. For the I-
80 trace, using ECDSA with a Core 2 processor actually resulted in more
application layer receptions in my simulations with certificate distribution
than without. Without certificate distribution, the Core 2 is computationally
slightly under-powered for the verification load. However, with certificate
distribution, fewer packets are received, and thus, fewer verifications need
to be done. Consequently, the processor is not as heavily loaded, and all
verifications can be performed almost immediately after reception.
The extra verifications required to process certificates (i.e., 1 ECDSA
signature verification) generally do not affect the verification latency for
TESLA. For the I-80 trace, using TESLA with the Pentium 3 processor
shows some roll-off on the stair-step pattern of TESLA, which indicates that
there is some latency added by certificate verifications. However, the roll-off
is only a few data points wide (5 milliseconds each).
Thus, though TESLA’s performance is penalized slightly more than
ECDSA’s by adding certificate distribution to my simulations, TESLA still
outperforms ECDSA in each of the metrics I have shown except for minimum
latency.
2.5 Authentication Analysis Conclusions
VANETs will be an important addition to automobiles and have the poten-
tial to greatly increase vehicular safety. It is important to make sure this
technology is correctly designed before it is implemented in vehicles so that
its potential can be achieved.
Making use of the proposal to use TESLA as a light-weight broadcast au-
thentication mechanism [16], I presented simulations of network performance
when using TESLA for broadcast authentication in a VANET comparing
both separate and attached key releases. These results showed that using
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Figure 2.8: MAC layer delay with and without simulating certificate distri-
bution.
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TESLA with attached keys results in a higher fraction of successful packet
receptions from the network layer because of smaller packet sizes and a higher
fraction of successful application-layer packet receptions as compared to us-
ing ECDSA signatures, per the IEEE 1609.2 draft standard [6]. TESLA with
either key release mechanism benefits significantly from being able to verify
packets with keys following the intended key. Using TESLA with separate
key releases results in reduced performance due to either or both of two
mechanisms: the additional packets increasing network congestion and/or
successfully verifying a safety message requires correctly receiving two pack-
ets, the safety message and the packet carrying the key. TESLA attached
also suffers from this latter failure mode. As a result of these loss mecha-
nisms, ECDSA performs better than TESLA at greater distances, which is
an important area of performance for detecting head-on collisions.
Finally, I investigated the latency of packets from reception at the PHY
layer to when they are verified at the application layer. I profiled a variety
of computer hardware to measure individual packet verification times under
the three authentication mechanisms and simulated verification delays using
this data. My results show that to enable the use of ECDSA signatures for
safety message authentication, processing power equivalent to current state-
of-the-art hardware is required, but TESLA should perform well on current
embedded processors.
I will return to measuring the performance of these authentication mech-
anisms in Chapter 5, where I will directly simulate accident scenarios. Such
simulations will more directly answer the question of which authentication
mechanism should be used in VANET safety applications.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFICIENT CERTIFICATE REVOCATION
LIST DISTRIBUTION
The speed at which authentication can be performed and the reliability of
the network resulting from using a given authentication scheme affect if and
how quickly warnings can be presented to a driver. Authentication allows a
receiver to know which vehicle (though not necessarily a long-term identity)
a message came from and to verify that the message has not been altered.
The other piece of information that a vehicle will require to trust a safety
message is whether or not the vehicle from which the message originated is
trustworthy.
In a VANET, vehicles will rely on the integrity of received data for decid-
ing when to present alerts to drivers. Further in the future, this data may be
used as the basis of control decisions for autonomous vehicles. If this infor-
mation is corrupted, vehicles may present unnecessary or erroneous warnings
to their drivers, and the results of control decisions based on this informa-
tion could be even more disastrous. Information can be corrupted by two
different mechanisms: malice and malfunction. Similarly, vehicles have two
defense mechanisms: an internal filter and external reputation information.
The former defense mechanism can consist of filters based on physical laws
(e.g., maximum braking deceleration, maximum speed, and physical space
constraints) [21]. The latter defense mechanism can consist of reports from
other vehicles or entities on the validity or trustworthiness of data originat-
ing from certain vehicles. In this chapter, I will focus on the latter defense
mechanism.
Information received from corrupted vehicles should be disregarded or not
trusted by legitimate vehicles; otherwise, a malicious vehicle could, for ex-
ample, obtain a less congested route for itself by overstating the number of
vehicles on its desired roadway. As a second example, a corrupted vehicle
could trigger erroneous driver warnings to be displayed in other vehicles by
falsifying its position information. IEEE 1609.2, the trial-use standard con-
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cerning security services for vehicular environments, stipulates that vehicles
will be authenticated using certificates issued by a Certificate Authority (CA)
in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) setup [6]. Illegitimate vehicles should
have these certificates revoked, and the identity of the revoked certificates
(although ideally not the identity of the associated driver) should be pub-
lished and distributed to legitimate vehicles. Whatever mechanism that is
used for distributing this revocation information should distribute the infor-
mation securely, quickly, and broadly in order to limit the amount of damage
illegitimate vehicles can do.
In a VANET, the CA can utilize road-side units (RSUs) to distribute this
revocation information. However, the density of RSU placement (i.e., how
many RSUs are set up in a certain area) has not yet been determined. In
fact, it is likely that RSUs will be sparsely placed, and thus, vehicles may
spend significant time outside radio contact of an RSU [22]. Even if RSUs
are eventually deployed with sufficient density, a VANET must be able to
operate during stages of incremental deployment, that is, before a sufficient
density of RSUs come online.
I propose that revocation information be distributed in the form of a cer-
tificate revocation list (CRL) in an epidemic manner, that is, through vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) communication [8]. This epidemic distribution mechanism
supplements RSU-based distribution,1 essentially turning vehicles into mo-
bile distributors, making use of vehicles’ mobility. The use of V2V distribu-
tion of CRLs addresses incremental deployment issues. I will present results
evaluating the performance of my epidemic distribution mechanism through
simulation and show that my mechanism provides significant advantages over
an RSU-only CRL distribution mechanism in terms of speed and breadth of
network coverage.
In order to reduce the potential network and computational overhead im-
posed by any CRL distribution mechanism, I propose optimizations for or-
ganizing, storing, and exchanging CRL information. My first optimization
generates certificate identifiers for a single vehicle for intervals of time us-
1The CA may utilize other communication methods to distribute CRLs, such as cel-
lular or WiFi. However, the combining of multiple communication technologies within
a vehicle’s safety computer is not yet a certainty. Further, if a subset of VANET nodes
can receive a CRL via an alternative communication technology, the epidemic distribu-
tion method can be used to propagate the CRL to other VANET nodes that lack this
alternative channel.
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ing a secret key si and a block cipher (e.g., AES) keyed by si or a secure
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) where si is used as the seed. For
each interval of time, there is a single si, which is drawn from a hash chain
to preserve vehicles’ privacy prior to their revocation. Either of these mech-
anisms allows the CA to revoke a vehicle’s certificates with a single addition
to the CRL (i.e., si and i), thus minimizing the size of the CRL or CRL
updates. I present a mechanism for a single CA to revoke a vehicle in an
efficient manner. In Section 3.2, I extend my scheme to allow for two CAs,
neither of which holds the complete key si; rather, both combine information
they hold about si only during revocation, thus providing unrevoked vehicles
with privacy from a single CA.
Second, I propose that certificate identifiers be stored in a Bloom filter,
which is a probabilistic data structure (i.e., searching has a non-zero, but
ideally small, false positive rate) and has a constant (O(1)) cost in terms
of computation for searching and storage. This approach was proposed by
Raya et al. [23], who analyzed Bloom filter false positive rates, and suggested
that Bloom filters can be used for storing CRLs. I addresses the important
question of what computational resources are required for a Bloom filter
implementation. My data shows that using a Bloom filter requires a small
amount of computational overhead when it is used to search for certificates
in the CRL. I also compare using Bloom filters with other deterministic data
structures. Finally, I discuss the effects of a Bloom filter’s false positive rate
and how to alleviate those effects.
My final optimization regards how CRL information should be exchanged
in the network so that network bandwidth is conserved. I propose that
CRL updates, rather than the whole CRL, be exchanged, similar to delta
CRLs [24]. Each time a CRL is passed to a receiver, the sender sends only
the revocation information that the receiver does not have, and includes a
signature (generated by the CA) that covers the entire CRL (including the
parts not sent). For example, if there are 1000 entries in the CRL, but the
receiver already has 997 of them, then the sender need only send 3 entries
and one signature, substantially reducing the overhead of CRL transfer.
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Table 3.1: An example of a generalized public key certificate exchange. When
vehicle A hears a message from a previously unknown vehicle X, it replies
with a query for the certificate and short-term public key of X.
X→*: 〈Messagei〉 A receives a broadcast from X but does not
have X’s short-term key.
A→*: 〈certA, pubA, X〉 A broadcasts its certificate, its signed short-
term public key, and a request for X’s certifi-
cate.
X→*: 〈certX , pubX〉 X broadcasts its certificate and its signed
short-term public key.
3.1 Certificate Organization
For vehicles to communicate securely, they must possess copies of each other’s
credentials in the form of a certificate. Vehicles can exchange certificates
upon first encounter. An example is shown in Table 3.1. Certificates can
be pre-installed or updated during production and periodic service appoint-
ments, which may potentially reduce the necessity of certificate exchanges.
In a VANET, there is a tension between privacy and authentication. Re-
ceived safety messages must be trusted, and this requires trusting the sender.
However, senders wish to retain as much privacy as possible, which implies
that a receiver must trust, but not conclusively identify, the sender. I will
explore this tension in mathematical detail in Chapter 4.
Clearly, if a vehicle V has only one certificate, even if it is identified by a
pseudonym certificate ID, P , then tracking the vehicle via passive recording
of DSRC messages is possible. An attacker, A, who attacks privacy needs
only to link P to V one time (e.g., by listening to messages sent by V near
V ’s home location). Then, by employing listening stations near a location of
interest, A can determine if and when V visits that location.
3.1.1 Certificate Groups
To make it more difficult for A to track V , V could be issued a group of
certificates, each with a different ID. V would then use different certificates
at different times and locations. Of course, if A is willing to follow V to collect
all (or even many) of V ’s certificate IDs, multiple certificates will not improve
V ’s privacy. However, V has little hope of retaining location privacy from
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such a determined attacker; that is, if A tracks V , A no longer needs DSRC
certificates to track V ’s movements. (For example, a determined attacker
can easily track vehicles using license plates.)
Further, issuing V a set of certificate IDs that are easy to relate does
little to improve V ’s privacy. For example, issuing V the block of IDs
C4ED34ACBFF80000 . . . C4ED34ACBFF8FFFF would make V easy for
A to track. Instead, the certificate IDs issued to V should be very difficult
for most entities to associate. From the perspective of V ’s privacy, it is best
if V ’s certificate IDs appear to be completely random.
To make use of the group of certificates it is issued, V must change the
certificate it is currently using. I define a certificate transition as the event
when vehicle V switches from one certificate to another. It would be rela-
tively easy for those entities within communication range of V at the time of
a certificate transition to link these two certificates to the same vehicle. This
linking is made even easier if the messages include information about V ’s
current and future location (as some safety applications require [25]). Ob-
serving a large number of V ’s certificate transitions would allow the creation
of a certificate profile for V , even if the true identity of V is not known.
It is useful to consider how many certificates V might be issued. This
number should be large enough so as to make observing a large number
of certificate transitions difficult for all but the most determined attacker.
This concern is removed if certificates are used only once for a period of
time and then never reused. However, the number of certificates issued to a
vehicle is limited by storage constraints. If certificates are used only once,
then there must be reliable opportunities for the vehicle to replenish its list
of certificates, or vehicles must be preloaded with a sufficient number of
certificates for the expected vehicle lifetime. On the question of the size of
the certificate group, I do not offer definitive recommendations, but instead
describe the logic that influenced my designs.
3.1.2 Size of Certificate Revocation Lists
A recent study found that a typical American spent 15 hours/week in a
car [26]. As this included time spent as a driver or as a passenger, sup-
pose that an average US vehicle operates no more than 15 hours/week. If
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each certificate is used for a single 10-minute period and never reused, then
4660 certificates are consumed each year. Therefore, a vehicle will need
approximately 5000 certificates per year (fewer, if they are reused). If an
opportunity to replenish a vehicle’s certificates occurs at least once every
five years, a vehicle must be able to store approximately 25,000 certificates.
If each certificate is approximately 100 bytes, this requires a storage size of
approximately 2.5 MB, which is on the order of on-chip FLASH memory on
currently available automotive embedded processors.2
Thus, it is possible that a vehicle will possess 25,000 certificates at one time.
It is desirable that these certificate IDs be difficult to relate. A CA may need
to revoke all certificates held by a given vehicle. If the certificate IDs for the
revoked vehicle are truly random, i.e., there is no compact representation
for the certificate group, then the CA would need to explicitly identify all
25,000 certificates of the revoked vehicle in the updated CRL. Assuming that
certificates can be identified by a 16 byte fingerprint (the size of one AES
block), to revoke a single vehicle, the CRL would thus grow by 400 kB. Since
the CRL must be widely propagated, such growth in the size of the CRL
would result in excessive computational and storage overhead, and network
bandwidth consumption.
3.1.3 Privacy-Preserving Certificate Groups
I now present my method for creating a group of certificate IDs for one vehicle
V that appear to be unrelated but in fact are related by a single secret value
s known only to the CA. Only for the certificate loading phase of vehicle
operation will the CA be required to be online, which will likely occur in
a centralized location (e.g., an automobile factory). I present my proposed
method in pseudo-code as Algorithm 1.
To obtain this privacy feature, certificates must include a new field con-
taining a single integer. First, the CA chooses a secret random nonce unique
to the requesting vehicle, η. The CA then repeatedly hashes this value I
times, generating a hash chain using a cryptographic hash function, where
si = H
i(η), i ∈ [1, I], and H i(.) is the hash applied i times. Each si is a
possible revocation key for the vehicle being reloaded. Each possible revo-
2The Freescale MPC5554, as advertised in April 2008, has 2 MB of FLASH memory.
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cation key si is used as the key to a block cipher, which takes fixed length
inputs and permutes them into outputs of the same length, where the par-
ticular permutation chosen is based on the key si. Alternatively, si can
be used as the seed for a PRNG rather than the key to a block cipher.
Next, the CA creates M public/private key-pairs (above, I argued that M
could be 25,000). (K+r,i, K
−
r,i), r ∈ [1,M/I]. Then the CA creates a corre-
sponding group of M/I certificates; for each r the CA creates a certificate,
Certr,i = {Esi(r), K+r,i, sigCA} where Esi(r) is defined as the certificate ID
and is the value produced by encrypting the integer r using the block cipher
with the symmetric key si (or for a PRNG the r-th output of the PRNG with
seed si), and sigCA is the CA’s digital signature over {Esi(r), K+r,i} using the
CA’s private key. The CA then issues these M key-pairs and associated cer-
tificates to vehicle V , either before the vehicle begins its service, or during
the replenishing events discussed above.
3.1.4 Revocation Method
When the CA wishes to revoke vehicle V , it simply appends the values si
and i to the CRL that corresponds to the time interval during which the
revocation event was reported. I will discuss time intervals in more detail
in Section 3.1.6. I will describe my proposed CRL delivery method in Sec-
tion 3.5. When a vehicle receives a new CRL that includes a new secret
si, it generates each r, which are known to every vehicle, and the following
revocation keys sj , j ∈ [i + 1, I]. If a result matches the certificate ID of a
certificate in its cache, that certificate is revoked.
To increase the revocation list management efficiency, a Bloom filter [27]
can be loaded with revoked certificate identifiers. To do this, a vehicle gen-
erates all possible revocation keys sj = H
(j−i)(si), j ∈ [i+ 1, I]. Vehicles can
recalculate these additional revocation keys because they are drawn from a
hash chain and the CRL specifies i and I (if I is not implicitly known). Addi-
tionally, a vehicle generates all revoked certificate IDs Esj(r), j ∈ [i, I] given
a key si. Esi(r) can be calculated by vehicles holding the CRL since the
CRL contains the revocation key si and the range of r, M/I (M/I may not
be included if it is constant and therefore implied). The resulting certificate
IDs can then be included in a Bloom filter. I will discuss what should be
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done if a certificate identifier results in the Bloom filter indicating a match
in Section 3.3, since my discussion there concerns design parameters for the
Bloom filter. Further algorithm extensions employing Bloom filters can be
used to efficiently prune cached certificates upon receiving a new revocation
key si. I will present an analysis of the computational overhead imposed by
using Bloom filters in Section 3.3.1, in light of the discussion of our potential
setup in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.5 Certificate Group Privacy Properties
The desired privacy property is that it should be difficult for an attacker
to relate the certificates belonging to one vehicle (i.e., one certificate group)
without knowledge of si. To make this association, the attacker must be able
to break the block cipher or PRNG used to generate Esi(r).
Unless the attacker observes vehicle V transition between two certificates,
the attacker cannot relate two of V ’s certificates under practical conditions
(i.e., the attacker cannot break the cipher used or track the vehicle with an
attached GPS tracking device, etc.). Such an attacker would already have
compromised V ’s location privacy. The attacker, and every other vehicle,
will be able to group V ’s certificates once the revocation key si and a time
interval i for V are exposed. This quick association allows for space-efficient
representation of CRLs.
3.1.6 Backwards Privacy
A CA may specify that time be divided into intervals (our use of the term
“time intervals”). The CA can then specify for how many time intervals
a vehicle should receive certificates during reloading. In my description of
revocation keys above, each si would correspond to a single time interval.
Using my proposal for linking certificates with a revocation key, a block
cipher (or a secret seed and a PRNG), and a cryptographic hash function,
vehicles that are revoked have backwards privacy with regard to the messages
that they have already signed prior to the time interval for which the revoca-
tion key was released (i.e., i). Specifically, a party interested in compromising
the privacy of a revoked vehicle cannot link a revoked vehicle’s signed mes-
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sages prior to the time interval for which the revocation key was released
since the privacy attacker cannot regenerate any of the revoked vehicle’s cer-
tificate IDs that were used during earlier time intervals better than using a
brute force search. I anticipate that this backwards privacy will be desirable.
For example, if a vehicle changes owners and the vehicle is revoked under
the new owner, then both the old owner and the new owner would have no
privacy in terms of the use of the common vehicle, even though the old owner
had nothing to do with the event that triggered the vehicle’s revocation.
3.1.7 Discussion
Combining the proposed revocation key approach with Bloom filters for fast
certificate acceptance, the certificate generation and revocation scheme has
the following properties:
I. Certificates grow by only a small amount for Esi(r) (one block; 16 B
for AES).
II. All of a vehicle’s keys can be represented in the CRL with a small
amount of data: the revocation key si (of size 32 B for SHA-256), the
time interval i, the total number of time intervals for which the vehicle
was issued certificates I (which could be omitted if all vehicles have
the same I), and a count of the number of certificates granted for each
key, M (which could be omitted if all vehicles have the same M).
III. Any additional loss in privacy is due only to imperfections in the block
cipher (or PRNG), or the cryptographic hash function, and not due to
the protocol design itself.
IV. With memory usage linear in the number of revoked vehicles, each cer-
tificate can be checked in time linear in the number of revoked vehicles
(no-precomputation approach).
V. With memory usage linear in the number of revoked keys, certificates
can be checked very quickly using a Bloom filter with few false positives.
(Bloom filters use memory linear in the number of elements it is meant
to hold for a fixed false positive rate and number of index functions.)
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Table 3.2: Parameter definitions for certificate signing process.
{a}b Sign/encrypt a using private/public key b (asymmetric cipher)
Esi(r) Encrypt r using key si (symmetric cipher)
K+CAj CA j’s public key
x1 ⊕ x2 XOR x1 and x2
yr The r-th certificate identifier
yr,j Section of yr sent to CA j for revocation search filtering (CAj’s
search field)
η Unique revocation search filtering nonce
zr,j Blinded yr that must be combined by the CAs to revoke a certifi-
cate
βr() V ’s blinding function, parameterized by r
VI. The network overhead involved in transferring CRL information re-
garding a single vehicle is constant (independent of the number of cer-
tificates that a vehicle holds).
3.2 Multi-CA Certificate Organization
3.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Certificate Groups
I now propose a method for creating a group of certificate IDs for one vehicle
V that appear to be unrelated (privacy preserving), but in fact are related by
a single secret value, s, collectively known only to two CAs. In other words,
no single CA knows s exactly, but two CAs can recreate s by combining
the information they each have individually. My scheme employs two-party
blind signatures, as proposed by MacKenzie and Reiter [28]. The revocation
key, s, is split between two CAs such that no single CA can compromise
a vehicle’s privacy. I use two CAs because the cryptographic mechanism I
make use of allows only two parties to generate the blinded signatures. For
the discussion below, I present a concise overview of the definitions of my
parameters in Table 3.2.
A vehicle V that wants to load itself with certificates begins by first gen-
erating B sets of M messages, where M is the number of certificates the
car desires, and B is one greater than the number of messages the CAs will
require V to unblind as proof that V is not creating malformed messages.
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For the following discussion, the index r is defined as r ∈ [1,M ] and denotes
V ’s request for its r-th certificate. Each of B sets of messages consists of
[
{xd,1}K+CA1 , {xd,2}K+CA2
]
, ∀d ∈ [1, B]
and M certificate requests. Each individual certificate request is composed
as follows. (In the following, I drop the d subscripts denoting each of B
requests for readability.)
[
r, βr
(
yr, K
+
V,r
)
, {revr,1}K+CA1 , {revr,2}K+CA2
]
where yr = Es(r), ∀r ∈ [1,M ] and si = H i(x1 ⊕ x2). V uses xj , j ∈ {1, 2} to
generate the revocation keys si and the certificate identifiers yr. Both x1 and
x2 are required to produce each yr. Each xj is encrypted with the respective
CA’s public key. βr(yr, K
+
V,r) is the blinded certificate that V wants the
CAs to sign, where K+V,r is the public key for which this certificate is issued.
βr is the blinding function that V uses to blind the certificate information.
revr,j is the revocation information that CAj will store concerning V ’s r-th
certificate, where revr,j = [zr,j, yr,j, η]. zr,1⊕zr,2 = yr, thus zr,j is information
the CAs must combine to recover yr during revocation, which I will describe
in more detail below. For each CA, a contiguous range of bits in yr is selected
so that the ranges, of length λ, do not overlap (e.g., CA1 corresponds to bits
1-20 and CA2 corresponds to bits 21-40 in each yr). These ranges are denoted
as yr,j. Thus, V reveals different parts of its certificate identifiers to each of
the CAs in yr,j
3. I will call yr,j CAj ’s search-field. η is a nonce chosen by
V , which the CAs will use to associate key data for revocation purposes, as
described below. η must be unique to the network. If V chooses a non-unique
η, V regenerates another set of B blinded certificates for signing.
After V presents this information to the CAs, the CAs request that V
unblind B − 1 sets of requests in order for V to show that it has correctly
formed the requests with high probability. The CAs then use a two-party
signing mechanism to sign the blinded certificate requests [28] and return
the results to V . Both CA store all of the η, yr,j, zr,j values so that they can
perform revocation.
3The length, λ, of yr,j should be chosen such that 2λ < b, where b is the block size of
the cipher used to create yr.
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Privacy Properties Considering privacy from a non-CA attacker, the de-
sired privacy property is that it should be difficult for such an attacker to
relate the certificates belonging to one vehicle (i.e., one certificate group)
without knowledge of si. Non-CA privacy is preserved for the same reasons
described above in the single-CA scenario in Section 3.1.5. A single CA can
only remove the privacy of a vehicle if either or both of the following are true:
the CA knows the other CA’s private key, or the CA can undo the blinding,
breaking the blinding function. In the former case, this is equivalent to hav-
ing a single CA. In the latter case, with a cryptographically strong blinding
function, this means the CA has to do work equivalent to the security factor
of the blinding function.
CA Privacy Preservation Revealing yr,j to the respective CAs does not
reduce a vehicle’s privacy. Consider choosing λ = 20 and M = 25,000, as
discussed above, and the total population of vehicles to be N =100,000,000.
Now suppose CAj wants to discover one complete certificate identifier for
some unrevoked vehicle. CAj might do this by listening to traffic on the
network and obtaining a certificate that has ID yr. Next, CAj wants to
eliminate the vehicles this certificate cannot belong to whose certificate setup
information CAj holds. CAj then reads its yr,j field from the certificate ID.
The expected number of vehicles that possess a certificate that has the set
of bits in this field identical to the one in the received yr is
E[possess(V, yr,j)] = N
(
1−
(
1− 1
2λ
)M)
≈ 2,400,000 (3.1)
Thus, with high probability, for correct choices of λ and M , the CA will
not be able to hear a certificate and meaningfully match it to any certificate
creation information that it holds.
Colluding CAs If two or more CAs collude, they are able to substantially
compromise the privacy of a vehicle. For example, if two CAs collude, then
they can match the 2λ bits of each yr. Continuing the example from above,
when λ = 20, the two CAs could together determine that the car it heard
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was one of
E[possess(yr1,1, yr2,2)] = N
(
1−
(
1− 1
22λ
)M)
≈ 2
vehicles (using the same technique as described in the previous paragraph).
This is a very small fraction of the population and represents almost a com-
plete reduction in privacy.
3.2.2 Revocation Method
When a certificate with ID yr is presented to the CAs for revocation, each
CA matches its own search field in yr to each yr,j it has. For each match, CAj
adds the corresponding η to a list. This search can be efficiently performed by
simply keeping an array of pointers to lists, where the array index corresponds
to each possible yr,j, and the lists pointed to hold all the recorded sets of
[zr,j, yr,j, η]. If there are N vehicles in the network (thus N unique η’s),
using a yr,j of length λ reduces the search space from N to that given by
Equation (3.1). The CAs then intersect their lists of η’s. The results of this
intersection are the remaining possible η’s, and the search space has been
reduced to
N
(
1−
(
1− 1
2λ
)M)2
≈ 56,000 (3.2)
(e.g., approximately 1800 times for λ = 20). Each CA then finds the zr,j’s for
the remaining η’s and xor’s them together to recover the yr’s. The recovered
yr’s are then searched to find the one that matches the yr in the certificate
that is to be revoked. When the match is found, the CAs share their xj
values and compute the revocation key s = x1 ⊕ x2. This key is then added
to the CRL and the offending vehicle is revoked. When a vehicle receives a
new CRL that includes a new secret si, it proceeds to add revoked certificate
IDs to its Bloom filter, as in Section 3.1.4.
In combining the zr,j values, vehicle privacy from the CAs is only marginally
reduced for the number of vehicles given by Equation (3.2). Even then, the
certificate identifiers for these vehicles are revealed to the CAs, not all of
their certificate identifiers or their revocation keys.
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3.3 Revoked Certificate Storage
As discussed above, I propose that vehicles use Bloom filters to store all
revoked certificates. To be clear, the Bloom filter is not populated with
values of si received via CRLs. The CRL will contain revocation keys, si,
and time intervals, i, while each vehicle will insert certificate IDs, Esi(r),
into its Bloom filter. Thus, vehicles can efficiently check both certificates
previously received and certificates they receive in the future to see if these
certificates have been revoked. In this section, I discuss the results from
my analysis of the performance of practical Bloom filter implementations.
Additionally, I discuss the consequences of using a Bloom filter, which is
a probabilistic data structure; that is, when searching a Bloom filter, false
positives occur with some probability. I also compare the use of Bloom filters
with deterministic data structures.
3.3.1 Bloom Filter Performance Analysis
A Bloom filter is a data structure that has constant computational cost
(O(1)) for insertion and search operations. However, Bloom filters are a
probabilistic data structure, meaning that there is a chance that a search op-
eration may indicate a data item is in the filter when it actually is not. In the
context of this section, a false positive occurs when a non-revoked certificate
appears to be a revoked certificate; that is, it appears to be in the Bloom
filter. I propose an approach to addressing the problem of false positives
below. A desired false positive rate can be chosen by setting 3 parameters:
the number of elements to be inserted (n), the size of the data structure (m,
here specified in bits), and the number of hash or index functions used for
insertions and searches (k). Using this notation, the false positive rate can
be calculated as [29]
P (false positive) =
(
1−
(
1− 1
m
)kn)k
(3.3)
To illustrate, let us assume that 1 in 100,000 vehicles are malicious or mal-
functioning in a VANET with 100,000,000 vehicles; then there are 1,000
vehicles whose revocation keys should appear on the CRL. If each vehicle
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possesses 25,000 certificates, as mentioned above, then the CRL should en-
code 25,000,000 certificate identifiers. Thus, n = 25,000,000. If we choose
m = 228 bits (32 MB) and k = 6, then we obtain a false positive rate of
0.616%, or approximately 1 in every 160 certificates. I believe this false
positive rate is acceptable for reasons described below.
To evaluate the computational overhead of using Bloom filters, I imple-
mented a Bloom filter, using k = 6 hash functions based on MD-5 for index
functions and a vector ofm = 228 bits for the Bloom filter storage. The input
to my hash functions were randomly generated 128-bit certificate IDs. The
hash functions were implemented as follows. First, a random byte repeated
16 times was concatenated with the input certificate ID and with the ran-
dom byte repeated 16 times again. Next, this step was repeated but using
a different random byte. (In a deployed VANET implementation, these two
padding bytes would be fixed and specified in a standard.) Each of these
two 48-byte strings were hashed separately using MD-5. This concatenation
mechanism is derived from previous work by Fan et al. [29]. A single MD-5
output was used as 3 different hash functions, taking the 3 indices from 3 dif-
ferent 4-byte blocks of the output. Essentially, MD-5 was called 2 times with
2 different random bytes padding the random certificate IDs, as described
previously. Then three 4-byte blocks from each output were used to generate
28-bit indices for the Bloom filter. By reusing the MD-5 outputs, I was able
to double the filter’s performance. I used the OpenSSL implementation of
MD-5 for my tests.4
I tested the performance of both inserting certificate IDs into and search-
ing for certificate IDs in the Bloom filter. The certificate IDs consisted of 16
bytes from a cryptographically strong PRNG, also obtained from OpenSSL.
I used a cryptographically strong PRNG to emulate the output of my certifi-
cate ID generating scheme, as described above. For each insertion or search
test, I inserted or searched for 25,000 certificate IDs, which is the number
of certificate IDs a vehicle would possess according to my discussion in Sec-
tion 3.1.1. I recorded the time taken for each batch of tests (25,000 insertions
or searches) to microsecond precision, and I performed each batch of tests
10,000 times on each test machine. For the search benchmarking, half of the
identifiers sought were in the filter and half of them were not in the filter.
4See http://www.openssl.org.
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I performed my tests on three different machines, each of which has differ-
ent hardware. The first machine had an Intel Core 2 (2.4 GHz), the second
machine had an Intel Pentium 3 (1 GHz), and the third machine had an Intel
Pentium MMX (200 MHz). Figure 3.1 shows the time it takes on each pro-
cessor to insert or search for a single certificate ID. Table 3.3 lists the exact
timing numbers shown graphically in Figure 3.1. These performance tests
indicate that all of the certificates from a revoked vehicle could be added
to a vehicle’s internal CRL data structure (Bloom filter) in 10’s to 100’s of
milliseconds. Also, searching for a certificate in the CRL is 1000’s of times
faster than the cost of verifying the CA’s signature of a certificate. Both of
these operations, Bloom filter search and CA signature verification, should
be performed by vehicles when they receive a new certificate. The time to
search is slightly faster than the insertion time because a search indicates
that a certificate ID is not found as soon as a single hash function output is
found to not be in the Bloom filter; thus not all hash functions will need to
be calculated.
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Figure 3.1: Performance analysis of Bloom filter insertions and searches of
vehicle certificate IDs.
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Table 3.3: Intel Core 2 2.4 GHz insert and search times per certificate.
Data Structure Insert (µs) Search (µs)
Bloom filter 2.6 1.4
AVL tree 6.8 3.4
Red-black tree 5.6 3.6
3.3.2 Data Structures
Deterministic vs. Probabilistic
Bloom filters are probabilistic data structures; thus, there is a chance of a
false positive when searching them. Consequently, it may be preferable to use
a deterministic data structure, such as a linked list or balanced binary tree,
to store revoked certificate IDs so that no false positives occur. Previously
in this chapter, I concluded that there could be up to 25,000,000 certificates
revoked under my assumptions. With 16-byte certificate IDs, each vehicle
would require 381 MB to store all of the revoked certificate IDs. In my
discussion above, I found that a Bloom filter with a false positive rate of
0.616% requires only 32 MB of storage. Using a balanced binary tree to
store the revoked certificate IDs, the complexity of searching for a single
certificate ID is O(logn).
To compare the performance of deterministic versus probabilistic data
structures, I implemented inserting and searching for certificates in AVL
trees and red-black trees as well. For the each type of tree, I again populated
the tree with 25,000,000 certificates, then searched for and inserted (in that
order) 25,000 certificates each. I only tested the performance of each tree on
the Core 2 machine because it was the only machine with enough memory
to run the tests without accessing a disk.5 The search times for the trees
I used were more than twice those for the Bloom filter I tested. However,
for a processor with equivalent performance to the Core 2 machine, inserting
all of the 25,000 certificates of a revoked vehicle could be done in less than
100 ms. Thus, using a deterministic data structure may not have significant
additional processing time overhead, but may be unrealistic for immediate
deployment because of the memory requirements.
5My AVL and red-black tree tests used GNU libavl on Linux (see http://www.
stanford.edu/~blp/avl/index.html) and required approximately 2 GB and 1.5 GB of
RAM, respectively.
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False Positive Rate
Having a false positive rate is acceptable for a number of reasons. A certifi-
cate from a non-revoked vehicle could trigger a false positive when using a
Bloom filter; that is, the certificate could appear to be revoked though that
certificate may not be revoked. A vehicle can avoid triggering a false positive
by eliminating any of its own certificates that will trigger a false positive.
Before using or transmitting a specific certificate, a vehicle can check to see
if the certificate will generate a false positive, given the established CRL
known to the network. If the certificate will create a false positive, the vehi-
cle can just discard it before it is ever sent, thus preventing a receiver from
generating a false positive, assuming every vehicle uses standardized hash
functions for the Bloom filter. This discarding can be overcome by simply
loading a fraction more certificates initially. However, under this approach, it
is more important for a vehicle to have an updated CRL, so that the vehicle
can know whether a certificate will produce a false positive when it changes
certificates.
I now calculate the fraction of additional certificates required to be pre-
loaded on vehicles so that vehicles have a desired number (in expectation) of
certificates that do not trigger false positives. The terms I use in my analysis
here are summarized in Table 3.4. The desired number of certificates per
vehicle is c = 25,000, as I used above. Using the same assumptions as I
used in the previous section, I set the number of vehicles in the network to
be N = 100,000,000. I increase the fraction of revocable vehicles from my
assumptions above to f = 10−4 in order for the Bloom filter performance to
be more robust to having more revocable vehicles than estimated. I denote
the additional fraction of certificates that need to be pre-loaded on vehicles
as p.
Table 3.4: Bloom filter pre-loading parameters.
c Number of certificates desired per vehicle
k, n,m Bloom filter parameters
l Number of certificates loaded per vehicle
N Number of vehicles in the network
f Fraction of revocable vehicles
p Fraction additional certificates to load
Pfp Probability of a false positive
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Assuming certificate identifiers are uniformly and independently distributed
among vehicles, the expected number of certificates triggering false positives
per vehicle is
E[Pfp] = Pfp(1 + p)c = pc (3.4)
I set this expected value to be equal to the number of additional certificates
to be loaded on each vehicle (pc).
From Fan et al. [29], I use the approximation for k that minimizes the
number of certificates that trigger false positives. I denote this optimized
number of hash functions as k∗.
k∗ = argminPfp(k) ≈ m
n
ln2 (3.5)
I calculate n, the number of entries in the Bloom filter as
n = Nfl = Nf(1 + p)c
Substituting these equations in for k and n in to (3.3) and rearranging, I get
pc
(1 + p)c
−
(
1− (1− 1
m
)k
∗n
)k∗
= 0 (3.6)
Choosing m = 231, I solved Equation (3.6) numerically to get p = 1.767%,
which results in k∗ = 6. Thus, an additional 442 certificates are required
to be pre-loaded on vehicles to replace certificates that are expected to gen-
erate false positives. 442 certificates equates to less than 3 days of usable
certificates on a schedule of recharging vehicles’ certificates every 5 years,
using certificate at the rate of 1 every 10 minutes, as I discussed above. If
my assumption of f = 10−5 is accurate and the parameters (k∗ and , m) for
f = 10−4 are used, the expected number of false positives is negligible.
3.4 Efficiently Disseminating
Certificate Revocation Lists
As discussed above, if the CA wants to invalidate a vehicle’s certificates, it
must append the vehicle’s revocation key, s, to the CRL. The CA would
then distribute the CRL so that vehicles can identify (and likely distrust)
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the newly revoked vehicle. The distribution of the complete CRL to every
node in the network may consume significant bandwidth. In this section,
I present a CRL update mechanism to reduce the bandwidth required by
distributing CRLs, which is similar to delta CRLs [24]. I will assume, in this
section, that there is a single CRL, either due to there being a single CA
for the VANET, or because each vehicle is concerned only with the CRL for
the geographical region in which it is currently operating. Border crossings
are prime locations for placing RSUs such that crossing vehicles obtain the
latest CRL for the region they are entering.
Since a CRL update will be rebroadcast many times, the CRL update size
should be small. As a result, I propose that only the entries necessary to
bring the receiver’s CRL up to the latest version be broadcast. The update
will also include a CA signature over the entire CRL, which can then be
verified by the receivers. Algorithm 2 shows how updates are generated and
distributed among vehicles. The following example will illustrate.
Consider the case where the sender has 1000 entries in its CRL (the number
of entries is equivalent to the version number in Algorithm 2): s1, s2, . . . , s1000
6.
The sender also has the CA’s digital signature over all 1000 revocation keys,
sigCA(H(s1|s2| . . . |s1000)), where H() is a cryptographic hash function and |
denotes concatenation. Therefore, the sender’s CRL is
[s1, s2, . . . , s1000, sigCA(H(s1|s2| . . . |s1000))]. Suppose the receiver has 997 en-
tries in its CRL: s1, s2, . . . , s997, so its CRL is
[s1, s2, . . . , s997, sigCA(H(s1|s2| . . . |s997))].
The sender advertises that the size of its CRL is 1000. The receiver adver-
tises that its CRL is of size 997. The sender deduces that the receiver needs
the last three values of its CRL. It therefore transmits these three revocation
keys as well as the signature over all entries,
[s998, s999, s1000, sigCA(H(s1|s2| . . . |s1000))]. The receiver can then check the
CA signature by verifying sigCA(H(s1|s2| . . . |s1000)). (The receiver already
has values s1, s2, . . . , s997.) If the signature is verified, the receiver updates its
CRL to be identical to the sender’s, [s1, s2, . . . , s1000, sigCA(H(s1|s2| . . . |s1000))],
and begins to advertise its CRL size to be 1000.
The above example showed only a single receiver. However, if there are
multiple receivers with varying CRL sizes, the sender simply broadcasts the
6In Section 3.1.3, the certificate ID is denoted as Es(r), and s is the revocation key (16
bytes).
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update with the largest number of missing values. Each updated receiver
then appends to its CRL the missing values and checks the final signature
(over the 1000 certificates in the above example).
In my example, a revocation key is never removed from the CRL. It may be
desirable to remove a revocation key from the CRL if, for example, a vehicle’s
certificates expire. A direct extension of the above can apply to cases where
revocation keys are pruned. However, this would require new signatures for
the newly pruned CRL to be generated by the CA and propagated. Hybrid
solutions can be adopted by including signatures over various numbers of
revocation keys in the updated CRL, that is, over blocks of revocation keys
in the CRL if the complete CRL is subdivided. For example, the updated
CRL could include one signature for the CRL before pruning and a second
signature for the CRL after pruning, allowing nodes to decide which signature
to check. CRLs would then need to include information as to which signatures
they include or which signatures have been pruned out.
In my discussion above, I supposed that of 100,000,000 vehicles, 1 in
100,000 might get revoked (1000 vehicles). The size of the section of the
CRL containing revocation keys is thus 16,000 bytes, which can be sent in
only a few packets (considering a standard Ethernet MTU of 1500 bytes).
Generally, the full CRL would never need to be sent, and much smaller trans-
fers could be used. If a vehicle is missing a prefix of the CRL (i.e., missing
revocation keys s ∈ [1, m], m < N , where N is the version of the CRL), then
the entire CRL can be sent to such a vehicle since the size of the CRL is
small.
When a vehicle receives a new CRL, it must remove any cached certificates
identified as revoked. This pruning effort can be done in conjunction with
the Bloom filter insertion. In particular, when inserting Es(r), certificates
matching the Es(r) pattern should also be removed from the vehicle’s cache.
3.5 Epidemic Certificate Revocation List Distribution
As discussed above, for a CA to invalidate a vehicle’s certificates, the CA
appends the vehicle’s revocation key to the CRL. The CA then distributes
the CRL so that vehicles can identify and distrust the newly revoked vehicle.
The distribution should spread quickly to every vehicle in the system.
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Previous work assumed that CRLs will be distributed by broadcasting up-
dates from RSUs [30]. Distributing a CRL quickly to all vehicles in the system
would require a very large number of RSUs to be deployed and maintained
by the CA, incurring substantial deployment costs. Another significant chal-
lenge to RSU-only distribution is that many vehicles may rarely encounter a
RSU providing CRL updates, e.g., in rural areas.
My proposal improves the distribution speed and spread of the CRL by
using vehicles to distribute the CRL in an epidemic fashion. A CRL update
could be broadcast by a small number of RSUs in high vehicle density lo-
cations. The RSU then infects each passing vehicle with the CRL update.
Each infected vehicle, in turn, infects every vehicle it encounters. This in-
fection propagates very quickly in an epidemic fashion (as verified by the
simulations presented below).
3.5.1 Methodology
In order to evaluate the performance of V2V epidemic CRL passing as com-
pared to the performance of CRLs being distributed exclusively by RSUs, I
obtained realistic traces of car movements for simulation. The trace I used
was based on the area surrounding the city of Zurich, Switzerland [31]. This
trace contains nearly 260,000 vehicles and covered approximately 354 km x
263 km. In order to handle the massive size of this trace, I built a highly
parallel, custom simulator to track encounters between vehicles. This simu-
lator uses a simple infection criterion, described below. It does not attempt
to emulate packet-level communication. I believe my simulations to be the
largest simulations of CRL distribution thus far reported in the literature.
In the simulator, vehicles are given velocities and destinations based on
the events in the trace file. The positions of the vehicles are sampled every
0.1 seconds. Every 0.1 seconds, a list of neighbors is generated for each
vehicle. For the simulations where I did not consider V2V communication,
the neighbor list consists of only nearby RSUs. For the simulations where
I did consider V2V communication, the neighbor list included nearby RSUs
and nearby cars. I consider the CRL update to be exchanged if two neighbors
(one possessing the CRL update) are within 100 meters of each other for at
least the simulated association time, which I varied.
49
To simulate incremental VANET deployment, I chose various levels (per-
centage deployed) of vehicles having VANET radios. The average vehicle age
in the United States is less than 10 years [32]. Thus, on average, deployment
levels should reach 2% in a little under 2.5 months after VANETs begin to be
deployed (assuming all new vehicles will be equipped with VANET radios).
In order to determine the locations at which I should place RSUs for max-
imum effectiveness, I ran simulations without any CRL passing and recorded
which grid squares contained the highest number of cars at each time step of
the simulation. I only recorded the grid squares with 50 or more cars in them
at any time. I then sorted the grid squares based on this count in descending
order. In my simulations, I included RSUs based on their order in this sorted
list. For example, in a specific scenario, if I used 4 RSUs in my simulation,
I chose the 4 RSUs that recorded the 4 highest numbers of vehicles in them.
Each RSU was placed at the center of its respective grid square. (The size
of the grid squares, 100 meters x 100 meters, with a communication range,
100 meters, implies that an RSU is a neighbor of every vehicle in its square.)
I placed RSUs at the center of the densest areas of the trace, based on
off-line calculations. In order to validate my simulator, I used a program to
display node locations and whether they have the CRL or not at any specified
time. After viewing the movement of the cars, Using this visualizer for my
simulations, I discovered that there are what appear to be a morning rush
hour and an evening rush hour, where cars generally move into the city and
move out of the city, respectively. Table 3.5 summarizes the parameters that
I used in my simulations. I used release times of 27,500 and 35,000 seconds
only for 100% deployment, for which I varied the association time of V2V
passing only between 0.1 and 2.0 seconds. I varied the release time of the
CRL in response to observing two periods of higher vehicle mobility (i.e., rush
hours). Consequently, the release times of 9,000, 27,000, and 35,000 seconds
correspond to releasing the CRL just before the first rush hour, between the
rush hours and just before the second rush hour, respectively.
3.5.2 Results
CRL Release Times Figure 3.2 shows the total number of cars in the
simulation that received the CRL up to a given time when the CRL update
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Table 3.5: Epidemic passing simulation parameters.
Number of RSUs (R) 1,4,16,64,256,275,300,325
Association time (ta) 0.1 s, 1.0 s, 2.0 s, 5.0 s, 10.0 s
V2V communication Disabled (“No V2V”), enabled (“V2V”)
Deployment percentage 1%, 2%, 5%, 25%, 100%
Release time (seconds) 9,000, 27,500, 35,000
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Figure 3.2: A comparison of the number of vehicles in possession of a CRL
released at 9,000 s.
was released at 9,000 seconds. Gaps in each data set occur when there are no
new vehicles receiving the CRL update during that time interval. The gaps
between 22,000 seconds and 32,000 seconds correspond to a period of time
when very few vehicles move in the trace, i.e., between the rush hours. After
this plateau, the CRL update distribution progresses again around 35,000
seconds as more vehicles begin to move. Figure 3.2 shows that the V2V
CRL update passing method outperforms the method where CRL updates
are distributed solely by RSUs (No V2V) in both total coverage (the number
of cars with the CRL update at the end of the simulation) and speed of
coverage (the rate at which cars obtain the CRL update). This remains true
even when the No V2V case uses 325 RSUs while the V2V case uses only
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Figure 3.3: A comparison of the number of vehicles in possession of a CRL
released at 27,500 s.
one RSU. To stress the V2V case even further, I increased the association
time from 0.1 seconds to 2.0 seconds (all No V2V cases were run with an
association time of 0.1 seconds). This increase in association time made
little impact on the efficacy in passing CRL updates in the V2V cases.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the number of cars receiving the CRL update
when the update is released at 27,500 seconds and 35,000 seconds, respec-
tively. Even with the reduced window of opportunity to pass the CRL update,
epidemic CRL passing results in almost the entire population of vehicles re-
ceiving the update. These figures also show epidemic passing outperforming
every RSUs-only scenario.
Partial Deployment After observing that the performance of CRL dis-
tribution appears to be relatively independent of the release time, assuming
there is at least one period of higher vehicle mobility after a selected release
time, I simulated partial deployment scenarios only using the 9,000-second
release time, which are shown in Figures 3.5-3.9 and are ordered according
to increasing deployment rates. Figure 3.9 shows that the V2V CRL update
passing method with 100% deployment outperforms the method where CRL
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Algorithm 1 Certificate generation algorithm.
Require: M ≡ number of certificates per time interval for this vehicle
Require: I ≡ number of time intervals during a reload period
Begin: certificate loading for vehicle V
η ← get random nonce()
for i = 1 to I do
si ← Hi(η)
for r = 1 to M/I do
(Kr,i
+,Kr,i
−)← generate public private key()
sigCA,r,i ← sign(H({Esi(r),Kr,i+}),KCA−)
Certr,i ← {Esi(r),Kr,i+, sigCA,r,i}
send(V, {Cert1,i, . . . , CertM,i})
end for
end for
End
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Figure 3.4: A comparison of the number of vehicles in possession of a CRL
released at 35,000 s.
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Algorithm 2 Certificate exchange and update algorithm.
my CRL ≡ the CRL held by this vehicle
my CRL version ≡ the version of he CRL held by this vehicle
my diff version ≡ lowest version of CRL
advertised by another vehicle
Begin: Upon receipt of broadcast message m
if (is CRL update(m)) then
if (CRL version(m) > my CRL version) then
CRL diff ← get CRL diff(m,my CRL)
temp CRL← concat CRL(my CRL,CRL diff)
if (check sig(temp CRL, get sig(m))) then
my CRL← temp CRL
my CRL version← CRL version(m)
end if
end if
else
if (CRL version(m) < my diff version) then
my diff version← CRL version(m)
end if
end if
Periodically:
if (my diff version < my CRL version) then
broadcast(create CRL update msg(my CRL,my diff version,
my CRL version))
my diff version← my CRL version
end if
updates are distributed solely by RSUs in both total coverage (the number
of vehicles with the CRL update at the end of the simulation) and speed of
coverage (the rate at which vehicles obtain the CRL update) for any of the
association times that I simulated (i.e., 0.1 seconds ≤ ta ≤ 10 seconds. This
remains true even when the No V2V case uses 325 RSUs while the V2V case
uses only one RSU. In other words, for full deployment scenarios, the case of
1 RSU using V2V passing results in superior CRL update coverage for any
length of association time compared to any number of RSUs simulated with
V2V CRL update passing disabled.
Figure 3.5 shows the case of 1% deployment, which results in slightly slower
CRL update dissemination for V2V passing and ta=0.1 seconds compared to
325 RSUs, but approximately the same number of total vehicles having the
CRL update by the end of the simulation. Increasing the deployment to
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Figure 3.5: Number of vehicles in possession of a CRL released at 9,000
seconds with 1% deployment.
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Figure 3.6: Number of vehicles in possession of a CRL released at 9,000
seconds with 2% deployment.
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Figure 3.7: Number of vehicles in possession of a CRL released at 9,000
seconds with 5% deployment.
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Figure 3.8: Number of vehicles in possession of a CRL released at 9,000
seconds with 25% deployment.
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Figure 3.9: Number of vehicles in possession of a CRL released at 9,000
seconds with 100% deployment.
2%, as shown in Figure 3.6, results in the V2V dissemination matching the
speed of the 325 RSU case but also exceeding the total number of vehicles
reached by the 325 RSU case. Figure 3.7 (5% deployment) shows that V2V
dissemination is better than the 325 RSU case with ta ≤ 5 seconds. For higher
levels of deployment (Figure 3.9, the performance of the V2V mechanism
continues to outperform the RSU-only mechanism for all of the association
times I simulated.
Table 3.6 shows that increasing the association time from 0.1 seconds to
2.0 seconds made little impact on the efficacy in passing CRL updates in
the V2V cases. V2V passing outperforms RSU-only distribution with the
simulated number of RSUs for all deployment levels with ta ≤ 2.0 seconds.
As the deployment percentage increases, V2V distribution benefits and can
still outperform 325 RSUs alone for longer required association times. It is
likely that the association time will be shorter during the initial months of
VANET deployment (e.g., 1–5% deployment) because the channel will be
less congested.
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Table 3.6: Percentage of vehicles with the updated CRL at the end of the
76,000 seconds of simulation and for various levels of deployment (with the
CRL released at 9,000 seconds).
Deployment
Setup 1% 2% 5% 25% 100%
V2V, R=1,
ta=0.1 seconds
91.8462% 96.7692% 98.8076% 99.4307% 99.6119%
V2V, R=1,
ta=1.0 seconds
91.8077% 96.6538% 98.7691% 99.4169% 99.6069%
V2V, R=1,
ta=2.0 seconds
91.5385% 96.6154% 98.7384% 99.4061% 99.5219%
V2V, R=1,
ta=5.0 seconds
82.0000% 92.9615% 97.9460% 99.3338% 99.4457%
V2V, R=1,
ta=10.0 seconds
37.3077% 54.3846% 73.5672% 95.1427% 99.0176%
No V2V, R=325,
ta=0.1 seconds
91.5000% 91.8462% 91.5378% 91.4501% 91.7035%
No V2V, R=300,
ta=0.1 seconds
90.2692% 90.4231% 90.1377% 89.9623% 90.0742%
No V2V, R=275,
ta=0.1 seconds
89.9615% 90.1154% 89.8915% 89.7531% 89.8434%
No V2V, R=256,
ta=0.1 seconds
87.7692% 87.8077% 87.8068% 87.5252% 87.7220%
No V2V, R=64,
ta=0.1 seconds
62.3846% 62.8846% 63.1510% 62.6648% 62.9338%
No V2V, R=16,
ta=0.1 seconds
42.4231% 42.4615% 43.0572% 42.2109% 42.4086%
No V2V, R=4,
ta=0.1 seconds
29.0769% 29.1154% 29.3946% 28.7391% 28.7428%
No V2V, R=1,
ta=0.1 seconds
10.9231% 10.4615% 10.5777% 10.4977% 10.4036%
58
3.6 Related Work
Studer et al. [33] proposed TACKs for certificate organization and vehicle
revocation in a VANET, which I consider to be the most relevant and closely
related scheme to the work I present in this chapter. The authors propose
using group signatures to provide vehicles privacy from authorities. Specif-
ically, TACKs loads vehicles with a number of certificates for a period of
time, after which they will need to be reloaded. During reloading, the reload
request is authenticated using a group signature. The regional authority
(RA) receives this request but cannot identify the exact vehicle from which
the request originated because the RA is not the group manager; that is,
the RA cannot trace a vehicle’s identity based on a group signature. When
a reload request is made, the RA forwards the request to the CA, which is
the group manager which can identify the vehicle. The CA then confirms
or denies the request (i.e., whether the requesting vehicle is revoked or not),
and returns this information to the RA. If the requesting vehicle is trusted,
then the RA issues another batch of short-term certificates, i.e., certificates
that have a short lifespan. Thus, revocation is accomplished by not issuing a
new batch of certificates to revoked vehicles. In the authors’ proposal, RAs
are responsible for small areas of the total network so that vehicles need to
acquire new short-term certificates when entering an area administered by a
different RA. Because revocation is performed in an online manner (i.e., by
denying vehicles new short-term certificates) and because of the geographic
division of the network among RAs, TACKs requires extensive infrastructure
deployment and an online CA. Consequently, TACKs provides a solution for
certificate organization and distribution after VANET deployment is well es-
tablished and infrastructure is broadly deployed. My solution to certificate
organization and distribution focuses on being viable during initial deploy-
ment (i.e., when there is little infrastructure).
Xu [34] and Korkmaz et al. [35] present preliminary ad hoc protocol designs
to support acceptable safety broadcast message reception over a single safety
802.11 DCF channel.
Parno and Perrig [36] discuss various security issues in vehicular networks,
including some attempts to address privacy. They propose methods for se-
curing VANET applications, and the use of anonymizers for preserving a
vehicle’s privacy.
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Hu and Wang [37] propose silent periods between transmissions to improve
privacy. This proposal is generally not feasible for VANET safety applica-
tions. In both of the two preceding papers, the authors do not consider the
issue of revocation.
Raya and Hubaux [38] propose the use of public key ECDSA signatures and
show that computation in a vehicular environment is feasible. The authors
concur that RSUs may be sparse, especially during incremental deployment.
Jakobsson and Yung [39] propose a mechanism called “Magic Ink,” which
provides a way of producing blinded signatures that can be revealed by the
signer if misbehavior is detected. The signers can be either centralized or
distributed. In the latter case, the integrity of the blinded signatures depends
on a (t, n)-threshold scheme. Magic Ink is based on using DSS to produce
signatures. To revoke a signature, the CA can release what the authors call
a signature–view invariant. This invariant has properties that match it to a
specific signature.
Fischer et al. [40] propose a use of Magic Ink with a two-part CA, which
allows the vehicle to remain anonymous during certificate signing. Vehicles
can be tracked or revoked by the CA if t out of n of the CAs cooperate (that
is, a (t, n) threshold scheme is used). However, anonymity from the CA is
lost if the two CA entities share information. With this Magic Ink scheme,
or with any Magic Ink scheme, revocation must be done by matching the
signature-view invariants to the offending certificate’s signature. Matching
these two sets of information is computationally expensive, since a complete
search must be made by the CA of all certificates of all vehicles, and for each
tested signature-view invariant, two shared values need to be multiplied in
a privacy preserving way [41]. Thus, to revoke a single vehicle, all vehicles’
signature-view invariants must be searched, requiring them to be revealed to
a single CA. Consequently, no more privacy from the CA is provided by this
scheme as compared to my proposed scheme. This method also results in
larger CRLs as compared to my mechanism, since revoking a vehicle requires
adding each if its certificates to the CRL.
Online certificate status protocols (OCSPs) serve as an alternative to dis-
tributing CRLs. For an OSCP to be practical for VANET, each vehicle
would need a constantly available connection to the CA. Until DSRC can
provide continuous connectivity between every vehicle and the CA, use of an
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OCSP would require a second wireless technology, e.g., cellular data, to be
integrated into the DSRC system.
Papadimitratos et al. [42] propose a mechanism for distributing CRLs from
RSUs, where they break the CRL into pieces that are encoded using erasure
or fountain codes so that cars that obtain a certain subset of the pieces of the
CRL can fully reconstruct the CRL. The authors investigate the bandwidth
overhead required by their scheme. However, they do not support their
results by vehicle simulation or other empirical data, and the obtained results
are based on an assumption of RSU placement density. Specifically, the
authors’ simulate RSUs placed every 1, 2, and 3 km.
3.7 Summary
I have made two contributions in this chapter. First, I proposed a certifi-
cate organization method where certificates for a single vehicle are related
by a single, secret revocation key. Without this key, certificates are difficult
to group, thereby preserving the privacy of a vehicle. However, a revoked
vehicle’s certificates can be easily identified once the revocation key is dis-
tributed via a CRL. To revoke a new vehicle, the CRL need only increase in
size by one revocation key, regardless of the number of certificates provided
to the revoked vehicle. I presented specific privacy properties of this scheme,
including preserving revoked vehicles’ privacy for messages released prior to
their revocations. I have also shown the real-world performance of my cer-
tificate identifier storage mechanism, a Bloom filter. My analysis has shown
that there is relatively low overhead, in terms of memory cost and required
computational power, in using my storage mechanism.
Second, I have analyzed and improved the practicality of distributing
CRLs. I proposed a mechanism for passing CRL updates, rather than the en-
tire CRL, which reduces the imposed network overhead and is similar to delta
CRLs. Also, I proposed that vehicles be employed to spread CRL updates in
an epidemic fashion. My simulation results show that using epidemic V2V
passing of CRLs obtains better performance for a single deployed RSU than
using 325 RSUs without epidemic V2V passing of CRLs. In other words,
for deploying RSUs, the cost savings of using a system with epidemic V2V
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CRL passing is greater than a factor of 325 when compared to an RSU only
system, and can be used effectively to cover an entire metropolitan area.
Together, these contributions demonstrate that a lightweight privacy-preserving
method for VANET security is possible, even in the case of sparse roadside
infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPACT OF KEY ASSIGNMENT ON
VANET PRIVACY
Generally, a VANET consists of vehicles that are assigned keys by a certificate
authority (CA). The CA signs these keys and cryptographically ties them to
a vehicle or group of vehicles, creating certificates. Vehicles use these keys to
sign messages that they send on a VANET, tying the messages to the vehicle
or group of vehicles. Keys may be assigned to more than one vehicle in
general, and vehicles may have more than one key. Keys need to be assigned
to vehicles for authentication purposes to prevent arbitrary and unauthorized
misuse of a VANET.
Privacy is a central requirement for VANET systems. In this chapter,
I investigate how specific key assignment methods affect vehicular privacy
in VANETs, and I define privacy in this context as the inability to link a
broadcast signature to a vehicle or a usefully small group of vehicles. Though
operating a vehicle already involves significant privacy risks from technolo-
gies such as automated toll collection and automatic license plate recogni-
tion [43, 44], VANETs are unique, in that vehicles use relatively long-range,
non-line-of-sight, radio communications to very accurately advertise their po-
sitions in safety beacon messages. Furthermore, vehicles sign messages using
the keys assigned to them. Periodically, these messages include either a cer-
tificate, certificate digest, or certificate chain, which attests to the validity
of the key [6]. Most of the contemplated VANET designs require VANET
vehicles to regularly broadcast their certificate(s). Even if a certificate con-
tains only the vehicle’s pseudonym, if care is not taken in how the VANET
is designed, and specifically, in how keys are assigned to vehicles, it may be
possible to remotely track individual vehicles in a VANET using their certifi-
cates and signatures. Additionally, I will explain why an efficient revocation
process is required (see Axiom 4.2.2 and Corollary 4.2.4 below). Given this
requirement, it may not be possible to provide the same level of privacy with
a VANET as would exist without the VANET. In this chapter, I evaluate the
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privacy provided by key assignment methods, the robustness of those meth-
ods as defined by the properties I describe in Section 4.3, and the ability of
those methods to maintain VANET security goals.
I divide attempts to preserve privacy into preserving privacy (1) from the
CA or (2) from non-CA entities (e.g., other vehicles). There are many rea-
sons to be interested in providing privacy to vehicles, including protection
from big-brother behavior of governments and corporations, and auto man-
ufacturer concerns about the acceptability of VANETs to consumers. I will
discuss the motivation for providing privacy when I discuss the details of
CA privacy in Section 4.3.1 and non-CA privacy in Section 4.3.2. However,
my primary concern in this chapter is to analyze the viability of various key
assignment methods for a VANET with respect to the privacy and security
those methods provide.
Privacy is significantly affected by how keys are assigned in a VANET.
However, privacy may also be impacted by other factors outside of key as-
signment that will affect the level of privacy a vehicle can maintain. Specif-
ically, it is possible to correlate broadcast VANET data with information
obtained through other methods, such as cameras, and it may be impossible
to defend against determined attackers who use both sources of information.
I will omit a discussion of this tracking problem in this chapter because the
problem exists independent of the key assignment method used, and I am
only concerned with privacy and security issues arising from key assignment
in this chapter.
4.1 Related Work
Generally, privacy for VANETs can be divided into two, not entirely separa-
ble, categories: preventing identity information leakage from credentials (e.g.,
information in certificates that is cryptographically bound together) and pre-
venting unrelated third parties from tracking vehicles and users. These two
categories are not entirely separable because if an unrelated third party can
associate a single vehicle with multiple identities or pseudonyms, then it is
easier for the third party to track the target vehicle or user. My discussion
of previous work will reflect this dichotomy.
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Raya and Hubaux [38] gave a brief introduction to privacy issues in VANETs.
They also propose that vehicles use multiple pseudonyms and that vehicles
should change their pseudonyms periodically. These authors and Do¨tzer [45]
suggest that conditional privacy, that is, using identifying information that
is publicly anonymous but can be linked to a long-term identity (e.g., a VIN)
by the CA, should be used in VANETs so that malfunctioning and malicious
vehicles can be identified.
Do¨tzer provided a variety of privacy topics for VANETs from an automo-
bile manufacturer’s point-of-view [45]. Specifically, Do¨tzer notes that privacy
is an important topic among vehicle manufacturers because customers may
be willing to select a different manufacturer’s vehicles based on which vehi-
cle’s technology is in-line with the customer’s view on privacy matters. In
the category of leaking identity information, Do¨tzer observes that it may be
possible to correlate messages over long periods of time such that identity
information can be recovered by an interested over hearing party. He pro-
poses that changing identifiers at multiple layers may be required to thwart
privacy-compromising adversaries. Implicit in this proposal is the idea that
vehicles will have multiple identifiers, which are likely to be pseudonyms.
However, such identifier changes may not be sufficient if an adversary is able
to identify a vehicle based on its RF fingerprint. The potential of using
analog/RF fingerprinting or radiometric identification to reduce or eliminate
user privacy has been investigated by a number of other authors [46, 47, 12].
Recently, Brik et al. [12] have demonstrated the viability of using radiomet-
ric identification for identifying individual off-the-shelf WiFi cards. For the
purposes of this chapter, I consider RF fingerprinting simply to be a po-
tential mechanism that an adversary could use to link multiple pseudonyms
(or keys below). Do¨tzer [45] also gives example situations of when various
entities might be interested in compromising privacy and proposes that mix-
zones may be useful in trying to reduce an adversary’s ability to link multiple
identifiers together.
A number of other authors have proposed and studied using mix-zones to
enhance user privacy in VANETs and in other networks where users have
high mobility [48, 49, 50]. Mix-zones try to prevent a privacy-compromising
adversary from linking two pseudonyms to a single vehicle by having vehi-
cles stop transmitting for a period of time in a busy location, that is where
there are many vehicles or nodes. Mix zones can work without vehicles
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ceasing to transmit, but this provides little privacy because vehicles’ move-
ments are highly predictable over the time period between safety message
broadcasts. The privacy provided is often measured in terms of the size of
the anonymity set, that is, the number of vehicles in the mix-zone at the
time when pseudonyms are changed, among which the adversary can only
probabilistically link pseudonyms. The main problem with this approach to
mix-zones is that they defeat the purpose of deploying the VANET; that
is, vehicles are not able to use the VANET for safety enhancement in crit-
ical areas of high road-traffic density, such as, intersections, interchanges,
and rush-hour traffic. For the purposes of my investigation in this chapter,
I am less concerned with how a privacy-compromising adversary can link
pseudonyms (or keys in my discussion below) than I am with the effects of
such linking on the privacy provided by various key assignment methods.
Sampigethaya et al. [51, 52] and Jiang et al. [53] investigated using silent
periods. However, like mix-zones, silent periods interfere with the safety-
related goals of deploying a VANET, and silent periods are intended to de-
crease an adversary’s ability to track vehicles using the VANET. Again, for
my investigation in this chapter, I am less concerned with how identity in-
formation might be linked, than I am with investigating the effects of linking
on privacy. Thus, I will not discuss silent periods further.
Group Signatures Others have proposed the use of group signatures for
obtaining privacy while maintaining the goal of binding safety beacon infor-
mation to vehicles, that is, maintaining conditional privacy [36, 54]. Parno
and Perrig [36] have noted that using group signatures can be used at the
cost of not being able to attribute misbehavior to a vehicle, thus failing to
support conditional privacy. However, they also note that there are group
signature schemes that allow a group manager to link a signature to the indi-
vidual group member. Such a group manager could take one of two forms: an
online CA, or another vehicle in the VANET. Important to this discussion
is the topic of road-side units (RSUs), which are fixed-position infrastruc-
ture DSRC radios that the deploying entity (i.e., CA) can use to spread and
gather information pertinent to the VANET (e.g., distribute traffic and road
condition information or gather traffic data for traffic reports). Using an on-
line CA as the group manager is untenable for either or both of the following
reasons: roadways will not support group signatures during incremental de-
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ployment, that is, when RSUs are being deployed, and/or roadways may not
have sufficient RSU coverage due to the cost of deploying such a large number
of RSUs. This latter view was shared by Do¨tzer [45] and more recently by
Resendes [22]. Using another vehicle in the VANET as the group manager
may open the door to a number of additional privacy-compromising attacks.
First, the group manager could be the privacy-compromising adversary; thus,
the privacy of the vehicles in the adversary’s group is trivially compromised.
Second, the mechanism for choosing the group leader may come under at-
tack, for example, if an election algorithm is used, the adversary may pretend
to be multiple vehicles to win the election.
Raya and Hubaux have also noted that group signatures are computation-
ally expensive and therefore may not be suitable for VANETs where vehicles
have insufficient computing power [54]. Lin et. al [55] develop a protocol
to use anonymous group signatures to bind heartbeats to a long-term iden-
tity that is only known by the CA. In their system, every vehicle can verify
the correctness of signatures of every other vehicle’s signatures, but only the
CA can recover the identity from a vehicle’s signatures. Thus, vehicles can-
not differentiate other vehicle’s broadcasts based on signature information.
The authors propose that high-powered processors be used on vehicles to re-
duce the time required for verifying signatures. Specifically, the authors give
7.2 ms as the time required to verify a signature in their scheme. However,
this means that during a heartbeat period (100 ms), fewer than 14 signatures
can be verified by any vehicle. Because of the computational delay imposed
by group signature verification, I will not consider further the use of group
signatures in my discussion of key assignment and privacy in VANETs.
Mathematical Analysis Xi et al. [56] propose sharing keys among groups
of vehicles for the purpose of increasing privacy. The authors acknowledge
that revocation may be slow (i.e., take many revocation events, which I
discuss below) when vehicles have many keys and keys are shared among
groups of vehicles. Consequently, they propose that the CA could require
vehicles to authenticate messages using multiple keys, thus allowing multiple
keys to be revoked per revocation event. The authors begin a probabilistic
analysis of the effects of revocation on vehicles that are not the desired target
of the revocation event. I expand significantly on this analysis and show that
it is not possible to maintain privacy, fast revocation, and protect innocent
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vehicles from falsely being revoked because of revocation events arising from
vehicles that should be revoked.
In previous work [16], Hu and Laberteaux briefly overviewed privacy issues
in VANETs and began a general mathematical analysis of privacy in relation
to the ease of revocation. I continue this work, specifically investigating key
assignment.
4.2 First Principles
In this section, I discuss some of the basic underlying assumptions I make
about the operation of a VANET, and the behavior of users and vehicles in
a VANET. I will build my arguments about privacy in the latter sections of
this chapter on the foundation laid in this section. These assumptions are
similar to the privacy related requirements given by Do¨tzer [45].
4.2.1 Malfunction and Misbehavior
Safety beacons will contain precise information about vehicle positions, ve-
locities, and accelerations. Vehicles will present warnings to drivers based
on information gathered by the vehicle from other vehicles’ safety beacons.
These warnings will inform the driver about potentially dangerous situa-
tions, such as hazardous road conditions, excessive speed approaching curves,
and emergency braking behavior by other vehicles [5]. If these warnings are
presented when there are no hazardous situations, then users may become
desensitized to the warnings, or the warnings themselves may pose a safety
threat. If an attacker can inject falsified packets into the VANET causing this
desensitization or causing accidents because drivers do react to the falsified
warnings, significant harm could be done as a result of the VANET instead
of resulting in the VANET helping reduce vehicle crashes or the severity of
crashes. These undesirable outcomes could also result from erroneous infor-
mation generated by malfunctioning hardware. It is likely that the perverse
attractiveness of these undesirable outcomes will cause some users to inten-
tionally generate falsified safety beacons. It is also likely that hardware will
fail. I state these assumptions in the following axiom.
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Axiom 4.2.1. Some users of a VANET will misbehave or will have equip-
ment that malfunctions.
I mathematically codify this axiom in my use of f , the fraction of the total
vehicles that misbehave or have malfunctioning equipment.
Since vehicles may malfunction and users may misbehave, I want to limit
the amount of damage such behavior can cause in a VANET. I state this
formally in the following axiom.
Axiom 4.2.2. Users that misbehave or vehicles that have malfunctioning
equipment should be excluded from the network in order to limit the damage
caused by these entities.
Specifically, such vehicles and users should be removed from the network.
4.2.2 Implementation
As a consequence of these axioms, safety beacon information should be bound
to a certificate. Binding this information in a certificate allows vehicles to
differentiate between correctly behaving vehicles that should be trusted and
malfunctioning or misbehaving vehicles that should not be trusted. This
binding also provides a mechanism for excluding misbehaving vehicles from
the VANET. I express this requirement in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2.3. In order to differentiate between trusted and untrusted ve-
hicles and to exclude misbehaving vehicles, safety beacon information should
be bound to certificates, belonging to vehicles.
Vehicles may be assigned multiple certificates so that long-term vehicle
behavior, that is, positions, cannot be correlated to a single vehicle. By
changing signing keys, and correspondingly certificates, a vehicle may achieve
greater privacy. Additionally, vehicles may share certificates so that certifi-
cates do not correspond to vehicles in a one-to-one manner. In other words,
observing the use of one certificate multiple times does not equate to observ-
ing a vehicle multiple times. Similarly, observing a vehicle multiple times
does not equate to observing the use of the same certificate multiple times.
Asymmetric cryptography should be used to create certificates and to bind
safety beacon information to vehicles’ certificates. Certificates are a standard
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way of binding information to an entity. Using asymmetric cryptography
makes key distribution easier compared to symmetric cryptography. If a
VANET designer used symmetric cryptography, then vehicles would need to
exchange keys with all other vehicles. This could be done either through
distribution during manufacturing or through ad hoc mechanisms. Vehicles
are not a static population; new vehicles will be added to the VANET, and old
vehicles will be removed from the VANET. Thus, preloading the certificates
of other vehicles onto a new vehicle during manufacturing is not a complete
solution. Using ad hoc mechanisms to distribute symmetric keys without
an online trusted third party introduces security concerns. Consequently,
I choose to assume that asymmetric cryptography is used to bind safety
beacon information to vehicles in the form of certificates. Additionally, using
asymmetric cryptography makes removing vehicles from the network easier.
To remove a vehicle from the network, all of a vehicle’s certificates need to
be invalidated. To invalidate a certificate, the certificate must be revoked.
Corollary 4.2.4. A VANET invalidates a certificate in order to remove or
start to remove a malfunctioning vehicle or malicious user’s radio from the
VANET. This process is called revocation.
Since vehicles do not know all other vehicles initially, a central authority
needs to be established to both attest to the validity of normal vehicles and
revoke malfunctioning vehicles or malicious users. This central authority
generally takes the form of a CA and signs vehicles’ certificates, thus creating
a public key infrastructure (PKI) to organize key information.
4.3 Properties
Using the axioms and the corollaries presented in Section 4.2, I present
properties relating to vehicle privacy, some desirable, some undesirable. A
VANET may possess these properties, or they may arise from employing pri-
vacy enhancing mechanisms. I assume that vehicles are assigned a number
of keys, d. This number, d, may be larger than 1, allowing vehicles to change
or rotate the keys they use to prevent long-term tracking from correlating
safety beacons signed with the same key. Each key may be shared among a
number of vehicles, g, which likewise may be larger than 1. Allowing g to be
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larger than 1 has been proposed as another mechanism for increasing vehic-
ular privacy, making vehicles indistinguishable from other vehicles that have
been assigned that same key [56]. I will also use the result from Axiom 4.2.1
that there is a fraction of revoked vehicles, f . Generally, I will apply these
properties to key assignment methods, which I will discuss in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 CA Privacy
A CA is a centralized organization that signs vehicles’ keys for the purpose of
generating certificates.1 Since a vehicle’s key information must pass through
some CA, the CA often has privileged information about the identity of a
key owner. Because the CA has this information, the CA may become a
useful tool for law enforcement. One specific concern with the CA having
this information is that government law enforcement may subpoena the CA
to enforce the law, including driving violations (e.g., speeding). Auto manu-
facturers are concerned that without CA privacy, a VANET system will not
gain acceptance among buyers for this reason. Other reasons to retain pri-
vacy from a CA include possible misuse by an observing government agency
or employee for political or personal reasons, and the possibility for uninten-
tional leakage. For the latter reason, consider the following scenario. Privacy
from CA(s) is not maintained, and law enforcement uses VANET information
to track vehicles to gather evidence for prosecution. This information will
need to be retained to possibly be presented in a court of law. A side-effect
of having to store this information is the government agency that stores this
information will be a centralized target for hackers who want the VANET
information. User privacy can be reduced through another mechanism if this
information is stored. There have been many cases of government agencies
or their employees leaking privacy-sensitive information in unintended ways,
e.g., a lost USB flash drive [57, 58], a misconfigured web server, or a mis-
placed organizational laptop [59]. Thus, it may be better not to deploy a
VANET where privacy depends on the ability of the CA to keep users’ data
private. It may be possible for the CA to perform its duties (e.g., revoking
vehicles and assigning keys to new vehicles) without retaining information
1In general, it is possible to have multiple CAs for a VANET. For example, one CA
might be a national government and another a state or provincial government. CAs might
even be non-government organizations such as auto manufacturers.
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sufficient for compromising privacy; however, the CA initially has access to
this information since the CA assigns keys, and therefore one must consider
that the CA has access to this privacy-sensitive information.
One way to describe privacy in this context is whether evidence gathered
in the form of vehicle position or speed data signed by a valid key would be
definitive evidence in a court. If it can be demonstrated that this evidence
suffers from an unacceptably high false positive rate, such VANET evidence
should not be definitive in a court, no more than establishing guilt of the
driver because he owns a “blue car.” Such a false positive rate is an un-
acceptably high probability that one vehicle could be mistaken for another
if the distinction between the two is based on only which keys the vehicles
hold. For a VANET, having privacy from a CA means that a CA, even if
subpoenaed, would only know imprecise or unreliable information about the
owner of any given certificate. I describe the condition of a CA having a poor
ability to link a key to a VANET vehicle as having “privacy from a CA.” If
the VANET designer’s goal is to provide maximum privacy to VANET vehi-
cles (above all other considerations), then privacy from a CA is an attractive
attribute. As I show below, maintaining privacy from the CA comes with
significant compromises to other design goals.
Increasing g leads to increasing the number of vehicles among which ve-
hicles are indistinguishable to the CA. Thus, vehicle privacy is increased by
increasing g.
4.3.2 Non-CA Privacy
Maintaining privacy from a non-CA entity may be important for other rea-
sons. If it is possible to remotely track vehicles through their VANET mes-
sages, a corporation (a non-CA entity) may be able to track a user’s shopping
habits and correlate that to the user’s home address. Thus, the corporation
may specifically target VANET users with unwanted advertisements. Addi-
tionally, VANET messages could be used by private investigators to track
the people they are observing.
Generally, increasing d increases privacy from non-CA entities. By as-
signing a large number of keys to vehicles, non-CA entities will not know if
broadcasts signed with two different keys came from the same or two dif-
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ferent vehicles based on key information alone. Care must be taken in how
certificates are constructed so that vehicles cannot be identified by infor-
mation included in their certificates. Clearly, other information, even the
information signed in the broadcast, can be used to reduce a vehicle’s pri-
vacy. Further discussion of using safety beacon information to track vehicles
is beyond the scope of this chapter. Increasing d, however, increases the cost
of revocation, either in the size of the CRL or in the computational cost
of revoking the certificate. I will show below that each of the considered
methods of key assignment provides non-CA privacy.
4.3.3 Revocation
Malfunctioning or malicious vehicles’ false information may harm correct and
innocent vehicles. For example, if a malfunctioning vehicle broadcasts an
incorrect position, another vehicle may display a false warning to its driver.
A malicious vehicle might also cause other vehicles to think the roadway the
malicious vehicle is on is more congested by broadcasting incorrect roadway
congestion information. These false reports may cause deceived vehicles to
take a different route, leaving the malicious vehicle’s roadway less congested.
In the following discussions, I do not distinguish between malfunctioning and
malicious vehicles, describing them collectively as untrusted vehicles.
My discussion of the basic principles which I assume hold for a VANET,
which I gave in Section 4.2, resulted in my deducing that a VANET should
use a PKI structure and asymmetric cryptography to sign packets in order to
protect users from unlimited damage from vehicles that are untrusted. The
CA assigns keys to vehicles, and vehicles use keys to sign messages. Receiving
vehicles assume that messages are valid once they verify the correctness of
the message signature and the validity of the associated key.2
Revocation is a mechanism for protecting correct and innocent vehicles
from the effects of untrusted vehicles. Stated more concretely, a CA revokes
a key by publicly announcing that the key is no longer valid. Receivers thus
distrust any information signed by a key once it learns that a CA has revoked
the same key. As I will discuss in detail below, it is possible for a vehicle to
2Vehicles may also filter messages based on message content, if they determine the
content to be inconsistent or invalid, as proposed by Golle et al. [21]. However, this is
orthogonal to my discussion here.
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have multiple keys. Therefore, it is also possible that a specific vehicle will
have some, but not all, of its keys revoked. An untrusted vehicle, if left with
at least one unrevoked key, can continue to operate with its valid key. Thus,
I stress that a vehicle is not revoked until all d of its keys are revoked.
I define a revocation event as the following sequence of events:
I. One or more entities observe and report to the CA that a vehicle, using
a specific key, acted in an untrustworthy manner.
II. The CA revokes the reported key, and perhaps other keys assumed to
be associated with the reported vehicle (details discussed below). The
CA creates an updated CRL containing these newly revoked keys.
III. The CA uses some method to disseminate this new CRL to all vehicles
in its area of responsibility.
Roughly speaking, a revocation event occurs when a vehicle “gets caught”
acting in an untrustworthy manner while using one of its keys, causing the
CA to revoke one or more of the vehicle’s keys.
I now consider the speed of a revocation process. As I will show below,
there is a tradeoff between revocation speed and privacy. While all three steps
above contribute to the speed of a revocation process, the first and third steps
have previously received consideration in the literature [21, 8, 42, 9] and as
I discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, I focus on the second step in
my discussion below. Since I focus on the second step, instead of specifying
revocation speed in minutes, I define a faster revocation process as one that
requires fewer revocation events.
Intuitively, when a CA receives a report of a vehicle’s use of a specific
key linked to untrustworthy behavior, depending on the information the CA
has, the CA can respond by revoking only one of the vehicle’s keys (i.e.,
the reported key), revoking all of the vehicle’s keys, or some fraction of the
vehicle’s keys. If the mechanism of revocation is to be useful for protecting
correct and innocent vehicles, revocation should be fast. If an untrusted
vehicle’s keys cannot be revoked quickly, vehicles cannot fully trust the PKI
to perform its core mission, i.e., enabling vehicles to identify an untrusted
vehicle at the time of contact. The slower the revocation, the larger the
window of opportunity for untrusted vehicles to damage the VANET. Since
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the creation and maintenance of any PKI is non-trivial and often expensive,
it would be unwise to create a PKI with known slow revocation properties.
I restate my assumption that the number of untrusted vehicles is propor-
tional to n, the total population of vehicles. Therefore, after a settling time,
it can be assumed that f · n vehicles are fully revoked.
4.3.4 Brittleness
If vehicles share keys, i.e., g > 1, then each revocation event may affect
innocent vehicles as well as the target vehicle. If we assume that g is large,
that is, a large number of vehicles share any single key, then revoking all
keys of an untrusted vehicle impacts a large number of users that shared
keys with the now revoked vehicle. As a result, the privacy retained by non-
targeted vehicles is reduced, i.e., the number of pseudonyms or keys for these
non-targeted vehicles is reduced.
For example, suppose there is a VANET consisting of 5 vehicles (n = 5),
each of which is assigned 2 keys (d = 2). Each key is shared by 2 vehicles
(g = 2). Now suppose that one of the vehicles is revoked; that is, all of its keys
are revoked. Assuming that a single vehicle does not share both keys with
the revoked vehicle, then there are two vehicles that have only a single valid
key remaining after the revoked vehicle is revoked. Before the revocation,
for each key, each vehicle could hide among a group of 2 vehicles, itself and
the other vehicle that shares the key with it. However, after the revocation,
the size of this group is reduced to 1. Thus, the privacy of the vehicles who
share keys with the revoked vehicle is reduced because after revocation no
other vehicle shares the keys held by the revoked vehicle. If d were increased
to 3, then the size of the group among which a vehicle is indistinguishable
would also be larger, thus providing more privacy to vehicles. Increasing g
to 3 would increase privacy by increasing the size of the group a vehicle hides
among, but it also would increase the brittleness, that is, the loss of privacy
experienced by innocent vehicles affected by the revocation.
Brittleness can be decreased by increasing d. If a large number of vehicles
lose a key due to a revocation, holding more keys reduces the adverse effect
to non-revoked vehicles.
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4.3.5 Collapsibility
The property of collapsibility reflects how resilient a key assignment method’s
security properties are to key compromise. If a vehicle’s hardware and cor-
respondingly keys are compromised, a significant number of vehicles may be
unable to use their keys to sign safety messages with the security properties
intended by Axiom 4.2.1 and Corollary 4.2.3.
Collapsibility can be decreased by decreasing g. Intuitively, the smaller the
number of vehicles that share a key, the smaller the number of vehicles that
will be affected by a hardware and associated key compromise. Collapsibility
is similar to brittleness in effect, however the two differ in mechanism.
4.3.6 Sybil Attack Resilience
Assigning identities to vehicles raises the concern that misbehaving vehicles
may perform Sybil attacks. If each vehicle holds multiple keys, a malicious
vehicle could use multiple keys simultaneously, giving the attacker an ad-
vantage. This advantage could take many different forms. The attacker
could use multiple identities to artificially congest a roadway and make other
drivers think they should take an alternative path to avoid the congestion.
If revocation is based on voting to determine malfunctioning or malicious
vehicles, then performing a Sybil attack gives the attacker a greater number
of votes. However, if keys are shared (i.e., g 6= 1), then Sybil attacks may
also be performed even if d = 1, giving attackers the same advantage.
4.3.7 Key Collisions
A key collision occurs when two or more vehicles use the same key simulta-
neously and within a 2-hop radio range of each other. When a key collision
occurs, a non-colliding vehicle that overhears both colliding vehicles’ trans-
missions may think that a single vehicle is claiming multiple locations and
is either malfunctioning or malicious. By increasing g, the probability of
having key collisions increases. Key collisions will increase the number of
vehicles wrongfully revoked, and present an opportunity for malicious vehi-
cles to use a shared key to revoke another vehicle’s keys. When g = n, key
collisions may be expected and therefore ignored. Increasing d will decrease
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Figure 4.1: The g vs. d design space explored in relation to CA privacy.
the probability of a key collision occurring, but it also increases the number
of identities a Sybil attacker can immediately use.
4.4 Key Assignment
In this section, I consider what performance various key assignment methods
can provide in terms of the properties given in Section 4.3. The CA is
responsible for assigning keys to vehicles; therefore, the CA will be the holder
of privacy-sensitive vehicle data, such as keys and relationships between keys
and vehicles. The CA keeps these keys so that the CA can revoke untrusted
vehicles. How keys are assigned affects vehicle privacy and the usability of a
VANET.
Key Assignment Design Space For the discussion below, a key assign-
ment method describes how many keys each vehicle will own (d), as well
as how many vehicles are assigned the same key (g). To fully analyze the
g–d design space, I divide the space up into 4 different regions, which are
illustrated in Figure 4.1. I will explore the properties of each of these regions
below. As I will show, the choice of g and d will determine the amount of
privacy available from the CA and from non-CA entities. I specifically in-
vestigate the impact of each key assignment region on the level of privacy
a vehicle can maintain with respect to the CA and with respect to non-CA
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entities. I will also show below that there is a trade-off between how much
privacy a vehicle can maintain from the CA and how quickly a vehicle can
be revoked from the network.
There are three main approaches for assigning a vehicle’s signing keys
which cover the g–d design space, as shown in Figure 4.1:
I. A. There is only one key in the VANET. Each vehicle is supplied with
this same key. (g = n, d = 1)
B. There are many keys in the VANET, and each vehicle has every
key. (g = n,D ≥ d > 1)
II. Each vehicle is loaded with a set of keys. Keys are not shared between
vehicles. (g = 1)
III. Each key is shared among a group of vehicles. (n > g > 1, D ≥ d ≥ 1)
I denote the maximum number of keys possible in a VANET as D, and
the total number of vehicles as n. I assume a fixed D, though D may be
very large. Without making this assumption, the problem of choosing a key
assignment method becomes much harder due to trying to assign keys to
vehicles when g 6= 1 and still being able to provide privacy to vehicles using
newly added keys. I evaluate a static n as an assessment of VANET privacy
properties at any given instance. The result of my analysis below will lead
me to the conclusion that Approach II is the best of the three key assignment
methods.
4.4.1 Key Assignment Approach I
I divide Approach I (g = n) into two sub-approaches: Approach I.A (d = 1)
and Approach I.B (d > 1). In Approach I.A all vehicles are provided with
a copy of the same key. Under this approach, signing a message can be a
simple, symmetric cryptographic operation since the key distribution prob-
lem is trivially solved, and non-repudiation is not possible. Since all vehicles
have the same key, the CA cannot identify which vehicle signed an individual
message based on the message’s signing information. Similarly, no non-CA
entity can tell two signatures apart based on key information alone. Thus,
CA and non-CA privacy is complete with regard to key information. Unfor-
tunately, a single hardware failure or successful attack would result in the
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complete compromise of such a solution, since no message could be trusted
following the compromise of a single shared secret key. Thus, Approach I.A
is extremely collapsible.
One difference between Approach I.A and Approach I.B is that instead of
having only a single key for the entire network, there are many keys, though
each vehicle still shares all of the keys. Approach I.B suffers from the same
problem of collapsibility as Approach I.A: a single hardware compromise re-
sults in all of the keys being compromised, which means no message could be
trusted. Similarly, the CA still cannot identify the transmitter of a message
for revocation purposes. Approach I.B can also suffer from key collisions,
where Approach I.A did not have this problem (since it would have been
anticipated and ignored). However, Approach I.B possesses the same level of
privacy from CAs and non-CAs as Approach I.A did.
Approach I.A and Approach I.B share some common performance in terms
of brittleness and Sybil attack resilience. Both Approach I.A and Approach I.B
are extremely non-brittle, in that the privacy of systems using Approach I.A
or Approach I.B is not reduced by the revocation of untrusted vehicles; how-
ever, the revocation of a single vehicle would result in the collapse of the
VANET. Both Approach I.A and Approach I.B are highly susceptible to
Sybil attacks since correct vehicle behavior and a vehicle misusing the com-
mon key(s) is indistinguishable using safety beacon information alone.
4.4.2 Key Assignment Approach II
Approach II provides each key to only one vehicle (g = 1), i.e., no single key
is held by more than one vehicle. This type of assignment solves Approach I’s
problem with key compromise and collapsibility. The primary advantage of
the second approach, where each key is known only to one vehicle, is that
revocation is efficient: once a single misbehavior is matched to a key, all
the keys belonging to that vehicle can be revoked in a single revocation
event, thus resulting in the exclusion of that vehicle from the VANET. In
this approach, fast revocation can be the same as complete revocation, since
each key is held by a single vehicle. A second advantage of this approach is
that it can provide the property of non-repudiation if public keys are used
for signing. The disadvantage of this approach is that each key uniquely
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identifies a vehicle, raising privacy concerns. Approach II is essentially the
approach I advocated in Chapter 3. In this section, however, I consider
the CA to be a single entity, which may really be a collection of CAs. In
other words, it is possible to divide key information among multiple CAs as
I presented in Section 3.2, but for the sake of simplicity in the analysis here,
I will refer to all CAs collectively as if they were a single CA.
The CA will need to be able to correlate a vehicle’s keys in order to enable
fast revocation. For example, the CA may keep a list of all keys for each
vehicle. These lists may be subpoenaed by a law enforcement agency that
wishes to track certain VANET users. More generally, consider a design that
attempts to protect users’ privacy from the CA by intentionally keeping in-
complete information about users keys at the CA. In such a case, the CA
may not be able to revoke a vehicle in a single revocation event. However, as
discussed in Section 4.3.3, if revocation is not fast (i.e., achieved in a small
number of revocation events), the PKI has diminished value because it is not
performing its function. Thus, even in such a case, there must be a process
to keep revocations fast. In this approach, the same mechanism that is used
to enable fast revocation can also be used for privacy compromise. In other
words, if there is a mechanism that is useful for quickly revoking a vehicle’s
certificates, the same mechanism can be used to compromise a vehicle’s pri-
vacy since the CA must be able to revoke all of the keys of that vehicle and
therefore all the keys must be known to the CA. This linkage between fast
revocation and privacy compromise is true independent of whether a single
CA holds all of the information necessary for revocation or the information
is dispersed among several CAs. Thus, no system based on having a single
vehicle per key (g = 1) can provide both fast revocation and privacy from
the CA. If a VANET designer is willing to sacrifice maintaining complete
privacy from the CA, then this assignment method is tenable.
Since vehicles can be loaded with a large number of keys, d, and keys may
never need to be reused, the non-CA privacy provided by Approach II is high.
Only the CA can know the keys assigned to a vehicle, not non-CA entities if
d 6= 1. Additionally, if d 6= 1 then Sybil attacks are possible. However, since
all keys are unique to their vehicles, there are no key collisions.
Similarly, since vehicles do not share keys with other vehicles (i.e., g = 1),
then Approach II is not brittle. When a vehicle’s key is revoked, the privacies
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of other vehicles in the VANET are not reduced because no other vehicle has
been assigned the revoked key.
4.4.3 Key Assignment Approach III
Approach III provides each key to several vehicles. This approach solves
the problem of a CA definitively knowing which vehicle possesses each key,
since each key is shared among a group of vehicles. However, as shown
below, this improved CA-privacy comes at the expense of slower revocation.
I mathematically explore this trade-off between revocation speed and CA-
privacy below.
Approach III solves the issue of key compromise and collapsibility that Ap-
proach I had since not all vehicles are assigned the same keys in the VANET.
Since d 6= 1 and g 6= 1, Approach III provides non-CA privacy because
signatures are not attributable to individual vehicles (g 6= 1) and non-CA
entities do not know which keys have been assigned to individual vehicles.
Sybil attacks are again possible in Approach III because vehicles are assigned
multiple keys. I include a discussion of the brittleness of Approach III in my
mathematical assessment below.
Approach III attempts to avoid the trade-off of maintaining privacy from
the CA and enabling fast revocation inherent in Approach II. Again, one
goal of sharing keys is that, when law enforcement detects that a vehicle
is using a certain key, they cannot affirmatively link that key back to a
single vehicle. In particular, because other vehicles share the same key, law
enforcement cannot affirmatively prove that a single vehicle was the violator.
It may be desirable to set an even tougher goal for vehicle privacy in this
scenario. Since evidence in a court of law builds a case, it may be desirable
that the information obtained from a VANET be even less probative such
that it cannot be efficiently used to build a case. A casual inspection of
Figure 4.1 may lead one to think that the design space of Approach III is
large. However, practical considerations greatly constrain the the design of
key management of Approach III. Here I list four primary constraints:
Constraint 1 — Assuming the CA can only revoke a single key for a single
reported infraction (the single reported key), revoking a vehicle requires
that each of its keys be individually revoked, which upper bounds the
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number of keys per vehicle (d), if the efficacy of revocation is to be
preserved. Generally this constraint is applicable, but I will discuss
below the case when this constraint does not hold. (At the time a key
is revoked, it may be possible to infer which other keys a vehicle holds
besides the key being revoked. I discuss this possibility in greater depth
below.)
Constraint 2 — If a constant fraction f of all vehicles have had all of their
keys revoked as results from Axiom 4.2.1, then excessive sharing will
result in all keys within the system being revoked. (Intuitively, if each
key is shared by g nodes, and g ≈ 1/f , then all of a vehicle’s keys
will be revoked with high probability. I will investigate this outcome
in mathematical detail below.)
Constraint 3 — A privacy compromiser might observe transitions between
keys. For example, a law enforcement officer may observe a single ve-
hicle speeding, and during this observation, the speeding vehicle tran-
sitions from one key to another. With each additional key observed by
the law enforcement officer, the pool of suspects shrinks. If the num-
ber of keys that the law enforcement officer observes in this way (ρ)
is sufficiently large, but the degree to which each key is shared (g) is
sufficiently small, then the probability that more than one vehicle has
all such keys approaches zero, contravening the objective of providing
anonymity from the CA.
Constraint 4 — Key collisions will cause additional revocations in a
VANET. A designer must mitigate these additional unnecessary revo-
cations by either increasing d or decreasing g.
Considering Constraint 1, it may be possible for the CA to infer which
additional keys are held by a vehicle given a single key from the vehicle.
This situation might arise and be of significance during revocation. Using
the single key reported for revocation, a CA may be able to infer additional
keys held by the offending vehicle, and the CA may use this knowledge to
revoke more than one key at a time. However, this option is not considered by
current approaches. I will show below that for other reasons, mathematically
described, Approach III does not allow for both privacy and fast revocation.
If the CA can infer more than one key given a single key, Approach III simply
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Table 4.1: Privacy design parameters.
g Number of vehicles sharing each key (cars/key)
d Number of keys held by each vehicle (keys/car)
n Number of vehicles in the VANET
ε Probability of false positive
f Fraction of vehicles with all certificates revoked
ρ Number of keys from one vehicle required by a single observer to
break privacy
w Wrongful revocation rate
σ Vehicle encounter rate
C Key collision rate
provides even less privacy. Additionally, any inference method useful to the
CA for revocation purposes will be useful to other agencies for their various
purposes (e.g., law enforcement using inference to more completely track
and ticket speeding vehicles). Consequently, I will not consider the use of
inference by the CA in my discussion below, and I will consider Constraint 1
to apply.
Designers of a VANET must be careful in how they choose the parame-
ters mentioned above. Failing to do so can result in consequences that may
not be immediately apparent. Table 4.1 shows the notation I will use in my
analysis. To illustrate these design decisions and the constraints discussed
above, I consider two bounding cases under two opposite assumptions: com-
plete independence in terms of key assignment, that is, keys are assigned
completely at random, and complete dependence, that is, any two cars that
share a single key in common will also share all of their keys in common.
In the following discussion, I assume g and d are constant, that is, keys are
shared among groups of equal size and each vehicle is loaded with the same
number of keys. A vehicle that has had some keys revoked will have less than
d keys remaining that it can still use. I will justify these assumptions after
presenting my mathematical analysis of privacy for Approach III.
Independent Distribution
Assuming keys are distributed independently, in Approach III, each key is
held by multiple vehicles. Therefore, the CA does not know which vehicle
among the group that holds a certain key is the vehicle being reported for
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revocation. In other words, the CA cannot know from a single revocation
report more than the single associated key, and only one key can be revoked
at a time. Thus, the number of keys per vehicle d must be limited so that
revocation is still an effective mechanism.
Design Assume that all keys are distributed independently in a VANET
that has n vehicles. Let us also only concern ourselves for now with revocation
effects due to the fraction of vehicles, f , that have had all of their keys
revoked. The probability that an arbitrary key is not revoked is equal to
the probability that no vehicle in the group of revoked vehicles holds that
key. Quantitatively, the probability that an arbitrary key is not revoked is
(1 − f)g. I call w the fraction of vehicles wrongfully revoked.3 I define an
innocent vehicle as a vehicle outside the group of justifiably revoked f · n
vehicles. Under the independent key distribution assumption, each innocent
vehicle may or may not share a key with one of the f · n untrusted vehicles.
Consequently, the probability that an innocent vehicle has all of its keys
revoked is
w = (1− (1− f)g)d (4.1)
Equation (4.1) states that for each of a vehicle’s d keys, at least one of the
g − 1 other holders of those keys are in the completely revoked, untrusted
vehicle group.
Above, I mentioned that one metric of privacy is the likelihood of being
correctly or incorrectly identified after an observation. If a vehicle blends
into its surroundings and enjoys high privacy, then the likelihood of it being
misidentified is high. Consider, for example, identification based on hair-
color (high likelihood of misidentification, since many people share the same
hair color), DNA matching (low likelihood of misidentification) and blood
type.4 To aid in the intuition, imagine cases where a court of law tries to
identify a defendant based on some identifier, e.g., hair color, DNA matching,
blood type. Essentially, the higher the likelihood for misidentification, the
3Wrongful revocation may be highly unacceptable to users. The average consumer
may not accept or understand when a vehicle service provider (e.g., repair shop) explains
that their vehicle or VANET safety enhancements are not functioning because some other
vehicles are misbehaving and the network is designed knowing that this could happen.
4Some current resources list blood type as having at least 0.6% likelihood of misiden-
tification. The least common blood type in the United States is AB-, which is present in
0.6% of the population.
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less likely the court will treat the evidence as definitive. Thus, a person who
is identified by some highly shared characteristic, e.g., brown hair, retains a
higher level of privacy than the person who is identified with some unique
characteristic, e.g., certain combinations of DNA markers. This method of
measuring privacy is appropriate for discussing the privacy VANET users
maintain from the CA and those (such as law enforcement officers) that can
subpoena the CA. Over the past few years, protecting privacy has become a
more pervasive issue in society. Thus, VANETs may be unacceptable to users
if governments or police can employ VANET data to issue driving violations,
such as speeding.
Continuing this line of thought, a vehicle that broadcasts identifiers that
are widely shared maintains more privacy from the CA than if it broadcasts
identifiers shared by a small group of vehicles. To illustrate, consider a sce-
nario where a law-enforcement-controlled listening-station receives a VANET
packet from a speeding vehicle. If that packet contains a non-reputable sig-
nature created using a key held by only one vehicle (g = 1), then that vehicle
has essentially no privacy. Via a subpoena to the CA, law enforcement could
use the unique identifier to determine the identity of the vehicle.
If, on the other hand, the identifying key is held by exactly three vehicles
(g = 3), then the vehicle has more privacy than before. Then consider that
law enforcement finds a vehicle shown to hold the offending key and arrest
the vehicle owner. In this case, if law enforcement has no more evidence,
they must admit that there is only a 1/3 chance that they have the correct
driver, i.e., the misidentification rate (given that the defendant is shown to
have the key) is still 2/3. Courts should not convict based solely on such
evidence since it has such a high misidentification rate. Of course, if the key
is held by even more vehicles, the misidentification rate, and thus privacy,
increases.
If instead the law-enforcement-controlled listening-station is able to ob-
serve the same vehicle using two different identifiers, e.g., the speeding ve-
hicle switches from one signing key to a different signing key while being
observed by the listening-station, then the situation changes: assuming that
the keys were assigned independently, the pool of possible vehicles (i.e., ve-
hicles which hold both observed keys) shrinks significantly. I now develop a
general mathematical analysis of privacy when an arbitrary number of cer-
tificates are known to come from a single vehicle.
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Suppose a vehicle behaving maliciously is observed by a law enforcement
officer, and that the officer observes the vehicle using ρ keys. The probability
that a second arbitrary vehicle other than the observed vehicle shares ρ keys5
with the observed vehicle is
ε =
(
g − 1
n− 1
)ρ
(4.2)
ε is the probability ofmistaken identity or of a false positive. I will refer to ε as
the false positive rate below. Again, the false positive rate is the probability
that one vehicle is mistaken for another vehicle based on key information.
Here, the two vehicles can be mistaken for each other because they have
at least ρ keys in common. Consider the following scenario. One vehicle
is observed using ρ specific keys. A second vehicle is compelled to admit
that it also possesses the same ρ keys. In this scenario, the second vehicle
has a probability of being mistakenly identified as the first with probability
ε. One analog of this false positive rate is the false positive rate for DNA
matching between two random people. Under the assumption of independent
key distribution, Equations (4.1) and (4.2) result in a trade-off between the
false positive rate and the wrongful revocation rate, which I will illustrate
below.
Initially, one might think that the false positive rate should be minimized.
However, a high enough false positive rate (e.g., from using keys to identify
rule-breakers) implies that such evidence would not be definitive. In other
words, those that would like to discourage law enforcement from using keys
for identifying suspects would want ε to be so large that such use would be
widely discredited. This argument is similar to the fact that law enforcement
cannot convict a driver of a “green car” simply because they observed a green
car breaking the law; the likelihood of mistaken identification is too high.
Essentially, the larger the ε, the less privacy is sacrificed by VANET users to
the CA.
A false positive may occur if the innocent vehicle and the observed vehicle
share at least ρ keys. If a lower bound, ε′ρ, is specified which provides an
acceptable amount of privacy for a given ρ, then, solving Equation (4.2) for
5In a privacy compromising situation ρ would need to be the number of keys observed
by the privacy attacker.
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g results in
g
(
ε′ρ
) ≥ 1 + (n− 1)ε′ρ 1ρ (4.3)
Thus, g() is Θ(n); that is, given a number of observed keys ρ and a privacy
bound, ε′ρ, as the number of cars n increases, the number of keys held by
each car, g() would also need to increase linearly with n. Additionally, since
g() is Θ(n), (1 − f)g goes to 0 and w =
(
1− (1− f)g(ε′ρ)
)d
goes to 1 as n
goes to∞. w going to 1 implies that once all the f ·n vehicles are completely
revoked, the remaining (1− f) · n innocent vehicles are also revoked. Thus,
Approach III with independent key distribution does not scale with increasing
network size. When the false positive rate (ε), the maximum fraction of cars
wrongfully revoked (w), number of cars (n), and number of connected keys
(ρ) are fixed, I find a bound on d that satisfies Constraints 2 and 3 by
combining Equations (4.1) and (4.3):
d ≥ log(w)
log
(
1− (1− f)1+(n−1)ε′ρ1/ρ
) (4.4)
I now explore realistic designs that keep ε sufficiently large and the im-
pact of that strategy on revocation effectiveness, under the framework of
Approach III and independent key distribution.
Examples Consider the situation in the United States where n ≈ 200
million. Figure 4.2 illustrates some of the design space for the United States.
Figure 4.2(a) shows the number of keys, d, that must be distributed to each
vehicle in the VANET for a given false positive rate, ε (or level of privacy
desired), and various choices of ρ and f . This graph shows that to increase
ε and achieve more privacy, the number of keys assigned to each vehicle d
must increase dramatically or ρ must be decreased for a fixed fraction of
completely revoked vehicles f . Figure 4.2(b) shows the wrongful revocation
rate as a function of the fraction of completely revoked vehicles f for various
choices of g, d, ε and ρ. The dashed line shows the case of w = f . This figure
compares the fractional population size of two groups: vehicles that have been
completely and intentionally revoked (f) and vehicles that are wrongfully
revoked (w). The graph shows that w increases rapidly with increasing f , and
increases rapidly with increasing levels of privacy, ε. Since w increases rapidly
with increasing ε, this shows the trade-off between wrongful revocation and
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Figure 4.2: Privacy performance of independent key distribution.
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privacy. To achieve a plausible level of privacy, that is, a reasonably large
number of vehicles to hide among, e.g., ε = 1
4000
in the graph, and w < f , a
large number of vehicles must share each key; i.e., g must be large (greater
than 1 million in the figure) and the fraction of revoked vehicles must be small
(less than 1 in 100,000 in the figure). To illustrate these results further, when
ε = 10−7, w = 10−4, f = 10−5, and ρ = 2, then d ≈ 110. When ρ increases,
d grows quickly; at ρ = 4, d > 2.7 · 1016. To reduce d to ≈ 320, f cannot
exceed 10−6, but this results in 100 times more innocent revoked vehicles
than rightfully revoked vehicles.
Dependent Distribution
Design Now, assume keys are no longer independently distributed but are
distributed in a completely dependent manner; that is, if any two vehicles
share a single key, then they share each of their keys. At a high level, this
type of distribution will suffer increasingly from wrongful revocation as f
and g increase. The larger the groups of vehicles are, that is, g, the more
wrongfully revoked vehicles there will be.
Consider again Constraint 1 from above in this new manner of distribution.
When a vehicle is reported for revocation purposes, the CA can do one of two
things: the CA can revoke a number δ of a vehicle’s keys or the CA can revoke
all of a vehicle’s keys. A dependent distribution is essentially Approach II
where the CA could keep a list of unique keys held by each vehicle, except
now the CA can keep a list of unique keys held by a single group of vehicles.
Thus, revocation can be fast for this manner of distribution for the same
reasons as revocation could be fast for Approach II above. This results in d
not needing to be bounded for fast revocation purposes.
Since keys are no longer independently distributed, the false positive rate is
ε = g−1
n−1
, and after fixing ε, g ≥ 1+ (n− 1)ε. With a dependent distribution,
ε is no longer a function of ρ. In this design, the false positive rate cannot be
decreased by increasing the number of keys a vehicle holds. The probability
that a vehicle is wrongfully revoked has become w = 1 − (1 − f)g. Again,
the wrongful revocation rate cannot be reduced by increasing the number of
keys held by a vehicle.
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Examples Using the same assumption for the vehicle population in the
United States, Figure 4.3 shows the resulting wrongful revocation rate as
a function of the fraction of completely revoked vehicles, and for various
choices of g and ε. Again, the dashed line shows the case of w = f . In
the dependent case, the resulting privacy ε is solely dependent on g for a
fixed n. This figure shows that for greater privacy (e.g., ε = 1
20000
), the
fraction of vehicles wrongfully revoked is many orders of magnitude higher
than the fraction of revoked vehicles. Thus, keys distributed in a completely
dependent manner is untenable.
Key Collisions
Under either distribution, independent or dependent, because more than one
vehicle can be using the same key at the same time in the same general
location, key collisions will occur. When an observer hears two other “vehi-
cles” claiming two separate locations, each using the same key, the observer
has no way to differentiate between the case of two innocent vehicles using
the same key by coincidence, or one untrustworthy vehicle pretending to be
multiple vehicles. In such cases, an observer may report the common key as
untrusted, with the goal of triggering its revocation. There is a rate at which
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keys will be removed from the VANET due to unnecessary revocations due
to key collisions. These revocations will come from vehicles that overhear
other well-behaved vehicles that happen to be using the same key within the
radio range of the overhearing vehicle (the vehicles whose keys are colliding
need not be within radio range of each other for this to occur). I define σ
to be the rate at which a vehicle encounters other vehicles (e.g., 100 vehicles
per day).
Intuitively, the expected number of revocations due to key collisions is
proportional to the rate at which a vehicle encounters other vehicles, σ, and
the number of vehicles that share each key, g. The expected number of
revocations due to key collisions is inversely proportional to the number of
keys held by each vehicle, d, and the total number of vehicles in the VANET,
n. That is, the more vehicles another vehicle encounters, or the more vehicles
that share keys with that vehicle, the higher the probability that key sharing
vehicles will encounter each other and a key collision revocation will occur.
Conversely, by increasing d it becomes less likely that vehicles that share
keys will use their shared keys concurrently.
Consider a single vehicle which encounters σ other vehicles during some
time period. During this period, suppose that no vehicle changes the key
that it is using. Let C be a random variable that denotes the number of
vehicles encountered by the first vehicle and that have been assigned the key
that the first vehicle is using during this time period.
The probability that a vehicle encounters any number of other vehicles,
i ≤ σ, that hold the key the first vehicle uses during a period is
P (C = i) =
(
min(g − 1, σ)
i
)(
n− g
σ − i
)
(
n− 1
σ
) (4.5)
I make use of the property that
(
a
b
)
= 0, ∀b > a to handle the case where
σ > g − 1. However, not all vehicles that share the key the first vehicle is
using are using that key during this period. K is a random variable describing
how many vehicles are using the same key as the observed vehicle when the
observed vehicle encounters those other vehicles. Thus, the probability that
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C = i and that K = j of the encountered sharing cars are using that key is
P (C = i ∩K = j) =
(
min(g − 1, σ)
i
)(
n− g
σ − i
)
(
n− 1
σ
) (1
d
)j (
1− 1
d
)i−j
(4.6)
In order for a designer to be able to choose system parameters such as d and
g, a useful quantity to know is the expected number of revocations due to
key collisions over some period, which is calculated using the following:
E[C ∩K] =
σ∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
(
min(g − 1, σ)
i
)(
n− g
σ − i
)
(
n− 1
σ
) (1
d
)j (
1− 1
d
)i−j
(4.7)
First, notice that the terms introduced to capture which key a vehicle is
using during a given period, terms that include d and j, are binomial and
not dependent on i. Thus, the expected value contributed by this part is
easily calculated as i
d
. Again, making use of a well known binomial identity,
κ = E[C ∩K] = σ(g − 1)
d(n− 1) (4.8)
This expected value, κ, is the expected number of key-collision-induced re-
vocations over a given period of time per vehicle.
If κ is bounded from above as κ′, holding d constant, then g is bounded
from above,
g ≤ 1 + κ
′d
σ
(n− 1) (4.9)
Conversely, a constant g can be chosen to achieve a lower bound on d. My
analysis, however, is for the initial static situation in a VANET. As the
VANET operates, key collisions and revocations will occur; thus keys will
be removed from the VANET. This key evaporation leads to an increased
probability that two vehicles will be using the same key simultaneously, and
will lead to an accelerating rate of wrongful revocations due to key collisions.
Ignoring the accelerating key evaporation, imagine that vehicles are con-
strained to a fixed area of operation, then the steady-state behavior of the
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Figure 4.4: Expected number of revocations due to key collisions per vehicle
per day. σ (vehicles/day) d (keys/vehicle).
VANET is a complete lack of privacy. Because of the mixing of vehicles in
their overlapping areas, the certificates that are shared by the overlapping
vehicles will all be revoked due to key collisions after a sufficiently long period
of time. Thus, for VANET traffic that is recorded at a single location, there
is no privacy provided to vehicles. In reality, vehicles are not constrained to
a fixed area. However, it is likely that most of the time, a vehicle operates in
the same area, that is, trips made outside some area are relatively infrequent
as compared to “normal” operation.
The result of key collisions is that a designer must increase d to combat
the extra unnecessary revocations. However, increasing d makes revocation
in response to malfunction or malice slower when keys are not assigned in
a completely independent manner, as was the case when I was trying to
preserve privacy and reduce wrongful revocation.
Examples Assume the same vehicle population as above (n = 200 million),
and assume that vehicles encounter each other at a rate of σ (e.g., 100 vehicles
per day). Figure 4.4 shows the expected number of revocations per vehicle
per day with σ (the number of vehicles encountered per day) measured in
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vehicles/day and d being the number of keys assigned to each vehicle. The
dashed line shows κ = 1
n
. Intuitively, one might expect the network-wide
number of revocations per day to be on the order of nκ. Taking g = 100,
d = 10, 000, and σ = 10, nκ ≈ 1. Increasing σ to 1,000 gives nκ ≈ 10.
Discussion
In reality, designers of a VANET may choose a system with the key distribu-
tion lying somewhere between complete independence and complete depen-
dence. The above discussion illustrates that privacy from the CA may be
unattainable while maintaining reasonable network performance (e.g., more
malicious vehicles are revoked than legitimate vehicles, i.e., w < f) using
Approach III.
Reconsider the assumptions that g and d are constants, and allow g to be a
function of the individual key under the mathematical framework developed
above.6 Suppose g is chosen such that glo ≤ g ≤ ghi. For the case of
independent key distribution, the keys that are shared by glo vehicles would
be considered low-privacy keys since there is a smaller population of vehicles
for an individual vehicle holding one of these keys to hide among. The
low-privacy keys provide a smaller ε to vehicles than choosing the constant g
would have provided. Consider also that keys shared among ghi vehicles result
in a larger w; that is, more vehicles are revoked wrongfully. Thus, these keys
have higher risk for revocation than keys distributed with constant g. The
same outcome is obtained if keys are distributed in a completely independent
or in a completely dependent manner.
Consider allowing d to vary from vehicle to vehicle. Let dlo ≤ d ≤ dhi.
If keys are distributed completely independently, vehicles with dlo keys will
have a smaller false positive rate, and thus are low-privacy vehicles. Similarly,
vehicles with dhi keys have a higher false positive rate and are high-privacy
vehicles. This type of distribution implies different classes of service in terms
of privacy for different vehicles. When keys are distributed in a completely
dependent manner, having a non-constant d does not affect either the false
6The mathematics of a scheme where g and d vary are not actually the same. In fact,
having non-constant g and d may make the mathematics of an analysis, such as I have
carried out above, intractable.
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positive rate or the wrongful revocation rate. Thus, allowing g and d to vary
results in both poorer privacy and more wrongful revocations.
Considering the above arguments for how to assign keys to vehicles, I
eliminate Approach III because it cannot provide both CA privacy (large ε)
and fast revocation (small d).
4.5 Summary
If a VANET designer wants to preserve the principles laid out in Section 4.2,
there is only one key assignment method that is viable, that being Ap-
proach II. Choosing Approach II may come with the sacrifice of CA privacy,
but it is the only approach that results in a viable VANET and provides fast
revocation. I have shown that due to collapsibility, Approach I is not viable.
Similarly, I have shown that due to the inherent trade-off between fast re-
vocation and the false positive rate (i.e., privacy), plus the brittleness and
potential evaporation of legitimate keys due to key collisions, Approach III
is not viable.
Approach III is not totally dismissible, though from our analysis, Ap-
proach II provides a superior VANET design. I have investigated two meth-
ods for distributing keys under Approach III, completely independent and
completely dependent distributions. There may be other methods for dis-
tributing keys under Approach III. For example, a geographic-based distri-
bution, where certain keys are assigned to vehicles only within a certain
geographic area, may provide superior performance to the distributions I
have discussed. Geographic distribution may suffer from increased key col-
lisions, due to higher densities of vehicles having been assigned a specific
key, and may be restrictive in the sense that a vehicle’s privacy can only
be maintained while it is within the geographic area in which it is designed
to operate. This latter problem may be important to, for example, college
students or military families who move large distances and take their vehicles
with them. Whether a type of distribution exists that makes Approach III
viable is an open problem for research. As a result, Approach II remains,
where limited CA privacy is possible, but is not able to be retained for ve-
hicles that have keys revoked. I believe Approach II to be superior for key
assignment because the safety properties of the VANET are preserved (e.g.,
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vehicles are removed quickly for infractions through revocation), it provides
a highly non-brittle VANET, and it results in no wrongful revocation, unlike
Approach III.
The loss of CA privacy from Approach II may not be a significant loss
in the big picture of VANET privacy. Tracking vehicles through the use of
information broadcast in safety messages can allow both CA and non-CA en-
tities to reduce vehicular privacy without the need to use keying information.
This tracking problem is fundamental to the long-range, non-line-of-sight na-
ture of radio communications. It may be impossible to prevent a determined
attacker of privacy from reducing vehicles’ privacy because such an attacker
can combine safety beacon broadcasts with information from other sources
such as cameras or automated tolling equipment.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
CRASH AVOIDANCE
5.1 Introduction
Safety applications are one of the driving forces behind the anticipated de-
ployment of VANETs, due to their expected impact in reducing the loss
of life and economic cost of vehicular accidents. Because of the relatively
high importance of safety applications, researchers have studied the effects
of various mechanisms such as authentication mechanisms [19, 7] and power
control [60, 61] on VANET communication reliability. To address another
key concern about the privacy of information broadcast in basic safety mes-
sages, researchers have proposed using privacy preserving mechanisms such
as silent periods [51, 37, 52] and mix zones [48, 49]. Additionally, researchers
have envisioned other services that would use VANETs. Such services could
support intelligent transportation systems [62] or commercial applications
such as advertisement dissemination [63]. All of these proposed mechanisms
and services have an impact on the reliability of communication among vehi-
cles in a VANET. For example, any protocol that adds additional overhead,
or limits the rate or power with which a vehicle sends a basic safety message,
will impact the effectiveness of safety applications. Though previous work
describes such mechanisms, often for safety messages, a critical question is,
given any set of deployed mechanisms, how well will safety applications work?
Previous attempts at answering this question have employed small-scale
simulation, or test beds that do not use actual collisions. Additionally, there
has been a decoupling of network performance measurement from safety ap-
plication performance. In general, previous approaches for analyzing safety
application communication requirements have lacked both realism and scale.
However, due to the high cost of an extensive VANET test bed with mov-
ing vehicles and DSRC radios, an extensive large-scale evaluation of safety
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application communication requirements would be prohibitively expensive.
Furthermore, to test such protocols in collision environments would be even
more expensive and quite hazardous, since safety applications are designed
to yield warnings only in actual emergency situations, so triggering such an
application would require putting a vehicle in a potentially hazardous situa-
tion.
In this chapter, I develop a simulation framework for analyzing the safety
application communication requirements in a way that addresses the prob-
lems of both realism and scale. I use the VANET simulator I developed
in Chapter 2 [7] to conduct simulations of vehicles on a large scale. In my
simulations, I inject accidents into the traffic traces, model a safety applica-
tion, and model the responses taken by drivers. I run my safety application
simulations in various scenarios, and present my results. My scenarios var-
ied vehicles’ transmission powers and authentication mechanisms, and con-
tained different numbers of vehicles. Additionally, I show the communication
requirements for predicting and (usually) preventing the injected collision.
I organize the remainder of the chapter as follows. In Section 5.2, I present
related work, which I follow in Section 5.3 with an overview of how I ap-
proached the problem of analyzing safety applications performance require-
ments. Next, I detail my simulation setup and experimental parameters in
Section 5.4. I present my results in Section 5.5, and conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Previous Work
5.2.1 Privacy Motivation
The key organization and assignment schemes I presented in the previous two
chapters create certificates that are unlinkable for non-CA entities because
they do not know the revocation key or pseudo-random number generator
seed used to create certificate identifiers. Other schemes also provide this
unlinkability based on signatures, either making all signatures look the same
(using a group signature approach) or making the signatures themselves un-
linkable. However, the linkability of certificates is only the beginning of how
privacy might be compromised through VANET communications. Providing
privacy to vehicles from non-CA entities involves more than just certificate
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unlinkability; it also requires the unlinkability of any two messages sent as
long as they are sufficiently far apart in time and distance. (Two updates
separated by 100 ms are unlikely to provide any reasonable level of unlinka-
bility, regardless of the cryptographic mechanisms used.) As I stated above,
previous work has introduced the possibility of tracking vehicles without us-
ing any key-related information simply using vehicles’ broadcast information
(e.g., position, velocity, and acceleration) tracking them based on the known
limits of vehicular physics [21].
Some have proposed the use of mix-zones and silent periods to overcome
this tracking problem. However, using these mechanisms while preserving the
safety properties intended for VANETs and security properties required to
make VANETs useful is both challenging and an open problem for research.
Mix-zones [49] are areas where vehicles’ position information is not broad-
cast in a manner that allows observers to assign a specific safety beacon to a
specific vehicle or vehicle’s key. Additionally, these mix-zones should provide
an opportunity for vehicles to change the key they are currently using in a
manner such that broadcasts made before entering the mix-zone are unlink-
able to broadcasts made after exiting the mix-zone, which are signed with a
different key. Silent periods are times during which vehicles do not broadcast
their safety beacon information.
The central idea of using these two anonymizing mechanisms in a VANET
is to provide an anonymity set [64] for vehicles. An anonymity set is a group
of vehicles among which another vehicle hides and is indistinguishable (at
least to some degree) from other vehicles in the group. Figure 5.1 illustrates
the concept of these anonymizing mechanisms, that is, mix-zones and silent
periods, being used to create an anonymity set. In this illustration, four
vehicles approach an intersection. Using either the availability of a mix-zone
at this intersection or engaging in a silent period, when the vehicles enter the
intersection an observer using only broadcast VANET information should not
be able to correlate the vehicles he observes exiting the anonymity set with
the vehicles he observed entering the anonymity set. Vehicles are shown
entering the anonymity set where solid lines approaching the intersection
turn to dotted lines, and vehicles are shown exiting the anonymity set where
dotted lines in the intersection turn into solid lines moving away from the
intersection. In other words, the observer should not be able to tell which
car took which dotted path through the intersection.
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of an anonymity set.
Mix-Zone Privacy Discussion Mix-zones [50, 49] and silent periods [37,
51, 52] have received much attention in the literature. From some initial
unpublished studies, I believe that mix-zones based on a single intersection
will not provide significant privacy. This is intuitive for two reasons. First,
people do not drive randomly, and they avoid using routes that require them
to turn frequently. Second, roads are generally constructed such that inter-
sections usually have more lanes dedicated to straight-through traffic than
to turning traffic.
However, there is a more fundamental problem with mix-zones. Though
much work has been done on how to use mix-zones to prevent privacy-
compromising attackers from linking keys from a single vehicle when that
vehicle is changing keys, there has not been any work investigating the ef-
fects of mix-zones on safety application performance. In fact, mix-zones
seem as if they would impair safety application performance. To my knowl-
edge, there has not been a conclusive study that measures or proposes the
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communication requirements for VANET safety applications. However, this
direction of research is not devoid of work.
5.2.2 Safety Application Work
Bai and Krishnan [65] provided early field measurements of DSRC perfor-
mance on freeways and an “open-field” test track, using these measurements
to argue about the reliability of various safety applications. The authors
developed an equation based upon the probability of correctly receiving a
safety message at a specified distance (d),
P (application success, d) =
1− (1− P (communication success, d))Tt
T is the window of time during which an application must receive a packet
for it to function properly, and t is the period between safety messages. As
a result of the authors’ field tests, they observe that the probability of a
packet drop seems to be independent from packet to packet, resulting in the
formulation of the equation above. The authors assert values for T for a
few safety applications, but do not provide evidence supporting their claims.
They propose using the above equation, calling it the T -window reliability,
as a metric for safety application reliability. However, the distance in this
equation is static, while vehicles in crash situations are anything but.
Huang and Tan [66] also performed field tests, using two vehicles equipped
with DSRC radios and DGPS receivers, and using extended Kalman filters
to estimate the other vehicle’s trajectory in a collision scenario. The authors
develop a mathematical framework for deciding when to present collision
warnings to drivers based on the probabilities of collision, taking into account
the statistics of sensor measurement errors. Using the data gathered from
the sensors and their corresponding error statistics, the authors simulate
potential collision scenarios, also making use of the data measured by Bai
and Krishnan (which I described in the previous paragraph). The authors
also include communication errors, that is packet drops, in their simulations.
The authors conclude that under their setup broadcasting safety messages
at 5 Hz with a packet delivery ratio of at least 0.5, their collision warning
system is tolerant to communication losses and delays. The authors only
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use two vehicles in their simulations, and they make use of communication
reliability data based on three vehicles. Additionally, the field test data that
the authors use did not result in actual collisions. In another paper [67],
the authors describe more of how they simulated various crash types (e.g.,
intersection violation).
Nekovee [68] developed a deterministic model for deciding if a vehicle col-
lision would occur using vehicle kinematics, driver reaction time, and com-
munication delay. The model applies only to rear-end collisions and only
incorporates two vehicles, which initially travel at the same speed. Nekovee
numerically evaluates the maximum allowed communication delay using an
intelligent driver model based on traffic theory for various road conditions
(i.e., coefficients of friction for icy, wet, muddy, and dry roads). In these
equations, both drivers’ strategies for avoiding the collision is to engage in
maximum braking. In these evaluations, Nekovee models PHY-layer effects
as a combination of deterministic two-ray path loss and log-normal fading.
Instead of simulating MAC-layer effects, Nekovee simply models MAC-layer
interference as an additional loss probability. These numerical evaluations
do not include other crash scenarios, such as intersection violations or lane
changes, and they do not encompass a realistic scenario where there could
be many other vehicles.
Shladover [69] analyzed cooperative intersection collision avoidance sys-
tems (CICAS). He described three different intersections: rural, suburban,
and urban. These intersections had traffic that was progressively more dense,
and correspondingly, Shladover concludes that the urban intersection sce-
nario would result in the worst case communication requirements (i.e., most
vehicles sending information resulting in higher channel congestion). He
specifically notes that due to intersections being spaced closer together in
the urban area, network traffic from one intersection competes with traffic
from neighboring intersections. Shladover does not provide any analysis of
communication latency for CICAS.
5.3 Safety Application Approach
My approach is distinct from the prior work because I inject actual accident
scenarios into traces, simulate the impact of collision-inducing mobility on
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network traffic, and consider scenarios that include a large number of vehi-
cles, not just the vehicles involved in the accident. To provide results with
more vehicles, I used the simulator described in Chapter 2 [7] to conduct
simulations of vehicles on a large scale, injecting accidents into traffic traces.
Simulating accidents in large scale traffic simulations has many advantages
over or enhancements to the previous work in this area. Simulation allows me
to evaluate the reliability of communication at varying distances rather than
at a static distance. Because the simulator I used accurately models MAC-
layer effects, my work has added realism which previous work did not have.
Due to the large-scale nature of the simulations I performed, I can evaluate
the impact of other vehicles’ safety messages on the communications of the
accident vehicles.
Through simulation I investigated the reliability requirements of VANET
communication in various scenarios. My techniques can be expanded to eval-
uate how various road conditions, traffic densities, driver reaction times, and
maximum braking decelerations impact the effectiveness of VANET safety
applications. Thus, my work provides a framework for auto manufactur-
ers, government agencies, and researchers alike to evaluate communication
options and their effects on safety applications. Additionally, I use this
framework to evaluate an implementation of a safety application to show
its communication requirements.
Collision Modeling Summary Because my approach provides a method-
ology for mapping network performance to application performance, my re-
sults will shed light on many other results published in the VANET com-
munity. Specifically, I can determine whether the results of the network and
application layer performance measurements from earlier work show that
VANETs in such scenarios will reliably support safety applications [19, 7].
Additionally, this work provides a baseline for evaluating the effects of
other VANET mechanisms and protocols on safety applications, such as mix-
zones and silent periods, or power control algorithms. Since most current
research on VANETs merely measures network-specific performance metrics,
researchers often do not know the extent to which safety applications are
impacted. Furthermore, without a guarantee of effectiveness, governments
and manufacturers deploying VANETs may be hesitant to deploy a system, or
may choose one that does not function as intended at full market penetration.
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5.4 Methodology
In this section, I introduce my methodology for carrying out my evaluation
via simulation. I also describe how I implemented my Intersection Collision
Warning (ICW) safety application in the simulator. The following structure
outlines the methods I used to analyze safety application communication
requirements.
 Analyzed recordings of actual crashes, observing vehicles traveling with
constant velocities (no deceleration)
 Obtained SUMO traces on a city grid map using randomized vehicle
traffic flows that start and end at peripheral intersections
 Converted SUMO output to simulator input, removing all potential
collisions
 Verified no collision warnings from collision-free data (no false positives)
 Inserted collisions into trace data
 Simulated collision traces and measured results
5.4.1 Crash Data Analysis
I began my work by observing driver behavior in data from actual roadway
crashes. This data was obtained from video recordings of an intersection in
Louisville, Kentucky.1 An analyzed version of this information is freely avail-
able online, though only a small subset of the number of collisions recorded
is available.2 The main observation that I made concerning this data was
that the involved vehicles maintained a constant velocity right up to the time
of collision. This behavior tells us that the involved drivers were completely
unaware of the impending crash beforehand. Furthermore, this obliviousness
validates the intended goal of safety applications such as ICW, that being
the ability to restore a driver’s attention to the road. Consequently, I mod-
eled my driver behavior in the collisions I generated based on this behavior.
1See http://www.e-archives.ky.gov/pubs/transportation/tc_rpt/ktc_05_09_
spr_277_03_1f.pdf.
2See http://path.berkeley.edu/~zuwhan/ztracker/index.html.
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In other words, in my injected collisions, the involved drivers maintain a
constant speed.
5.4.2 Crash-Free Scenarios
Trace Sources There are a number of sources for realistic vehicle traces
that are freely available online and that have been used in previous VANET
simulations [7, 31]. However, these traces are unusable for my purposes
of simulating safety applications because these traces do not respect the
physical extents of vehicles; that is, these traces run vehicles on top of each
other. Thus, these traces do not allow for control experiments and injecting
specific modes and restrictions on collisions. Additionally, these data sets
consist of only a small number of traces, which prevents us from being able
to sufficiently vary traffic density and physical network size. Consequently, I
turned to using traces generated by traffic simulators.
I evaluated two different traffic simulators: VanetMobiSim [70] and SUMO
[71]. I eliminated the former because it exhibited the same faults (i.e., ve-
hicles being run on top of each other) as the realistic vehicle traces. SUMO
also exhibited some of this behavior of not respecting the physical extents
of vehicles, though to a lesser degree. Thus, I chose SUMO to generate my
crash-free scenarios.
Trace Generation I used SUMO to generate an urban layout of roads
placed on a grid, as I show in Figure 5.2. Each block was approximately
150 meters long, each road consisted of 2 lanes in each direction, and each
intersection was controlled by a traffic light. To generate traffic, I specified
traffic flows. I randomly chose the starting and ending location that specified
each flow, and each of these locations was chosen to be on at a peripheral
intersection of the grid. I then used SUMO to route the traffic and generate
vehicle traces.
Next, I converted the SUMO trace output to the format of my simulator.
To do this, I interpolated vehicle positions at a granularity of 0.1 seconds. In
my interpolation, I forced vehicles to have a constant acceleration between
the starting and ending points of the interpolation.
To eliminate any undesired crashes from my initial traces, I removed all
vehicles that came within 3 meters of each other. I found this to occur as a
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Figure 5.2: Urban simulation area.
result of two different mechanisms. First, two vehicles making left turns from
opposite directions frequently resulted in collisions because SUMO placed the
connecting segments of road (on which the left turns were performed) too
close to each other for these vehicles to perform this operation simultaneously.
Second, vehicles enter the simulation area at a specified rate. Since the
vehicles simply appear on the roadway, they may collide with vehicles already
traveling on the roadway.
5.4.3 Collision Injection
To inject collisions of the desired type into my traffic traces, I modified vehicle
behavior in the generated traces, subject to certain criteria. Specifically, I
required colliding vehicles to collide at a minimum angle of 30◦, and traveling
with a minimum speed of 7 m/s. I chose these criteria because I wanted to
ensure collisions occurred at intersections and were representative of more
severe collisions, respectively.
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After a collision, the involved vehicles simply stop. All of the other vehicles
continue to move normally after a crash. I did not modify the movements
of other vehicles in the traces I generated during or after a collision in order
to investigate possible pile-up results of vehicles braking. Vehicles can and
do change their trajectories during and after a collision, which I will discuss
in further detail when I discuss follow-on collision avoidance in Section 5.4.7
below.
5.4.4 Crash Simulation
Finally, I used the traces with my injected crashes in my simulations. I imple-
mented an ICW safety application in the Illinois VANET simulator [7]. I sim-
ulated vehicles sending timestamped safety messages containing the source
vehicle’s position, velocity and acceleration, sent at a rate of 10 Hz. Vehicles
tracked other surrounding vehicles within a range of 100 meters. My ICW
safety application used vehicle dynamics to predict when a potential collision
would occur. The intended output of my ICW application was presenting a
warning to the vehicle’s driver. In order to reduce false positives, the ICW
application only alerts the driver after the vehicle predicts a collision two
consecutive times. I will detail my ICW safety application implementation
in Section 5.4.7 below. I chose to only implement the ICW application be-
cause that was the only accident situation for which I had actual data (i.e.,
the video recordings from Louisville, Kentucky), and on which I could base
my accident reconstruction.
5.4.5 Vehicle Parameterization
In order to conduct my simulations, I needed to parameterize various vehicle
properties, such as, the maximum possible deceleration and driver reaction
time. Table 5.1 shows a summary of the parameters I set and the values of
each that I used. I obtained many of these parameters from previous work.
I chose my coefficient of friction based on work done at the U.S. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) [72]. I chose to use the
minimum measured dry pavement coefficient of friction. Due to how I gen-
erated my vehicle traces using SUMO, I needed a coefficient of friction this
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Table 5.1: Simulation vehicle parameters.
Parameter Setting
Simulation duration 1000 seconds
Crash-free period 300 seconds
Warm-up period 30 seconds
Number of flows 5, 10, 15, 20
Number of vehicles per flow 40, 80
Coefficient of friction 0.89
Driver reaction time 0.5 seconds
Transmission power 0, 10 dBm
Authentication mechanism ECDSA, TESLA
high so that the dynamics of vehicles generated by SUMO were possible, i.e.,
so that under normal circumstances, without any injected collisions, normal
vehicle decelerations were below the maximum braking deceleration.
Consiglio et al. emulated a driving environment for test subjects, mea-
suring their reaction time with different distractions [73]. Specifically, they
measured the time required to respond to a visual stimulus and begin brak-
ing. I use a single value upper bound from their work, rounded to the nearest
0.1 seconds.
5.4.6 Network Parameters
I specified a warm-up period of 30 seconds before I started gathering net-
work statistics. All simulations were 1000 seconds long. I varied vehicles’
transmission power settings across simulations; that is, within a simulation
all vehicles used 0 dBm or all vehicles used 10 dBm for their transmission
power. In all of my simulations, I used either TESLA with attached key
releases or ECDSA for the authentication mechanism (as was developed in
previous work [7]). This variant of TESLA has a minimum 100 ms latency
to verify a packet, whereas the verification delay for ECDSA is essentially 0
since the network density is low enough to not result in significant delay due
to computation. Consequently, I wanted to investigate whether TESLA’s
minimum delay would impair the ICW safety application. I simulated vehi-
cles using the Core 2 processor for performing verifications, as was used in
previous work [7]. For each setting (i.e., number of vehicle flows, number of
vehicles per flow, transmission power, authentication mechanism), I ran 10
108
simulations, each with different randomly chosen vehicle flows and different
collisions.
5.4.7 ICW Safety Application Implementation
In order to test the ICW safety application, I needed to implement it in my
simulator, the details of which are as follows. Vehicles kept a path history of
other vehicles from which they received packets. I used a history of 5 packets.
Vehicles also kept a projection of the future trajectory of these vehicles based
on a constant-acceleration model (i.e., the tracked vehicle continues with
the accelerations it broadcast in its last received safety beacon). If vehicles
were within 2.75 meters of each other at some point along their projected
trajectories, then a collision is possible.
To prevent false positives from my detection algorithm, I implemented the
following restrictions in identifying potential collisions. If the speed of an
involved vehicle at the time of collision was less than 7 m/s (15.7 mph), I
considered the vehicle to be going slow enough to not warn the driver. I
limited the speed in this way because vehicles traveling this slowly are able
to make course changes (i.e., turn) easily, which they may be in the process
of doing. Next, if the involved vehicles were already decelerating at at least
0.5 m/s2, then I considered those drivers already aware of an approaching
intersection, and so I did not warn the driver in this case. Additionally, I
wanted to eliminate false positives resulting from both lane changing and
turning. To do this, I calculated the rate of change of the angle of vehicles’
headings across vehicles’ path histories. If this rate of change was larger
than 1.4 degrees/s, I considered the vehicle to be initiating a lane change
or a turn. Additionally, if the angle of collision was less than 30 degrees,
I considered the vehicle to be changing lanes and that it will not result in
an intersection collision. Finally, I required that the following two criteria
hold before warning the driver. First, the driver must not be able to stop
without maximum braking if the driver begins maximum braking within
0.6 seconds (driver reaction time plus 0.1 seconds of safety margin). Second,
two possible warnings (as fits the above criteria so far) must be detected at
least 0.1 seconds apart (the time period of safety beacons). If all the above
criteria were satisfied, then I warned the driver, and after the duration of
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a driver reaction time, the driver initiated maximum braking to avoid the
collision. When the driver initiated maximum braking, I set a flag in packets
transmitted from that vehicle so that safety beacon packets will warn other
drivers that the initiating driver is emergency braking.
I tuned the above parameters so that there were no false positives re-
sulting from my simulations of my base vehicle traces before any collisions
were injected. In an actual ICW safety application implementation, vehicles
might additionally use map information or other on-board sensor informa-
tion, which could additionally be shared in safety beacons, such as steering
wheel angle. These additional data sources could be used in addition to or
as a replacement for some of the above criteria that I used. I leave the use
of such data sources, further refinement of application-specific criteria, and
other safety applications for future work. I consider it necessary that I sim-
ulated an ICW safety application with no false positives because the total
hours of simulated vehicle driving is many orders of magnitude less than the
number of hours actual vehicles drive daily.
5.4.8 Follow-On Collision Avoidance
Due to space and time constraints, I did not fully implement an emergency
brake warning (EBW) safety application, which I leave for future work, as I
mentioned above. However, to analyze the possibility of follow-on crashes or
pile-ups, I implemented a basic version of the EBW safety application. In my
implementation, drivers who receive an EBW (from a safety beacon packet
containing this flag being set) also engage in maximum braking after the
duration of a driver reaction time. I consider this a possible driver reaction to
seeing a warning presented by the vehicle, that is a “knee-jerk” type reaction.
I then measured whether there were follow-on crashes (i.e., a pile-up) up
to 30 seconds after the initial issued warning. I consider pile-up collisions
occurring later than this time horizon to not be sufficiently realistic since I
am not modeling attentive drivers that could visually observe brake lights.
110
5.5 Results
5.5.1 ICW Crash Avoidance
Figure 5.3 shows the probabilities that a vehicle can avoid my injected col-
lisions for the two transmission powers and authentication mechanisms I
simulated, and for the different traffic flows and effective densities. For each
power setting (x-axis), I show the probabilities (y-axis) for each authenti-
cation mechanism I simulated. The error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals.
Both of these figures show that decreasing transmission power from 10 dBm
to 0 dBm results in a lower probability of avoiding a collision, that is, being
able to predict the collision and warn the driver sufficiently far in advance of
a potential collision. The probability that the initial collision is avoided does
not degrade with more vehicle traffic for the range of settings I explored.
On the contrary, with increasing vehicle traffic density, the reliability of the
ICW safety application appears to increase at the lower, 0 dBm transmis-
sion power setting, though it still results in fewer collisions being avoided
compared to 10 dBm. However, across all simulated scenarios, a significant
fraction of collisions due to otherwise oblivious drivers can be eliminated.
For all the tested number of flows with 40 vehicles per flow, using 10 dBm
transmission power with either authentication mechanism results in at least
96% of intersection collisions being avoided. For 80 vehicles per flow, the
fraction of avoided collisions increases to 99%.
5.5.2 Post-Collision Pile-Ups
Figure 5.4 shows the probabilities for safety application warnings being pre-
sented to drivers (either from my ICW implementation or from warnings
issued by other braking vehicles) and drivers avoiding pile-up crashes after
an initial crash for the same scenarios as in Figure 5.3. For each power setting
(x-axis), I show the probabilities (y-axis) for each authentication mechanism
I simulated. The error bars show the 95% confidence intervals. For some
of the collisions in my results no warnings were presented to the involved
drivers, and so their vehicles did not decelerate. Because these simulations
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Figure 5.3: Probability of crash avoidance in my simulated intersection col-
lision warning safety application for various vehicle flows with 40 and 80
vehicles per flow.
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Figure 5.4: Probability of post-collision pile-up avoidance in my simulated
intersection collision warning safety application for various vehicle flows with
40 and 80 vehicles per flow.
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resulted in drivers not being warned and the collision not being avoided, I
did not consider any resulting pile-ups from these simulation runs.
Figure 5.4 shows different trends for the different transmission powers as
vehicle density increases. As the vehicle traffic density increases, the proba-
bility that all post-collision pile-up type accidents are avoided decreases no-
ticeably for 10 dBm transmission power. For all vehicle density settings with
40 vehicles per flow except 20 flows, the probability of avoiding a pile-up col-
lision decreases. With 20 flows and 80 vehicles per flow, 0 dBm transmission
power results in more pile-up collisions being avoided. This is likely to occur
because of the higher vehicle traffic density resulting in a more well-connected
network and consequently a quicker response to EBWs. Additionally, 10 dBm
transmission power results in more congestion than 0 dBm.
While the trends of degrading performance in terms of avoiding pile-up
collisions as vehicle density increases reflects increased network congestion,
the trend in an actual deployment scenario is not likely to be as steep. Since
I simulated drivers relying on only warning messages to initiate braking to
avoid a pile-up accident, I omitted other significant accident-avoidance mech-
anisms, such as drivers reacting to seeing tail lights or being able to swerve
to avoid an accident.
5.5.3 Vehicle Speed Investigation
Figures 5.5-5.8 show the vehicle final speeds at the time of collision in meters
per second and the speed reduction as a result of drivers reacting to pro-
vided warnings in meters per second for 5, 10, 15, and 20 flows, respectively.
In these figures, “CDF” stands for cumulative distribution function, and
“CCDF” stands for complimentary cumulative distribution function. Each
figure shows results for both authentication mechanisms and power settings,
though most figures do not have any data for 10 dBm transmission power.
This power setting is largely missing because the collisions that usually result
with this power setting come from false negatives; that is, the collision is not
detected, and as such exhibited no reduction in speed.
These figures show that vehicles’ speeds can be significantly reduced prior
to a collision even if the collision is not avoided, thus reducing the severity of
the collision. Again, as I stated above, at lower speeds, some of the collisions
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Figure 5.5: Crashed vehicle speeds in my simulated intersection collision
warning safety application for 5 vehicle flows.
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Figure 5.6: Crashed vehicle speed in my simulated intersection collision warn-
ing safety application for 10 vehicle flows.
116
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Final speed (m/s)
CD
F
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Speed reduction (m/s)
CC
DF
 
 
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
(a) 40 vehicles per flow
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Final speed (m/s)
CD
F
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Speed reduction (m/s)
CC
DF
 
 
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
(b) 80 vehicles per flow
Figure 5.7: Crashed vehicle speed in my simulated intersection collision warn-
ing safety application for 15 vehicle flows.
117
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Final speed (m/s)
CD
F
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Speed reduction (m/s)
CC
DF
 
 
ECDSA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 10 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 10 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
(a) 40 vehicles per flow
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Final speed (m/s)
CD
F
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Speed reduction (m/s)
CC
DF
 
 
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
(b) 80 vehicles per flow
Figure 5.8: Crashed vehicle speed in my simulated intersection collision warn-
ing safety application for 20 vehicle flows.
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that did occur could be avoided if I modeled drivers’ ability to steer to avoid
a collision. For all settings, roughly 50% of vehicles involved in intersection
collisions where warnings were presented to the driver were slowed by at
least 5 m/s. Additionally, approximately 50% of all vehicles involved in
intersection collisions were traveling at 10 m/s or less at the time of collision.
5.5.4 Message Reception Times
Figures 5.9–5.16 show the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for mes-
sage reception time and distance of the last message received before a warning
was issued to a driver for the simulations that resulted in the collision be-
ing predicted, using each transmission power I simulated, and using either
ECDSA or TESLA for authentication. The message times shown are rela-
tive to when the warning was presented to the driver for the scenarios (i.e.,
how long before the warning the last message was received). The message
distances are the distance between sender and receiver at the time of trans-
mission. Each subfigure shows both transmission power settings I tested and
both authentication mechanisms for the different vehicle-flow scenarios I sim-
ulated. The CDFs in these figures that do not reach 1 do so because some
simulations resulted in false negatives (i.e., the injected collision not being
predicted); thus, there is no time or distance at which the message prior to
the warning was received.
Figures 5.9–5.16 show that 10 dBm transmission power results in all mes-
sages using TESLA authentication being delivered between 0.1 and 0.2 sec-
onds before the collision was predicted and the driver warned. No message
is delivered less than 0.1 seconds before the warning was issued because I
simulated using TESLA with attached key releases. Releasing keys attached
to the following safety message implies that the minimum verification latency
for verifying a packet is 0.1 seconds. The lower transmission power of 0 dBm
results in packets being received with less reliability, and thus a receiving ve-
hicle must use information from older packets to predict a collision. I expect
that scenarios with more road traffic (more flows) may result in a reversal
of performance between the two transmission powers. In other words, with
more congested roadways, there will be more loss due to interference at the
higher power setting, which may result in fewer packets being received from
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Figure 5.9: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 5 vehicle flows with 40 cars per flow.
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Figure 5.10: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 5 vehicle flows with 80 cars per flow.
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Figure 5.11: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 10 vehicle flows with 40 cars per flow.
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Figure 5.12: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 10 vehicle flows with 80 cars per flow.
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Figure 5.13: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 15 vehicle flows with 40 cars per flow.
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Figure 5.14: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 15 vehicle flows with 80 cars per flow.
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Figure 5.15: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 20 vehicle flows with 40 cars per flow.
126
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Message reception time (s)
CD
F
 
 
0 dBm, ECDSA
10 dBm, ECDSA
0 dBm, TESLA
10 dBm, TESLA
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Message reception distance (m)
CD
F
 
 
0 dBm, ECDSA
10 dBm, ECDSA
0 dBm, TESLA
10 dBm, TESLA
Figure 5.16: Cumulative distribution functions of the time relative to when
the warning was presented to the driver and the distance at which the last
message was received from the other vehicle involved in the collision, for
each simulated transmission power and using either ECDSA or TESLA for
authentication, and using 20 vehicle flows with 80 cars per flow.
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a potentially colliding vehicle and so packets that are more stale will be used
in predicting a collision.
In all of the plots in Figures 5.9–5.16, using ECDSA for authentication re-
sulted in the safety messages that are used to predict collisions being received
less distant from the time the warnings were issued (smaller message recep-
tion times) and with less distance between the involved vehicles (shorter
distances) compared to using TESLA for authentication. This is intuitive
because in the scenarios I simulated, there is effectively no verification de-
lay for ECDSA-authenticated messages, whereas TESLA-authenticated mes-
sages are delayed for verification at least by 0.1 seconds, and thus, older mes-
sages must be used to predict collisions, if warnings are issued at the same
time independent of authentication mechanism.
5.5.5 Network Performance Comparison
Figures 5.17-5.20 show the fraction of packets successfully received at the
network layer versus distance for increasing numbers of vehicle flows, using
each transmission power and each authentication mechanism. Additionally,
I included data from simulating the 8:45 am trace of Lankershim Boulevard,
as I used in Chapter 2. I included this trace to provide a map between
network performance using real-world trace data and synthetic trace data.
I re-simulated the Lankershim Boulevard traffic using parameters for the
Nakagami fading model based on previous work [74], which differed from
the default NS-2 settings I used in Chapter 2. I have omitted error bars
in these figures for the purpose of improving figure clarity. The data series
from Lankershim Boulevard are labeled as “Lank” in these figures. The data
for ECDSA and TESLA using 5 flows (Figure 5.17) significantly overlap and
thus are almost indistinguishable in the graph.
Progressing from less dense vehicle traffic to more dense vehicle traffic,
there is a reversal of network performance beyond a certain distance between
0 dBm and 10 dBm transmission power. That is, as vehicle traffic density
increases and beyond some cross-over distance, the probability that a packet
is successfully received is higher for 0 dBm than for 10 dBm, which was not
the case with lighter vehicle traffic. In the previous section, I noted that
for any combination of settings, the safety message that triggers or is used
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Figure 5.17: Fraction of network layer packets received versus distance for 5
vehicle flows and Lankershim Boulevard.
129
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Distance (m)
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 p
ac
ke
ts
 re
ce
ive
d
 
 
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 10 dBm
TESLA, 10 dBm
Lank, ECDSA, 0 dBm
Lank, TESLA, 0 dBm
Lank, ECDSA, 10 dBm
Lank, TESLA, 10 dBm
(a) 40 vehicles per flow
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Distance (m)
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 p
ac
ke
ts
 re
ce
ive
d
 
 
ECDSA, 0 dBm
TESLA, 0 dBm
ECDSA, 10 dBm
TESLA, 10 dBm
Lank, ECDSA, 0 dBm
Lank, TESLA, 0 dBm
Lank, ECDSA, 10 dBm
Lank, TESLA, 10 dBm
(b) 80 vehicles per flow
Figure 5.18: Fraction of network layer packets received versus distance for
10 vehicle flows and Lankershim Boulevard.
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Figure 5.19: Fraction of network layer packets received versus distance for
15 vehicle flows and Lankershim Boulevard.
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Figure 5.20: Fraction of network layer packets received versus distance for
20 vehicle flows and Lankershim Boulevard.
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Table 5.2: Cross-over distances beyond which 0 dBm transmission power
results in a higher fraction of network layer packet receptions compared to
10 dBm for 40 vehicles per flow.
Cross-over distance (m)
Flows ECDSA TESLA
5 165 165
10 105 105
15 95 105
20 100 100
Table 5.3: Cross-over distances beyond which 0 dBm transmission power
results in a higher fraction of network layer packet receptions compared to
10 dBm for 80 vehicles per flow.
Cross-over distance (m)
Flows ECDSA TESLA
5 125 125
10 110 115
15 105 110
20 105 105
to trigger a warning always is transmitted from a distance of approximately
20 to 60 meters. Additionally, in Section 5.5.1 I observed that 10 dBm
transmission power always results in the intersection collision being avoided
with higher probability than with 0 dBm. Because these cross-over distances
are beyond the range within which vehicles receive almost all of the messages
they use to predict a collision and finally warn their drivers, the application
layer performance (i.e., avoiding collisions) is lower for 0 dBm compared to
10 dBm. Tables 5.2-5.3 show the cross-over distances for 40 and 80 vehicles
per flow, respectively, for all the flows I simulated and for both ECDSA and
TESLA.
5.5.6 False Positives
Despite the additional detection criteria, I did not eliminate all false positives
from my simulations; false positives still occurred, though only in a small
fraction of my simulations. Figure 5.21 shows the fraction of simulations
that resulted in false positives. The error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals. This data shows that in many scenarios, TESLA results in more
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Figure 5.21: Probability of a false positive in my simulated intersection col-
lision warning safety application for various vehicle flows with 40 and 80
vehicles per flow.
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false positives than ECDSA, though the observed probabilities are within
error bars of each other. Upon further investigation, I found that these false
positives generally result from a vehicle not receiving a fresh packet from
a vehicle, which would indicate the transmitting vehicle is slowing down as
it approaches an intersection, while the stale packet does not indicate the
transmitting vehicle is at all slowing down.
Thus, the latency of TESLA can result in more false positives than using
ECDSA. The rate at which false positives occur due to TESLA’s minimum
latency of 0.1 seconds may or may not accurately reflect real-world perfor-
mance. How aggressive drivers decelerate in the initial traces is controlled by
a parameter set in SUMO. However, the resulting deceleration profile may
not accurately reflect actual drivers. Further study to match the generated
SUMO driving profiles to actual driver deceleration profiles might result in
less of a difference between ECDSA and TESLA in terms of the rate of false
positives.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, I proposed and implemented a simulation framework for
evaluating VANET safety applications and the corresponding settings of
their constituent components (e.g., transmission power, authentication mech-
anism). Using this framework, I analyzed the ability of an Intersection Col-
lision Warning (ICW) safety application to successfully warn drivers suf-
ficiently in advance of a potential collision so that the involved driver can
stop. My results show that for the vehicle traffic scenarios I simulated, a large
fraction of intersection collisions between unaware drivers could be avoided
by employing VANET ICW safety applications. Additionally, even in colli-
sions that were detected by my ICW application but not avoided, the result-
ing damage was significantly mitigated as the half of the involved vehicles’
speeds were reduced by approximately 5 m/s by their drivers reacting to the
simulated warnings before the actual collision occurred. Finally, I analyzed
and presented the communication requirements for my ICW implementation.
As I mentioned in Section 5.4, additional sources of information that were
unavailable in my simulations or that I did not make use of (e.g., steering
wheel angle, or map data) could also be used in deployed instances of ICW
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safety applications. Using these data sources may also lead to collisions being
predicted earlier and a higher fraction of accidents being avoided.
Having constructed the framework that I used in this chapter, I believe that
my framework will allow automobile manufacturers or government agencies
to evaluate safety applications in a low cost and accurate manner in the fu-
ture. My simulation framework directly answers questions regarding whether
specific mechanisms, protocols, or settings will result in sufficiently reliable
communication to support safety applications.
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CHAPTER 6
LOW-COST MITIGATION OF PRIVACY
LOSS DUE TO WIRELESS
FINGERPRINTING
In Chapter 4, I investigated the privacy provided by various key assignment
methods, which is an application-layer issue. However, preventing privacy-
compromising attacks in VANETs is a network stack-wide problem. If a
vehicle can be identified more easily based on its characteristics at other
layers than using its keys, then a privacy-compromising attacker will simply
use the easier method.
Additionally, wireless fingerprinting has a broader application than just
VANETs. Because wireless transmissions have the potential to leak informa-
tion regarding long-term identity, militaries may find it desirable to obfuscate
their transmission signatures so as to avoid being tracked or identified. For
example, in order to hide which units are deployed at which places on a bat-
tlefield or in a war zone, it may be desirable to obfuscate the radio signature
of the communication equipment used by each of the units. Hiding the units’
identity may be useful in preventing adversaries from determining what type
of unit is deployed at each location and whether any unit has taken any
casualties based on earlier encounters.
Besides militaries, consumer device manufacturers, including automotive
manufacturers, may be interested in providing their customers with privacy
preserving wireless devices. However, the cost constraints on such enhance-
ments are likely to be tight given the competitive nature of this area of
application.
Previous work on wireless fingerprinting (also called radiometric identi-
fication) has convincingly demonstrated that commodity hardware can be
effectively identified based on the characteristics of its PHY-layer compo-
nents [12, 75]. Tolerances in these components give rise to identifiable char-
acteristics in the waveform and modulation errors. In particular, prior work
has examined startup transients in the waveform, carrier frequency offset,
I/Q offsets, preamble modulation quality, and QPSK modulation errors. In
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this chapter, I will examine how low-cost techniques can be used to mask the
most distinct parts of wireless fingerprints.
6.1 Previous Work
Do¨tzer [45], in his analysis of VANET privacy issues, identified wireless fin-
gerprinting as having the potential to be used to distinguish among vehicles.
Remley et al. [76] studied the feasibility of identifying wireless LAN (WLAN)
cards via their “electromagnetic signatures.” In the controlled environment
of an anechoic chamber, the authors measured two cards from each of three
manufacturers using a vector signal analyzer (VSA) and a high-speed oscil-
loscope. The authors presented figures of the cards’ output in the frequency
domain (from the VSA) and of the start of the signals from each card in the
time domain (from the oscilloscope). These figures show that one can vis-
ibly distinguish among manufacturers and between each card from a single
manufacturer. The authors also presented limited data supporting the hy-
pothesis that the antenna radiation pattern is a distinguishing feature among
device manufacturers. The authors concluded that radiometric identification
of WLAN cards is feasible, but more testing outside of controlled environ-
ments was necessary. The authors also concluded with questioning whether
identifying individual cards (even from the same manufacturer) is a reliable
mechanism for authentication.
Brik et al. [12] answered this final question in the affirmative and provided
a taxonomy of using RF features of physical hardware to identify the specific
hardware in use. The authors presented their system, PARADIS, for using
radiometric measurements to identify individual radios among a large set of
802.11 commercial devices, all being from the same manufacturer. Using
various classification algorithms, the authors were able to identify individual
devices under varying channel conditions and across a long span of time with
over 99% accuracy. The authors briefly mentioned that their results may have
serious privacy implications but left further investigation of privacy issues as
future research. It is from this point that I launch my work regarding provid-
ing privacy, nullifying the possibility of such privacy-invasive measurements.
The authors stated early in their paper that radiometric identification has
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long been practiced by military and corporate entities, the details of which
are unpublished.
Edman and Yener [75] described their experimental setup for determining if
radiometric identification can be accomplished reliably with hardware much
less expensive than vector signal analyzers, as used by Remley et al. and
Brik et al. Edman and Yener also used their setup, based on USRP2 software
defined radios1 to attempt to impersonate laptop-based nodes. That is, by
recording many 802.11b frames, they trained their software defined radio
attacker to reproduce the modulation attributes (e.g., average phase error
and frequency offset) of the legitimate laptop-based nodes. Using the same
support vector machine (SVM) classifier as Brik et al., the authors were
able to impersonate other nodes with a 55% rate of success. The authors
stated that their motivation for using software defined radios rather than
vector signal analyzers was to use a more likely real-world setup, one that
was much less expensive to deploy than in previous work. However, even
software defined radios are far too expensive for automobile manufacturers
to justify using them for DSRC radios. Consequently, if techniques to modify
a transmitter’s wireless fingerprint are to be deployed, much cheaper solutions
need to be found and demonstrated.
Bauer et al. [77] investigate an eavesdropper using the received signal
strength (RSSI) of packets and a k-mean clustering algorithm to link trans-
missions from different sources in a wireless LAN. In addition to the authors’
experimentation, they provide an overview of privacy techniques and leak-
age across the network stack. The authors show that an attacker with only a
small number of listening posts can distinguish between different transmitters
using a vector of RSSIs (each individual measurement coming from a differ-
ent listening post) with 77-85% accuracy. Using this clustering, the authors
show that an eavesdropper using this clustering knowledge can additionally
use it to increase his accuracy in identifying sources and destinations of en-
crypted HTTP traffic. Finally, the authors implement two privacy preserving
techniques for mitigating privacy loss due to RSSI measurements: directional
antennas and transmission power control. Using both of these mechanisms
simultaneously, they show reduced clustering accuracy by almost 50%. In
their final discussion, the authors note that their techniques for mitigating
1See http://www.ettus.com.
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privacy loss due to RSSI measurement are imperfect for a number of differ-
ent reasons. Specifically, transmitters cannot perfectly know or predict the
exact fading of wireless signals and so do not know if a certain placement of
a directional antenna or a certain lower power setting will result in better or
worse interference in the wireless LAN, or if wireless LAN connectivity will
be sufficiently reliable.
Danev and Capkun [78] experiment with using transmitter start-up tran-
sients, custom hardware, and various statistical techniques for classification
on transmissions from sensor network nodes. The authors investigate their
classifiers’ performances in static environments and show that changing an-
tenna polarization (i.e., orientation) results in the shape of the start-up tran-
sients changing.
D’Andrea et al. [79] derived what they called “Modified Cramer-Rao Bounds
(MCRBs).” These bounds are looser, lower bounds than the Cramer-Rao
bound. The Cramer-Rao bound is a lower bound on the variance in an esti-
mated parameter for unbiased estimators. The authors derive three MCRBs
for the cases when the estimated parameter is the frequency offset, phase
angle, or symbol timing epoch, and specifically note that their derivation
applies to QAM and PSK signals. The consequence of this work in relation
to my proposed work is that a compromiser can only estimate the wireless
fingerprint of a transmitter with so much precision for a given duration of
time that he observes the transmitter. Of specific interest to my work here
is their MCRB for frequency offset estimation, which I will expand upon in
the next section.
6.2 Theory
In order to make standards-compliant devices relatively cheap to manufac-
ture, standards bodies allow for tolerances in the analog waveform modulated
by a wireless network interface device. Additionally, recent work indicates
network interface devices are not always made to strictly follow specifica-
tions [80]. For example, for a brief period of time before the preamble, a
node may emit meaningless but very device-specific transients. Likewise, the
modulation parameters allow for some limited amount of error. When some
error is systematic based on characteristics specific to a particular hardware
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device, one can gain information about that device. More formally, using
information theory,
I(X;T ) = H(X)−H(X|T )
where X is the observed phenomenon, T is the condition that the transmitter
is a specific node, H(X) is the entropy of X, and I(X;T ) is the mutual
information between X and T , that is, the amount of information that X
gives us about T .
In general, when there are a set of independent errors X1, . . . , Xn, the
information from each error can be aggregated as
I({Xi};T ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;T )
Thus, even if each form of modulation error contributes only a few bits of
information, the aggregate information from all of the errors may be sufficient
to identify a single transmitter out of a large group. If I can introduce
sufficient noise in the error X that is produced by any particular transmitter,
I can drive H(X|T ) closer to H(X), reducing the mutual information and
reducing the certainty of identification, and thus privacy reduction resulting
from wireless fingerprinting.
According to Brik et al. [12], carrier frequency offset is the most telling
characteristic for identifying an individual device. Consequently, I will focus
on frequency offset in the following discussion, though this bound could be
derived for other distinguishing characteristics. D’Andrea et al. [79] derived
an equation for a MCRB for estimating the carrier frequency offset of a signal,
σ2 =
3TN0
2pi2E0(LT )3
(6.1)
where N0 is the noise power spectral density, T is the symbol time, L is
the number of symbols observed, and E0 is the total received energy. If we
assume that a privacy compromiser can correctly receive transmitted data
(e.g., he has a DSRC radio), then the bound becomes
3N0
2pi2E0T0
2 or
3
2pi2T0
3B
1
SNR
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where T0 is the total duration of the transmission and B is the bandwidth.
This bound is applicable under the following assumptions:
I. The privacy compromiser’s estimator is unbiased; that is, the expected
value of the estimate is the actual carrier frequency offset.
II. The channel noise is Gaussian distributed.
III. The privacy compromiser uses maximum likelihood estimation, which
means he achieves the bound.
Suppose the system allows frequencies in the range (f0−∆, f0+∆), where
f0 is the nominal center frequency. Let the true frequency (fc) be a random
variable with probability density function
p(fc) =
1
∆
q
(
fc − f0
∆
)
where q() with support (−1, 1), and thus p() has support on (f0−∆, f0+∆).
The number of different resolvable frequencies is
N = 2I(fc,fˆc)
where I(fc, fˆc) is the mutual information between fc and fˆc. With an AWGN
channel, the noise is independent of the carrier frequency. Consequently, the
probability density function of fˆc is
p(fˆc) =
1
∆
q˜
(
fˆc − f0
∆
;
∆
σ
)
where
q˜(u; x) =
1√
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
q
(
u− y
x
)
e−y
2/2dy
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The mutual information can be derived as
I(fc, fˆc) = E
[
log2
p(fˆc|fc)
p(fˆc)
]
(6.2)
= E
[
log2
p(ε)
p(fˆc)
]
(6.3)
= log2
2∆
σ
+ E [log2(σp(ε))]− E
[
log2(2∆p(fˆc))
]
(6.4)
= log2
(√
2
pie
∆
σ
)
−
∫
∞
−∞
log2
(
2∆p(fˆc)
)
p(fˆc)dfˆc (6.5)
= i
(
∆
σ
)
(6.6)
where
i(x) = log2
(√
2
pie
x
)
−
∫
∞
−∞
q˜(u; x)log2 (2q˜(u; x)) du
In the first line of the above equation, I apply the definitions of mutual
information and conditional probability. In the second line, I apply the
definition of fˆc and the independence of ε and fc. By multiplying the top
and bottom of the fraction in line 2 and applying the division identity for
logarithms, I arrive at line 3. To derive line 4, I apply the expectation and
use the fact that ε has a Gaussian distribution.
If we assume p(fc) is uniformly distributed over the interval (f0−∆, f0+∆),
then q(u) = 1
2
, if |u| ≤ 1 and q(u) = 0 otherwise, and thus,
p(fc) =


1
2∆
|fc − f0| ≤ ∆
0 else
This results in q˜(u; x) = 1
2
[Φ(x(u+ 1))− Φ(x(u− 1))], where Φ(x) is the
normal probability cumulative distribution function. Currently, I believe
choosing p(fc) to be a uniform distribution results in providing the optimal
number of identities, or conversely, requiring the privacy compromiser to be
able to resolve more bits of the frequency offset. In the next section, I will
describe how a transmitter can set fc with inexpensive hardware. Assuming
the privacy compromiser can achieve the modified Cramer-Rao bound, the
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total number of identities that the compromiser can resolve is
N = 2i(∆/σ) ≈ 2∆
√
piBT0
3
3e
SNR (6.7)
where B is the signal bandwidth.
As a result of Equation (6.7), there are a number of methods for reducing
a privacy compromiser’s ability to resolve individual vehicles. First, we can
force the attacker to only receive with low SNR, but this is impractical be-
cause the compromiser is allowed to be anywhere, and consequently, put his
receiver anywhere. Reducing the SNR otherwise will result in poorer network
performance for the intended uses of the VANET. Second, we can reduce the
signal bandwidth, but this has the adverse effect of reducing the rate at which
vehicles can communicate, which is also unacceptable. Third, we can reduce
∆, but this requires using crystals of higher quality, which may be expensive.
Finally, we can limit the amount of time an attacker can observe by limiting
the length of time a transmitter uses an individual frequency, fc.
6.3 Implementation of Low-Level Low-Cost Error
Modulation
There may be low-cost ways of introducing new, easily modulated errors that
mask the original sources of error. Specifically, for each of the identifying
characteristics in the previous work, I suggest inexpensive mechanisms that
hide the imperfections of the corresponding components. Figure 6.1 shows
potential high level diagrams of architectures that could be used in implement
my suggestions.
 Startup Transients Data could be modulated even before the
preamble is sent in order to minimize the distinctiveness of startup
transients. Because previous work in startup transients tends to exam-
ine the phase noise during startup, sending an input on the I and Q
channels should help obfuscate startup phase noise that is specific to
each radio.
 Carrier Frequency Error Carrier frequency error could be intro-
duced in a variety of ways, including using digital potentiometers to
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Obfuscating
Data Encoder
FPGA
(a) Implementation in the digital domain using an FPGA
Inverse FFT
and DACData Encoder
(b) Implementation in the analog domain using variable amplifiers
Figure 6.1: Implementation design strategies for fingerprint obfuscation. The
shaded boxes represent the novel contributions of this proposal.
heat a crystal in a crystal oscillator or capacitor in an LC oscillator’s
tank circuit, thus changing the frequency of the oscillator over time.
A technique with lower latency might be changing the voltage on the
input to a voltage controlled oscillator (VCO), thus changing the fre-
quency error simply by changing the voltage input to the oscillator.
Additionally, frequency synthesizers or direct digital synthesizers could
be used, which would allow direct digital control over the carrier fre-
quency. Finally, additional precision may be obtainable using timing
rather than a strict hardware-only implementation. For example, to
obtain more precision in generating a voltage (i.e., to adjust a VCO), a
pulse-wave modulated (PWM) signal could be generated and smoothed
using a low-pass filter (e.g., a large capacitor and resistor pair). This
example solution could allow for a lower-cost DAC than a hardware-
only solution. Some precision could be provided by hardware (i.e., a
DAC) and the remainder by a timer and a PWM signal.
 Modulation Components In this category I consider I/Q offsets,
preamble modulation quality, and QPSK phase and amplitude modula-
tion errors. In general, any modulation component could be modified in
the digital domain, that is, in software, simply by modifying the I and
Q values. For example, a transmitter can rotate the entire constellation
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by φ, by using
I ′ = I · cos
(
pi
2
+ φ
)
cos pi
2
and Q′ = Q · sin
(
pi
2
+ φ
)
sin pi
2
A transmitter can perform this modulation either all the time, during
specific parts of the packet (such as the preamble), or only for specific
values of I and Q. The main disadvantage to this approach is that it
requires a substantial number of extra bits in the DACs required for
outputting I and Q, because if the number of extra bits is small, then
any movement of I and Q would be large. This disadvantage disap-
pears, however, in multi-carrier systems such as OFDM (which will be
used by VANETs) because all of the digital OFDM frequency-domain
modulation is done in a high precision inverse fast Fourier transform
(IFFT) right before the DAC (as illustrated in Figure 6.1(a)); inputs
to this IFFT can be at an equally high precision.
Another way to introduce changes to modulation is in the analog do-
main by adding separate variable gain amplifiers for the I and Q signals
as soon as they enter the analog domain. A transmitter can thus choose
different gains and can shift the points of the constellation as it chooses.
Figure 6.2 shows a possible architecture for these obfuscators. However,
if these privacy obfuscating techniques produce transmitters that cannot be
identified via wireless fingerprinting but results in a system that cannot re-
ceive any data, then the techniques is of little importance. Consequently,
building such an obfuscating radio that results in a viable system is an open
area of research. Before any such system can or should be built, an investi-
gation via simulation can be performed to validate the expectations of the
privacy gained by any proposed introduction of errors. I will describe my
investigation via simulation of carrier frequency error introducing techniques
in Section 6.5.
6.4 Coordinated Identity Shift
In certain circumstances, a node may have limited ability to inject noise into
measured phenomena. For example, a node’s startup transient may be very
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Figure 6.2: Architecture of my proposed DSP-based PHY-layer identity ob-
fuscating radio.
short, limiting a node’s ability to effectively and substantially modulate that
noise. My goal, however, is not to ensure that every packet is indistinguish-
able from every other packet. In general, when a collection of packets is
inherently tied together, such as by protocol or addressing [37], obtaining
privacy against wireless fingerprinting does not help overall privacy. As with
many other security properties, a privacy-preserving system is only as strong
as its weakest link, since an attacker that cannot identify a node with wireless
fingerprinting could simply use MAC or network addresses instead. Thus,
I propose to only shift identities at the physical layer when there is a shift
in higher-layer identities, as previously proposed by Do¨tzer [45]. In previous
work, Jiang et al. [53] developed a protocol for collision-free MAC address
changes. In a vehicular system or other system that desires privacy from
wireless fingerprinting, a change in higher-layer certificates (as in IPSec [81],
TLS [82], or otherwise) should be coordinated with a change in network-layer
address (e.g., IPv6 Address Privacy[83]), link-layer address (e.g., [53]), and
physical-layer properties (as I propose).
Another reason for coordinating identity shifts is that the na¨ıve approach
of changing PHY-layer identity with each packet gives rise to an attack where
the attacker eliminates the introduced noise by averaging over a large number
of packets that are all associated with the same higher-layer identity. For
example, if a transmitter changes the I/Q offset of each of its packets by
offsetting each element of a QPSK constellation equally, an attacker can
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measure the I/Q offset of all packets corresponding to a single higher-layer
identity, thus measuring X + Z where X is the I/Q offset introduced by
the transmitter’s hardware and Z is the average I/Q offset introduced by
the transmitter’s intentional modifications. However, when averaged over a
sufficient number of measurements, Z will exhibit insufficient noise to retain
strong privacy, further reinforcing the need for coordinated shifts in identity.
6.5 Simulation Analysis
To evaluate the effectiveness of privacy obfuscation techniques, I simulated
a privacy compromiser in software. I simulated both the VANET environ-
ment (802.11p) and a potential hardware radio design in order to evaluate
whether or not the attacker can achieve the bound on the number of resolv-
able identities for carrier frequency offset. By simulating this environment,
I am also able to evaluate the effects of interference on a simulated privacy
compromiser, which would otherwise be prohibitive to implement in terms
of cost, space, and time.
6.5.1 Attacker Model
Figure 6.3 shows the model of my simulated privacy compromiser (attacker).
In my simulations, I made the assumption that the compromiser will be
able to receive transmitted data and he will know the number of transmit-
ters. Thus, his problem is to decide which transmissions are from the same
transmitters. I used QPSK modulation, as QPSK is expected to be used
for transmitting VANET safety beacons [84]. I modeled the channel as an
AWGN channel, which I also simulated with and without interference from
other vehicles. The attacker used maximum likelihood estimation to esti-
mate the frequency via differentiating the phase error and a least-squares
regression. Simulated in this way, the attacker is able to almost achieve the
bound for an AWGN channel.
Because the attacker needs to decide which transmissions belong to the
same vehicles, his choice of decision algorithm is important. In order for my
proposed wireless identity changing techniques to be useful, as I noted in the
previous section, a vehicle’s identity at other layers also needs to be changed
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Figure 6.3: Simulated privacy compromiser model.
in a coordinated manner. Thus, I consider that the vehicles an attacker
observes enter a mix zone or participate in a silent period, through or during
which the observed vehicles change their identities. Thus, the attacker’s goal
is to match identities between the transmissions he heard before and after
the vehicles change their identities. In other words, the attacker observes
two sets of packets from the observed vehicles: one set before the mix zone
or silent period and one set after the mix zone or silent period.
Because an attacker can easily link transmissions either before or after a
mix zone or silent period, I only consider that the attacker needs to match
transmissions and vehicles between sets. The transmissions are likely easily
matched either before or after by using any or all of the following information
that is likely to be the same across multiple packets: MAC address, network
address, signing certificate. Additionally, the attacker should easily be able
to link transmissions using the known dynamics of vehicles (e.g., vehicles do
not teleport) to link transmissions. This linking must be possible in order
for safety applications to be effective. Consequently, I model the number
of transmissions that the attacker receives from a single vehicle as a single
long packet. For the frequency offset estimator I described above, the at-
tacker need only match phase between received packets and concatenate the
transmissions to emulate this model.
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Table 6.1: Parameters for simulation analysis of privacy attacker.
Parameter Setting
SNR 36 dB
Phase noise Colored Gaussian (AD 4106)
Frequency switching precision 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22 bits
Vehicle group size 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120
Packet size 100 bytes
Number of received packets 10
6.5.2 Methodology
In this section, I describe my methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of
the attacker (whose methods of resolving carrier frequency offsets I described
above) in resolving vehicles’ radiometric identities based on carrier frequency
offset. I summarize my choices of parameters in Table 6.1, and explain how
I arrived at those chosen parameters below.
Channel I modeled the channel as an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel, per the theory I developed in Section 6.2. I parameterized the chan-
nel using the baseline noise for 802.11p channels at -96 dBm, as set in NS-
2 [15]. Considering that an attacker is free to use directional antennas and
place his antennas (theoretically) any where he chooses, I chose to use a rel-
atively high received signal strength of -60 dBm for all of the packets the
attacker receives. Thus, the attacker’s SNR was 36 dB.
Phase Noise I modeled the phase noise of transmitters’ carrier frequencies
based on the AD4106 frequency synthesizer.2 I chose to model phase noise
using the phase noise data from this part’s data sheet because it contained
data at 5.8 GHz, which is very close to the 5.9 GHz DSRC carrier frequency.
From the data sheet, I used the phase noise measurements of -83.5 dBc at
1 kHz, -85 dBc at 10 kHz, and -115 dBc at 1 MHz. I generated phase noise
using this data and a colored Gaussian noise model.3
Phase noise serves as an additional noise source that could obscure a ve-
hicle’s radiometric identity. Additionally, with the colored Gaussian phase
2See http://www.analog.com/en/rfif-components/pll-synthesizersvcos/
adf4106/products/product.html.
3See http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/
8844-phase-noise.
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noise model, a vehicle’s carrier frequency can drift slightly during and across
packets.
Interference Interference from other vehicles’ transmissions may also serve
to obscure the radiometric identity of a single vehicle, and specifically in my
simulations, I investigated the effects of interference on the ability of an at-
tacker to use carrier frequency offset as a source of wireless identification. To
parameterize my simulations, I used my VANET simulator, as I described and
used in Chapters 2 and 5, to simulate a section of Zu¨rich, Switzerland [31].
The specific trace I chose to simulate to gather statistics on interference
was from the partial trace located in the center of the city (specifically, the
Zentrum-Bellevue high density trace). I used the first 1000 seconds of this
trace. The trace covered an area of approximately 4.7 kilometers x 4.0 kilo-
meters and contained on average 1280 active vehicles at any time. I chose
to simulate such a large trace (e.g., compare the size of the traces I used
in Chapter 2, which were approximately 500-550 meters in length and 8-14
lanes wide) in order to reduce edge effects. Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) show the
probability density function of the number of interfering transmissions and
the relative power of interfering packets during this trace, respectively. To
generate this data and these figures, I recorded the distributions of the num-
ber of interfering transmissions and the power of interfering transmissions.
The spike at -99 dB in Figure 6.4(b) is an accumulation of all interfering
transmissions that are -99 dB or lower in power. The powers shown in this
figure are relative to the received signal strength of the received packet.
In the simulations below, I will show data gathered from simulating the
attacker’s ability to identify vehicles both with and without interference. If
an attacker simply deploys (roughly) omni-directional antennas, then the
attacker will have to deal with interference. However, it may be possible
through a combination of intelligent placement of antennas and the use of
directional antennas for the attacker to eliminate (or largely mitigate) the
effects of interference. Thus, in my simulations below, I will also investigate
attackers who are either immune or susceptible to interference.
Signal Duration An attacker’s effectiveness in using carrier frequency off-
set to resolve a vehicle’s identity depends on the duration of the signal, or
cumulative signals the attacker receives from the vehicle. I simulated safety
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Figure 6.4: Interference data gathered from my simulations of central Zu¨rich,
Switzerland.
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messages being 100 bytes long, and the attacker receiving 10 packets from
each vehicle. Thus, if vehicles broadcast safety beacons at the rate of 10 Hz,
10 packets corresponds to the attacker overhearing a vehicle for 1 second.
Carrier Frequency Switching I simulated vehicles switching their carrier
frequencies by having them divide the defined range for carrier frequencies,
[f0−∆, f0+∆], by the number of identities a vehicle can assume. I varied the
number of identities each vehicle could assume by varying the precision of
their carrier frequency switching, that is, the number of bits of precision with
which vehicles could change their carrier frequency. I varied this precision
from 8 to 32 bits.
Rank I chose to use rank as the metric to evaluate the effectiveness of my
suggested carrier frequency switching mechanism and the attacker’s ability to
identify vehicles. Rank provides a straightforward metric for understanding
an attacker’s ability to match vehicles and is both more clear and more
broad than entropy. The core idea behind rank is that instead of using a
single piece of information, e.g., carrier frequency offset, an attacker may
use multiple pieces of information together to finally identify a vehicle. Such
other information might take many forms, such as a learned training set of
how vehicles behave at an intersection, including which lanes they turn from
and the probabilities that they turn or go straight. Thus, an attacker could
simply identify a group of most likely candidate vehicles using a single piece
of information (e.g., carrier frequency offset) for later refinement with other
information.
Rank works as follows. An attacker sorts a list of vehicles in order of most
likely match to least likely match, according to the information he has. If
a vehicle is the x most likely vehicle in this list (i.e., the first x), then the
vehicle is identified with rank x. Also, the vehicle is identified with rank
x′ ≥ x. Thus, by running multiple trials, I am able to assemble statistics
on an attacker’s ability to identify vehicles using carrier frequency offset as
the probability that an attacker identifies a vehicle within a specific rank,
that is P (Rank ≤ x). Additionally, previous work has used rank to evaluate
privacy [37].
Using the vehicle trace from Zu¨rich, Switzerland, as I described above, I vi-
sually observed the trace and identified a busy intersection. From the results
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of my earlier simulation of this trace, I determined the effective transmission
range in this trace (50% probability of reception at the network layer) to be
152 meters. I recorded the number of active vehicles within 152 meters of the
identified intersection, which varied across the duration of the trace between
65 and 121 vehicles. Thus, I modeled the attacker needing to match vehicles
within groups of size 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, and 120 vehicles.
In my simulations, the goal of the attacker was to identify or rank vehicles
correctly between two observation times. That is, the attacker overhears a
group of vehicles once and then the vehicles switch identities. The attacker
knows the size of the group of vehicles, that the same vehicles are present
in both groups, and the number of bits of precision with which each vehicle
adjusts its carrier frequency.
6.5.3 Results
First, I verified that my proposed attacker model could achieve the MCRB
in Equation (6.1). Simulating my attacker listening to 1000 vehicles (i.e.,
running 1000 tests) and using only background noise (i.e., no oscillator phase
noise, interference, or carrier frequency switching), I found that the variance
on the attacker’s estimated frequency offsets was 1.44σ2. Thus, my attacker
model is very close to but does not achieve the bound. Again, it may not
be possible to achieve the bound since MCRBs are looser lower bounds than
actual Cramer-Rao bounds.
Additionally, based on the setup I detailed in the previous section, Equa-
tion (6.7) predicts that for an attacker that receives 10 packets, vehicles will
require 22.63 bits of precision in varying their carrier frequencies. I rounded
this to the nearest number of bits, 22, for the following simulations using a
single setting for the number of bits of precision.
Attacker Estimator Performance
I first began by evaluating the performance of the attacker’s estimator by
simulating the attacker without the effects of phase noise or interference.
Figure 6.5 shows the attacker’s ability to rank vehicles with no phase noise
and no interference. This figure shows that vehicles can maintain perfect
privacy using 22 bits of precision, as predicted by our theory. Using fewer
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Figure 6.5: Varying number of bits of precision for frequency switching effects
on privacy attacker’s ability to rank vehicles for identification based on carrier
frequency offset, using a group size of 100 vehicles, without phase noise and
without interference.
bits of precision causes the amount of privacy a vehicle can maintain to
rapidly decrease.
Observed Group Size
Next, I investigated the effects of group size on the attacker’s ability to
identify vehicles based on carrier frequency offset. I enabled phase noise
in my simulations, and all results that I present below were measured with
phase noise enabled.
Figure 6.6 shows the effects of group size on the attacker’s probability of
correctly ranking vehicles for identification, having simulated the attacker
with and without interference. Each data series is the result of 100 tests.
The theoretically worst that the attacker can do in terms of ranking vehicles
is P (Rank ≤ x) = xgroup size , that is, random guessing. The data series
in these figures approximate this bound, implying that the attacker gains
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no information from carrier frequency offset, when vehicles use 22 bits of
precision for switching their carrier frequency identities.
Bits of Precision
Next, I varied the number of bits of precision with which vehicles switch their
carrier frequency. I experimented with various bits of precision with group
sizes of both 20 and 100 vehicles. Again, each data series below represents
100 runs.
100 Vehicles Figure 6.7 shows the probability that an attacker assigns a
given rank to a vehicle with various numbers of bits of precision for carrier
frequency switching and with and without the effects of interference. I per-
formed all runs with a group size of 100 possible vehicles. Thus, in these
figures a line with slope 1
100
represents random guessing.
In Figure 6.7(a), using 18 bits for carrier frequency switching results in
the attacker having approximately as good a chance at identifying a vehicle
using carrier frequency offset as using random guessing. If vehicles reduce
the number of bits of precision they use to 16, the advantage gained by the
attacker is minimal but non-zero. However, with only 8 bits of precision,
the attacker has a distinct advantage and can even identify a vehicle directly
(i.e., rank equal to 1) with greater than a 50% success rate.
Figure 6.7(b) shows how effective the attacker can be if he is able to ignore
or is immune to interference. In this figure, 18 bits also results in attacker
performance that approximates random guessing, while 16 bits gives the
attacker a small but noticeable advantage. The attacker’s advantage with
16 bits is larger without interference than with interference. Reducing the
number of bits of precision further still to 8 bits results in the attacker being
able to directly identify a vehicle (i.e., rank equal to 1) with greater than 80%
accuracy and 97.4% accuracy when considering the two most likely vehicles
(i.e., rank less than or equal to 2).
Thus, there is a clear advantage for the attacker that can eliminate or is
immune to interference from other vehicles, if vehicles must use less than
18 bits for switching their carrier frequencies. However, independent of the
attacker’s susceptibility to interference, vehicles can use 18 bits of precision,
requiring 4.63 fewer bits of precision to maintain perfect privacy compared
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Figure 6.6: Effects of group size on privacy attacker’s ability to rank vehicles
for identification based on carrier frequency offset.
157
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Rank
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y(R
an
k ≤
 
x)
 
 
8 bits
12 bits
14 bits
16 bits
18 bits
(a) With interference
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Rank
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y(R
an
k ≤
 
x)
 
 
8 bits
12 bits
14 bits
16 bits
18 bits
(b) Without interference
Figure 6.7: Varying number of bits of precision for frequency switching effects
on privacy attacker’s ability to rank vehicles for identification based on carrier
frequency offset, using a group size of 100 vehicles.
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to the 22.63 bits predicted by Equation 6.7, which is based only on back-
ground noise. If vehicles cannot use 18 bits of precision, there is a clear
advantage for the attacker that is immune to interference, and his advantage
increases rapidly as the number of bits of precision decreases. In other words,
to mitigate this advantage, the switching functionality requires more bits of
precision. However, since obtaining more bits of precision results in higher
cost (at least for a hardware implementation of carrier frequency switching),
maintaining perfect privacy for carrier frequency switching may not be ob-
tainable using a hardware-only solution on a tight budget. On the other
hand, some privacy can be preserved with lower cost implementations.
Both of these figures show that phase noise provides 4.63 bits of privacy,
independent of the attacker’s ability to eliminate interference. If the attacker
uses equipment with a higher quality carrier frequency source, vehicles will
obtain fewer bits of privacy from phase noise. However, imperfections or
non-linearities in the RF front-end may also contribute more noise to the
carrier frequency estimation. Again, on the other hand, these non-linearities
and imperfections could be used by an attacker to further characterize and
identify a vehicle’s radio.
Figure 6.7(a) shows the attacker’s ranking ability with interference. The
data in this figure appears to approach an asymptote for series besides the
“16 bits” and “18 bits” series. This asymptote does not appear (besides a
maximum probability of 1) in Figure 6.7(b), which shows the same scenarios
but without the effects of interference. Consequently, the asymptote shown
in Figure 6.7(a) represents the limit of accuracy an attacker can achieve due
to estimation errors induced by interference. Additionally, in each of these
figures, as the bits of precision are decreased, the advantage the attacker can
gain rapidly increases, quickly approaching each scenario’s respective limits.
20 Vehicles Next, I reduced the group size to 20 vehicles. Figure 6.8
shows the attacker’s ability to rank 20 vehicles varying vehicles’ bits of pre-
cision for carrier frequency switching, and for an attacker susceptible and
immune to interference. These figures also show a sharp drop-off in privacy
when vehicles use less than 16 bits of precision. Scaled by group size (i.e.,
normalizing the x-axis to 1) for figures with both 20 and 100-vehicle group
sizes results in approximately the same attacker performance for either group
size. Again, vehicles obtain almost perfect privacy with 16 bits against an
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attacker susceptible to interference but require 18 bits against either attacker
to approximate random guessing. Finally, these simulations show again that
group size does not affect whether vehicles can maintain perfect privacy.
6.6 Summary
Enhancements to PHY-layer privacy could have a very far-reaching effect.
Not only would the ability to hide PHY-layer attributes enable VANET pri-
vacy, but it could also do the same for standard WiFi or cellular devices.
Governments may also find this ability useful for protecting the secrecy of
covert operations or simply the identities of their agents and workers.
Without the ability to provide unlinkability at the PHY layer, upper layer
privacy techniques will not be able to provide vehicle privacy. Attackers are
likely to take the path of least resistance in terms of using information at
various layers to track or identify vehicles.
Governments and manufacturers intend on deploying VANETs in the next
five years. Manufacturers are unlikely to make major changes to designs of
components during that time span. Additionally, vehicle designers need to
keep costs of additional vehicle equipment to a minimum to maintain their
company’s competitiveness. Consequently, low-cost solutions for VANET is-
sues are important for their acceptability to manufacturers and their adoption
within such a short time span.
As a further consideration, the method of introducing these privacy pre-
serving mechanisms and their actual implementation are also of concern. For
example, if a single automotive manufacturer introduces such enhancements
and other manufacturers do not, then until other manufacturers do introduce
similar privacy preserving enhancements, an attacker can gain information
about vehicles using or not using such privacy enhancing methods. In other
words, if an attacker can tell that a vehicle shifted its carrier frequency, and
only, for example, Toyota implemented such a mechanism, then the vehicle
shifting its carrier frequency leaks a small amount of information about its
identity. However, this issue may be unavoidable given that deployment is
likely to be incremental. Additionally, the way in which such privacy en-
hancements are implemented may also result in a leakage of privacy as do
specific network stack implementations [85].
160
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Rank
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y(R
an
k ≤
 
x)
 
 
8 bits
12 bits
14 bits
16 bits
18 bits
(a) With interference
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Rank
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y(R
an
k ≤
 
x)
 
 
8 bits
12 bits
14 bits
16 bits
18 bits
(b) Without interference
Figure 6.8: Varying number of bits of precision for frequency switching effects
on privacy attacker’s ability to rank vehicles for identification based on carrier
frequency offset, using a group size of 20 vehicles.
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